37 ideas
1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
12797 | If plural variables have 'some values', then non-count variables have 'some value' [Laycock] |
12794 | Plurals are semantical but not ontological [Laycock] |
17453 | The meaning of a number isn't just the numerals leading up to it [Heck] |
17457 | A basic grasp of cardinal numbers needs an understanding of equinumerosity [Heck] |
17448 | In counting, numerals are used, not mentioned (as objects that have to correlated) [Heck] |
17455 | Is counting basically mindless, and independent of the cardinality involved? [Heck] |
17456 | Counting is the assignment of successively larger cardinal numbers to collections [Heck] |
17694 | Some non-count nouns can be used for counting, as in 'several wines' or 'fewer cheeses' [Laycock] |
17695 | Some apparent non-count words can take plural forms, such as 'snows' or 'waters' [Laycock] |
17450 | Understanding 'just as many' needn't involve grasping one-one correspondence [Heck] |
17451 | We can know 'just as many' without the concepts of equinumerosity or numbers [Heck] |
17459 | Frege's Theorem explains why the numbers satisfy the Peano axioms [Heck] |
17454 | Children can use numbers, without a concept of them as countable objects [Heck] |
17458 | Equinumerosity is not the same concept as one-one correspondence [Heck] |
17449 | We can understand cardinality without the idea of one-one correspondence [Heck] |
12792 | The category of stuff does not suit reference [Laycock] |
12799 | Descriptions of stuff are neither singular aggregates nor plural collections [Laycock] |
12818 | We shouldn't think some water retains its identity when it is mixed with air [Laycock] |
1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
12795 | Parts must be of the same very general type as the wholes [Laycock] |
1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
17696 | 'Humility is a virtue' has an abstract noun, but 'water is a liquid' has a generic concrete noun [Laycock] |
12791 | It is said that proper reference is our intellectual link with the world [Laycock] |
1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |