249 ideas
| 1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
| 19250 | Everything interesting should be recorded, with records that can be rearranged [Peirce] |
| 19228 | Sciences concern existence, but philosophy also concerns potential existence [Peirce] |
| 1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
| 19241 | An idea on its own isn't an idea, because they are continuous systems [Peirce] |
| 19227 | Philosophy is a search for real truth [Peirce] |
| 19218 | Metaphysics is pointless without exact modern logic [Peirce] |
| 21489 | Super-ordinate disciplines give laws or principles; subordinate disciplines give concrete cases [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 6947 | Metaphysics does not rest on facts, but on what we are inclined to believe [Peirce] |
| 14799 | Metaphysics rests on observations, but ones so common we hardly notice them [Peirce] |
| 19229 | Metaphysics is the science of both experience, and its general laws and types [Peirce] |
| 19219 | Metaphysical reasoning is simple enough, but the concepts are very hard [Peirce] |
| 14767 | The demonstrations of the metaphysicians are all moonshine [Peirce] |
| 19231 | Metaphysics is turning into logic, and logic is becoming mathematics [Peirce] |
| 14764 | I am saturated with the spirit of physical science [Peirce] |
| 14782 | Philosophy is an experimental science, resting on common experience [Peirce] |
| 3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
| 3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
| 1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
| 1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
| 1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
| 1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
| 1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
| 1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
| 6937 | Reason aims to discover the unknown by thinking about the known [Peirce] |
| 14779 | I reason in order to avoid disappointment and surprise [Peirce] |
| 1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
| 3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
| 3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
| 1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
| 1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
| 1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
| 14787 | Self-contradiction doesn't reveal impossibility; it is inductive impossibility which reveals self-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 19247 | The one unpardonable offence in reasoning is to block the route to further truth [Peirce] |
| 3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
| 7661 | Truth is the opinion fated to be ultimately agreed by all investigators [Peirce] |
| 19095 | Pragmatic 'truth' is a term to cover the many varied aims of enquiry [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 19097 | Peirce did not think a belief was true if it was useful [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 21494 | If truth is the end of enquiry, what if it never ends, or ends prematurely? [Atkin on Peirce] |
| 19246 | 'Holding for true' is either practical commitment, or provisional theory [Peirce] |
| 15335 | Peirce's theory offers anti-realist verificationism, but surely how things are is independent of us? [Horsten on Peirce] |
| 14796 | Independent truth (if there is any) is the ultimate result of sufficient enquiry [Peirce] |
| 14777 | That a judgement is true and that we judge it true are quite different things [Peirce] |
| 3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
| 14780 | Only study logic if you think your own reasoning is deficient [Peirce] |
| 19237 | Deduction is true when the premises facts necessarily make the conclusion fact true [Peirce] |
| 19256 | Our research always hopes that reality embodies the logic we are employing [Peirce] |
| 21493 | Pure mathematics deals only with hypotheses, of which the reality does not matter [Peirce] |
| 14783 | Logic, unlike mathematics, is not hypothetical; it asserts categorical ends from hypothetical means [Peirce] |
| 19102 | Bivalence is a regulative assumption of enquiry - not a law of logic [Peirce, by Misak] |
| 19238 | The logic of relatives relies on objects built of any relations (rather than on classes) [Peirce] |
| 7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
| 7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
| 7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
| 7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
| 7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
| 3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
| 14775 | Numbers are just names devised for counting [Peirce] |
| 14776 | That two two-eyed people must have four eyes is a statement about numbers, not a fact [Peirce] |
| 14788 | Mathematics is close to logic, but is even more abstract [Peirce] |
| 19226 | We now know that mathematics only studies hypotheses, not facts [Peirce] |
| 3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
| 5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
| 5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
| 3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
| 3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
| 3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
| 21492 | Realism is basic to the scientific method [Peirce] |
| 19240 | Realism is the belief that there is something in the being of things corresponding to our reasoning [Peirce] |
| 19239 | There may be no reality; it's just our one desperate hope of knowing anything [Peirce] |
| 10352 | The real is the idea in which the community ultimately settles down [Peirce] |
| 1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
| 6949 | If someone doubted reality, they would not actually feel dissatisfaction [Peirce] |
| 3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
| 14778 | Facts are hard unmoved things, unaffected by what people may think of them [Peirce] |
| 13498 | Peirce and others began the mapping out of relations [Peirce, by Hart,WD] |
| 5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
| 3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
| 3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
