Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for David O. Brink, Robert Grosseteste and Michael Tye

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8 ideas

9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 2. Substance / b. Need for substance
By comparing qualities and features, reason can gradually infer the nature of substance [Grosseteste]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
Are sense-data independent, with identity, substance and location? [Tye]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink]
Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink]
Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink]
Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink]
Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink]
How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink]