54 ideas
1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
23590 | Criminal responsibility can be fully assigned to each member of a group [Walzer] |
23578 | Double Effect needs a double intention - to achieve the good, and minimise the evil [Walzer] |
23564 | Deep ethical theory is very controversial, but we have to live with higher ethical practice [Walzer] |
20595 | You can't distribute goods from behind a veil, because their social meaning is unclear [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20592 | Complex equality restricts equalities from spilling over, like money influencing politics and law [Walzer, by Tuckness/Wolf] |
20549 | Equality is complex, with different spheres of equality where different principles apply [Walzer, by Swift] |
23568 | If whole states possess rights, there can be social relations between states [Walzer] |
23571 | States can rightly pre-empt real and serious threats [Walzer] |
23572 | Just wars are self-defence, or a rightful intercession in another's troubles [Walzer] |
23581 | The aim of reprisals is to enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |
23582 | Reprisal is defensible, as an alternative to war [Walzer] |
23588 | With nuclear weapons we have a permanent supreme emergency (which is unstable) [Walzer] |
23580 | States need not endure attacks passively, and successful reprisals are legitimate [Walzer] |
23587 | Nuclear bombs are not for normal war; they undermine the 'just war', with a new morality [Walzer] |
23567 | Even non-violent intrusive acts between states count as aggression, if they justify resistance [Walzer] |
23570 | The only good reason for fighting is in defence of rights [Walzer] |
23573 | For moral reasons, a just war must be a limited war [Walzer] |
23577 | Napoleon said 'I don't care about the deaths of a million men' [Walzer] |
23593 | Jus ad bellum and Jus in bello are independent; unjust wars can be fought in a just way [Walzer] |
23574 | The duties and moral status of loyal and obedient soldiers is the same in defence and aggression [Walzer] |
23575 | We can't blame soldiers for anything they do which clearly promotes victory [Walzer] |
23584 | Rejecting Combatant Equality allows just soldiers to be harsher, even to the extreme [Walzer] |
23589 | Kidnapped sailors and volunteers have different obligations to the passengers [Walzer] |
23614 | Even aggressor soldiers are not criminals, so they have equal rights with their opponents [Walzer] |
23579 | Soldiers will only protect civilians if they feel safe from them [Walzer] |
23586 | What matters in war is unacceptable targets, not unacceptable weapons [Walzer] |
23591 | If the oppressor is cruel, nonviolence is either surrender, or a mere gesture [Walzer] |
23592 | We can only lead war towards peace if we firmly enforce the rules of war [Walzer] |