22 ideas
15575 | Knowledge is not a static set of correct propositions, but a continuing search for better interpretations [Polt] |
13479 | Given that thinking aims at truth, logic gives universal rules for how to do it [Burge] |
8132 | We now have a much more sophisticated understanding of logical form in language [Burge] |
17622 | We come to believe mathematical propositions via their grounding in the structure [Burge] |
16901 | The equivalent algebra model of geometry loses some essential spatial meaning [Burge] |
9159 | You can't simply convert geometry into algebra, as some spatial content is lost [Burge] |
16902 | Peano arithmetic requires grasping 0 as a primitive number [Burge] |
15568 | When we consider possibilities, there must be something we are considering [Polt] |
16892 | Is apriority predicated mainly of truths and proofs, or of human cognition? [Burge] |
9382 | Subjects may be unaware of their epistemic 'entitlements', unlike their 'justifications' [Burge] |
8126 | Anti-individualism says the environment is involved in the individuation of some mental states [Burge] |
8127 | Broad concepts suggest an extension of the mind into the environment (less computer-like) [Burge] |
8129 | Anti-individualism may be incompatible with some sorts of self-knowledge [Burge] |
8131 | Some qualities of experience, like blurred vision, have no function at all [Burge] |
3115 | Are meaning and expressed concept the same thing? [Burge, by Segal] |
2848 | Two people might agree in their emotional moral attitude while disagreeing in their judgement [Brink] |
2851 | Emotivists find it hard to analyse assertions of moral principles, rather than actual judgements [Brink] |
2853 | Emotivists claim to explain moral motivation by basing morality on non-cognitive attitudes [Brink] |
2852 | Emotivists tend to favour a redundancy theory of truth, making moral judgement meaningless [Brink] |
2849 | Emotivism implies relativism about moral meanings, but critics say disagreements are about moral reference [Brink] |
2850 | How can emotivists explain someone who recognises morality but is indifferent to it? [Brink] |
14349 | If there are no finks or antidotes at the fundamental level, the laws can't be ceteris paribus [Burge, by Corry] |