| 21491 | Peirce's later realism about possibilities and generalities went beyond logical positivism [Peirce, by Atkin] |
| 14798 | All communication is vague, and is outside the principle of non-contradiction [Peirce] |
| 14797 | Vagueness is a neglected but important part of mathematical thought [Peirce] |
| 14786 | Some logical possibility concerns single propositions, but there is also compatibility between propositions [Peirce] |
| 14804 | Is chance just unknown laws? But the laws operate the same, whatever chance occurs [Peirce] |
| 19252 | Objective chance is the property of a distribution [Peirce] |
| 14303 | Truth-functional conditionals have a simple falsification, when A is true and B is false [Peirce] |
| 19232 | In ordinary language a conditional statement assumes that the antecedent is true [Peirce] |
| 16376 | The possible can only be general, and the force of actuality is needed to produce a particular [Peirce] |
| 19089 | Our whole conception of an object is its possible practical consequences [Peirce] |
| 7660 | We are aware of beliefs, they appease our doubts, and they are rules of action, or habits [Peirce] |
| 6940 | The feeling of belief shows a habit which will determine our actions [Peirce] |
| 6941 | We are entirely satisfied with a firm belief, even if it is false [Peirce] |
| 6942 | We want true beliefs, but obviously we think our beliefs are true [Peirce] |
| 6943 | A mere question does not stimulate a struggle for belief; there must be a real doubt [Peirce] |
| 14781 | A 'belief' is a habit which determines how our imagination and actions proceed [Peirce] |
| 19223 | We act on 'full belief' in a crisis, but 'opinion' only operates for trivial actions [Peirce] |
| 3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
| 3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
| 3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
| 3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
| 19107 | Inquiry is not standing on bedrock facts, but standing in hope on a shifting bog [Peirce] |
| 14770 | Reasoning is based on statistical induction, so it can't achieve certainty or precision [Peirce] |
| 14768 | Infallibility in science is just a joke [Peirce] |
| 3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
| 14774 | Innate truths are very uncertain and full of error, so they certainly have exceptions [Peirce] |
| 3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
| 14789 | Experience is indeed our only source of knowledge, provided we include inner experience [Peirce] |
| 19253 | We talk of 'association by resemblance' but that is wrong: the association constitutes the resemblance [Peirce] |
| 14765 | Association of ideas is the best philosophical idea of the prescientific age [Peirce] |
| 14794 | Instead of seeking Truth, we should seek belief that is beyond doubt [Peirce] |
| 14795 | Pragmatism is a way of establishing meanings, not a theory of metaphysics or a set of truths [Peirce] |
| 14785 | The world is one of experience, but experiences are always located among our ideas [Peirce] |
| 14773 | A truth is hard for us to understand if it rests on nothing but inspiration [Peirce] |
| 14772 | If we decide an idea is inspired, we still can't be sure we have got the idea right [Peirce] |
| 14771 | Only reason can establish whether some deliverance of revelation really is inspired [Peirce] |
| 3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
| 3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
| 6598 | We need our beliefs to be determined by some external inhuman permanency [Peirce] |
| 19224 | Scientists will give up any conclusion, if experience opposes it [Peirce] |
| 6944 | Demonstration does not rest on first principles of reason or sensation, but on freedom from actual doubt [Peirce] |
| 3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
| 6948 | Doubts should be satisfied by some external permanency upon which thinking has no effect [Peirce] |
| 3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
| 6945 | Once doubt ceases, there is no point in continuing to argue [Peirce] |
| 1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
| 19243 | If each inference slightly reduced our certainty, science would soon be in trouble [Peirce] |
| 14766 | Duns Scotus offers perhaps the best logic and metaphysics for modern physical science [Peirce] |
| 19225 | I classify science by level of abstraction; principles derive from above, and data from below [Peirce] |
| 19234 | 'Induction' doesn't capture Greek 'epagoge', which is singulars in a mass producing the general [Peirce] |
| 19235 | How does induction get started? [Peirce] |
| 19236 | Induction can never prove that laws have no exceptions [Peirce] |
| 19251 | The worst fallacy in induction is generalising one recondite property from a sample [Peirce] |
| 14790 | 'Abduction' is beginning a hypothesis, particularly if it includes preference of one explanation over others [Peirce] |
| 14791 | Abduction involves original suggestions, and not just the testing involved in induction [Peirce] |
| 19222 | Men often answer inner 'whys' by treating unconscious instincts as if they were reasons [Peirce] |
| 3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
| 3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
| 3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
| 5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
| 19220 | We may think animals reason very little, but they hardly ever make mistakes! [Peirce] |
| 5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
| 5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
| 5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
| 3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
| 3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
| 3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
| 3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
| 3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
| 3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
| 3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
| 3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
| 3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
| 5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
| 4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
