Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David O. Brink, Kenneth Kunen and Mirabeau and committee

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26 ideas

4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / b. Axiom of Extensionality I
13030 Extensionality: ∀x ∀y (∀z (z ∈ x ↔ z ∈ y) → x = y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / c. Axiom of Pairing II
13032 Pairing: ∀x ∀y ∃z (x ∈ z ∧ y ∈ z) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / d. Axiom of Unions III
13033 Union: ∀F ∃A ∀Y ∀x (x ∈ Y ∧ Y ∈ F → x ∈ A) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / f. Axiom of Infinity V
13037 Infinity: ∃x (0 ∈ x ∧ ∀y ∈ x (S(y) ∈ x) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / g. Axiom of Powers VI
13038 Power Set: ∀x ∃y ∀z(z ⊂ x → z ∈ y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / h. Axiom of Replacement VII
13034 Replacement: ∀x∈A ∃!y φ(x,y) → ∃Y ∀X∈A ∃y∈Y φ(x,y) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / i. Axiom of Foundation VIII
13039 Foundation:∀x(∃y(y∈x) → ∃y(y∈x ∧ ¬∃z(z∈x ∧ z∈y))) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / j. Axiom of Choice IX
13036 Choice: ∀A ∃R (R well-orders A) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / k. Axiom of Existence
13029 Set Existence: ∃x (x = x) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / n. Axiom of Comprehension
13031 Comprehension: ∃y ∀x (x ∈ y ↔ x ∈ z ∧ φ) [Kunen]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 4. Axioms for Sets / o. Axiom of Constructibility V = L
13040 Constructibility: V = L (all sets are constructible) [Kunen]
8. Modes of Existence / A. Relations / 4. Formal Relations / b. Equivalence relation
18465 An 'equivalence' relation is one which is reflexive, symmetric and transitive [Kunen]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
2850 How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]
2848 Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
2851 Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
2853 Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
2852 Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
2849 Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 1. Purpose of a State
19855 The purpose of society is to protect the rights of liberty, property, security and resistance [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
19856 The law expresses the general will, and all citizens can participate [Mirabeau/committee]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 3. Constitutions
19861 There is only a constitution if rights are assured, and separation of powers defined [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 2. Freedom of belief
19858 No one should be molested for their opinions, if they do not disturb the established order [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 3. Free speech
19859 Free speech is very precious, and everyone may speak and write freely (but take responsibility for it) [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 2. Political equality
19857 All citizens are eligible for roles in the state, purely on the basis of merit [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 4. Property rights
19862 Property is a sacred right, breached only when essential, and with fair compensation [Mirabeau/committee]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 4. Taxation
19860 Everyone must contribute to the state's power and administration, in just proportion [Mirabeau/committee]