40 ideas
11897 | A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P] |
11898 | Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P] |
11883 | A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P] |
11889 | Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P] |
11877 | An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P] |
11882 | No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P] |
11886 | There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P] |
11909 | Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P] |
11899 | Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P] |
11906 | The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P] |
11894 | Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P] |
11887 | Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P] |
11890 | De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P] |
11892 | Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P] |
11893 | Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P] |
11884 | The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P] |
11905 | Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P] |
20289 | Ethics is universalisable - it must involve an impartial and universal view of things [Singer] |
20286 | Following an inner voice for morality is irresponsible in a rational agent [Singer] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
20282 | The sanctity of a human life depends either on being of our species, or on being a person [Singer] |
20278 | 'Marginal utility' says something is more useful if it is in short supply [Singer] |
20281 | Why should I do anything for posterity? What has posterity ever done for me? [Singer] |
20276 | Conflict of rules might be avoided by greater complexity, or by a hierarchy of rules [Singer] |
20290 | Psychopaths may just be bored, because they cannot participate in normal emotional life [Singer] |
20288 | You can't condemn violent revolution without assessing the evils it prevents [Singer] |
21997 | In Marxism the state will be superseded [Singer] |
20287 | If 49% of the population can be wrong, so can 51% [Singer] |
21993 | Materialist history says we are subject to incomprehensible forces [Singer] |
20277 | Equality of interests is a minimal principle, not implying equal treatment [Singer] |
20279 | Equality of opportunity unfairly rewards those lucky enough to have great ability [Singer] |
20285 | If a right entails having the relevant desire, many creatures might have no right to life [Singer] |
20284 | Why should a potential person have the rights of an actual person? [Singer] |
20283 | Killing a chimp is worse than killing a human too defective to be a person [Singer] |
11907 | Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P] |