| 14769 | Only imagination can connect phenomena together in a rational way [Peirce] |
| 19255 | Generalisation is the great law of mind [Peirce] |
| 19242 | Generalization is the true end of life [Peirce] |
| 3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
| 3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
| 3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
| 3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
| 3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
| 3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
| 3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
| 3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
| 3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
| 3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
| 3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
| 19249 | 'Know yourself' is not introspection; it is grasping how others see you [Peirce] |
| 3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
| 3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
| 3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
| 3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
| 14802 | Physical and psychical laws of mind are either independent, or derived in one or other direction [Peirce] |
| 3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
| 19257 | Whatever is First must be sentient [Peirce] |
| 3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
| 3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
| 3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
| 3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
| 2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
| 7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
| 7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
| 3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
| 5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
| 3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
| 3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
| 5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
| 3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
| 3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
| 3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
| 3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
| 5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
| 3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
| 3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
| 3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
| 3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
| 3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
| 5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
| 3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
| 9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
| 3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
| 5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
| 3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
| 3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
| 19248 | Reasoning involves observation, experiment, and habituation [Peirce] |
| 19221 | Everybody overrates their own reasoning, so it is clearly superficial [Peirce] |
| 3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
| 3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
| 3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
| 3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
| 14792 | A 'conception', the rational implication of a word, lies in its bearing upon the conduct of life [Peirce] |
| 14793 | The definition of a concept is just its experimental implications [Peirce] |
| 3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
| 19087 | The meaning or purport of a symbol is all the rational conduct it would lead to [Peirce] |
| 3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
| 14906 | Non-positivist verificationism says only take a hypothesis seriously if it is scientifically based and testable [Ladyman/Ross on Peirce] |
| 7634 | Icons resemble their subject, an index is a natural sign, and symbols are conventional [Peirce, by Maund] |
| 3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
| 19233 | Indexicals are unusual words, because they stimulate the hearer to look around [Peirce] |
| 1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
| 1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
| 3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
| 3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
| 3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
| 3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
| 3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
| 14784 | Ethics is the science of aims [Peirce] |
| 3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
| 3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
| 3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
| 14805 | Is there any such thing as death among the lower organisms? [Peirce] |
| 3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
| 19230 | People should follow what lies before them, and is within their power [Peirce] |
| 3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
| 19245 | We are not inspired by other people's knowledge; a sense of our ignorance motivates study [Peirce] |
| 3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
| 19244 | Chemists rely on a single experiment to establish a fact; repetition is pointless [Peirce] |
| 6939 | What is true of one piece of copper is true of another (unlike brass) [Peirce] |
| 14800 | The world is full of variety, but laws seem to produce uniformity [Peirce] |
| 19254 | Our laws of nature may be the result of evolution [Peirce] |
| 14806 | If the world is just mechanical, its whole specification has no more explanation than mere chance [Peirce] |
| 14803 | The more precise the observations, the less reliable appear to be the laws of nature [Peirce] |
| 6938 | Natural selection might well fill an animal's mind with pleasing thoughts rather than true ones [Peirce] |
| 14801 | Darwinian evolution is chance, with the destruction of bad results [Peirce] |
| 3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
| 3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |
| 6946 | If death is annihilation, belief in heaven is a cheap pleasure with no disappointment [Peirce] |