11 ideas
| 2572 | Logical truth seems much less likely to 'correspond to the facts' than factual truth does [Haack] |
| 2570 | The same sentence could be true in one language and meaningless in another, so truth is language-relative [Haack] |
| 16083 | Aristotelian matter seriously threatens the intrinsic unity and substantiality of its object [Gill,ML] |
| 2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
| 2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
| 2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
| 2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
| 2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
| 2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
| 17006 | Prime matter has no place in Aristotle's theories, and passages claiming it are misread [Gill,ML] |
| 16093 | Prime matter is actually nothing and potentially everything (or potentially an element) [Gill,ML] |