30 ideas
| 1606 | You have to be a Platonist to debate about reality, so every philosopher is a Platonist [Roochnik] |
| 1595 | Philosophy aims to satisfy the chief human desire - the articulation of beauty itself [Roochnik] |
| 1571 | 'Logos' ranges from thought/reasoning, to words, to rational structures outside thought [Roochnik] |
| 1572 | In the seventeenth century the only acceptable form of logos was technical knowledge [Roochnik] |
| 1573 | The hallmark of a person with logos is that they give reasons why one opinion is superior to another [Roochnik] |
| 1592 | Logos cannot refute the relativist, and so must admit that it too is a matter of desire (for truth and agreement) [Roochnik] |
| 1593 | Human desire has an ordered structure, with logos at the pinnacle [Roochnik] |
| 1603 | Logos is not unconditionally good, but good if there is another person willing to engage with it [Roochnik] |
| 1598 | We prefer reason or poetry according to whether basics are intelligible or not [Roochnik] |
| 1584 | Modern science, by aiming for clarity about the external world, has abandoned rationality in the human world [Roochnik] |
| 1591 | Unfortunately for reason, argument can't be used to establish the value of argument [Roochnik] |
| 1599 | Attempts to suspend all presuppositions are hopeless, because a common ground must be agreed for the process [Roochnik] |
| 1605 | Reality can be viewed neutrally, or as an object of desire [Roochnik] |
| 19566 | Epistemology does not just concern knowledge; all aspects of cognitive activity are involved [Kvanvig] |
| 19261 | Understanding is seeing coherent relationships in the relevant information [Kvanvig] |
| 19568 | Making sense of things, or finding a good theory, are non-truth-related cognitive successes [Kvanvig] |
| 19567 | The 'defeasibility' approach says true justified belief is knowledge if no undermining facts could be known [Kvanvig] |
| 19679 | 'Access' internalism says responsibility needs access; weaker 'mentalism' needs mental justification [Kvanvig] |
| 19730 | Epistemic virtues: love of knowledge, courage, caution, autonomy, practical wisdom... [Kvanvig] |
| 19731 | If epistemic virtues are faculties or powers, that doesn't explain propositional knowledge [Kvanvig] |
| 19732 | The value of good means of attaining truth are swamped by the value of the truth itself [Kvanvig] |
| 19678 | Strong foundationalism needs strict inferences; weak version has induction, explanation, probability [Kvanvig] |
| 19570 | Reliabilism cannot assess the justification for propositions we don't believe [Kvanvig] |
| 1577 | Relativism is a disease which destroys the possibility of rational debate [Roochnik] |
| 1596 | Reasoning aims not at the understanding of objects, but at the desire to give beautiful speeches [Roochnik] |
| 1578 | If relativism is the correct account of human values, then rhetoric is more important than reasoning [Roochnik] |
| 6012 | We must choose in which of the virtues we wish to excel [Panaetius] |
| 6013 | Panaetius said we should live according to our natural starting-points [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
| 6014 | Panaetius identified courage with great-mindedness, preferring civic courage to military [Panaetius, by Asmis] |
| 5888 | Souls are born, since they are sensitive and inherited, so they must perish [Panaetius, by Cicero] |