83 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
21970 | Philosophy attains its goal if one person feels perfect accord between their system and experience [Fichte] |
22024 | Fichte's subjectivity struggles to then give any account of objectivity [Pinkard on Fichte] |
6912 | For Fichte there is no God outside the ego, and 'our religion is reason' [Fichte, by Feuerbach] |
23247 | The need to act produces consciousness, and practical reason is the root of all reason [Fichte] |
23232 | Sufficient reason makes the transition from the particular to the general [Fichte] |
15413 | With four tense operators, all complex tenses reduce to fourteen basic cases [Burgess] |
15415 | The temporal Barcan formulas fix what exists, which seems absurd [Burgess] |
15430 | Is classical logic a part of intuitionist logic, or vice versa? [Burgess] |
15431 | It is still unsettled whether standard intuitionist logic is complete [Burgess] |
15429 | Relevance logic's → is perhaps expressible by 'if A, then B, for that reason' [Burgess] |
15404 | Technical people see logic as any formal system that can be studied, not a study of argument validity [Burgess] |
15405 | Classical logic neglects the non-mathematical, such as temporality or modality [Burgess] |
15427 | The Cut Rule expresses the classical idea that entailment is transitive [Burgess] |
15421 | Classical logic neglects counterfactuals, temporality and modality, because maths doesn't use them [Burgess] |
15403 | Philosophical logic is a branch of logic, and is now centred in computer science [Burgess] |
15407 | Formalising arguments favours lots of connectives; proving things favours having very few [Burgess] |
22017 | Normativity needs the possibility of negation, in affirmation and denial [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
15424 | Asserting a disjunction from one disjunct seems odd, but can be sensible, and needed in maths [Burgess] |
15409 | All occurrences of variables in atomic formulas are free [Burgess] |
15414 | The denotation of a definite description is flexible, rather than rigid [Burgess] |
15406 | 'Induction' and 'recursion' on complexity prove by connecting a formula to its atomic components [Burgess] |
15425 | The sequent calculus makes it possible to have proof without transitivity of entailment [Burgess] |
15426 | We can build one expanding sequence, instead of a chain of deductions [Burgess] |
15408 | 'Tautologies' are valid formulas of classical sentential logic - or substitution instances in other logics [Burgess] |
15418 | Validity (for truth) and demonstrability (for proof) have correlates in satisfiability and consistency [Burgess] |
15412 | Models leave out meaning, and just focus on truth values [Burgess] |
15411 | We only need to study mathematical models, since all other models are isomorphic to these [Burgess] |
15416 | We aim to get the technical notion of truth in all models matching intuitive truth in all instances [Burgess] |
15428 | The Liar seems like a truth-value 'gap', but dialethists see it as a 'glut' [Burgess] |
10185 | Set theory is the standard background for modern mathematics [Burgess] |
10184 | Structuralists take the name 'R' of the reals to be a variable ranging over structures, not a structure [Burgess] |
10189 | There is no one relation for the real number 2, as relations differ in different models [Burgess] |
10186 | If set theory is used to define 'structure', we can't define set theory structurally [Burgess] |
10187 | Abstract algebra concerns relations between models, not common features of all the models [Burgess] |
10188 | How can mathematical relations be either internal, or external, or intrinsic? [Burgess] |
23227 | Each object has a precise number of properties, each to a precise degree [Fichte] |
23228 | The principle of activity and generation is found in a self-moving basic force [Fichte] |
15420 | De re modality seems to apply to objects a concept intended for sentences [Burgess] |
15419 | General consensus is S5 for logical modality of validity, and S4 for proof [Burgess] |
15417 | Logical necessity has two sides - validity and demonstrability - which coincide in classical logic [Burgess] |
15423 | It is doubtful whether the negation of a conditional has any clear meaning [Burgess] |
15422 | Three conditionals theories: Materialism (material conditional), Idealism (true=assertable), Nihilism (no truth) [Burgess] |
22018 | Necessary truths derive from basic assertion and negation [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22062 | Mental presentation are not empirical, but concern the strivings of the self [Fichte] |
22015 | The thing-in-itself is an empty dream [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
22064 | Fichte's logic is much too narrow, and doesn't deduce ethics, art, society or life [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |
21973 | Fichte believed in things-in-themselves [Fichte, by Moore,AW] |
21914 | We can deduce experience from self-consciousness, without the thing-in-itself [Fichte] |
23241 | I am myself, but not the external object; so I only sense myself, and not the object [Fichte] |
22032 | Fichte's key claim was that the subjective-objective distinction must itself be subjective [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
20951 | The absolute I divides into consciousness, and a world which is not-I [Fichte, by Bowie] |
21964 | Reason arises from freedom, so philosophy starts from the self, and not from the laws of nature [Fichte] |
21968 | Abandon the thing-in-itself; things only exist in relation to our thinking [Fichte] |
21966 | Self-consciousness is the basis of knowledge, and knowing something is knowing myself [Fichte] |
21967 | There is nothing to say about anything which is outside my consciousness [Fichte] |
21969 | Awareness of reality comes from the free activity of consciousness [Fichte] |
23231 | I immediately know myself, and anything beyond that is an inference [Fichte] |
23246 | Faith is not knowledge; it is a decision of the will [Fichte] |
23245 | Knowledge can't be its own foundation; there has to be regress of higher and higher authorities [Fichte] |
23242 | Consciousness has two parts, passively receiving sensation, and actively causing productions [Fichte] |
22020 | We only see ourselves as self-conscious and rational in relation to other rationalities [Fichte] |
23240 | We can't know by sight or hearing without realising that we are doing so [Fichte] |
22060 | The Self is the spontaneity, self-relatedness and unity needed for knowledge [Fichte, by Siep] |
22066 | Novalis sought a much wider concept of the ego than Fichte's proposal [Novalis on Fichte] |
22016 | The self is not a 'thing', but what emerges from an assertion of normativity [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23243 | Consciousness of external things is always accompanied by an unnoticed consciousness of self [Fichte] |
22019 | Consciousness of an object always entails awareness of the self [Fichte] |
22063 | Effective individuals must posit a specific material body for themselves [Fichte] |
23244 | Forming purposes is absolutely free, and produces something from nothing [Fichte] |
23237 | The capacity for freedom is above the laws of nature, with its own power of purpose and will [Fichte] |
23235 | I want independent control of the fundamental cause of my decisions [Fichte] |
21965 | Spinoza could not actually believe his determinism, because living requires free will [Fichte] |
23230 | Nature contains a fundamental force of thought [Fichte] |
22061 | Judgement is distinguishing concepts, and seeing their relations [Fichte, by Siep] |
23233 | The will is awareness of one of our inner natural forces [Fichte] |
23234 | I cannot change the nature which has been determined for me [Fichte] |
23239 | The self is, apart from outward behaviour, a drive in your nature [Fichte] |
22023 | Fichte's idea of spontaneity implied that nothing counts unless we give it status [Fichte, by Pinkard] |
23238 | If life lacks love it becomes destruction [Fichte] |
23236 | Freedom means making yourself become true to your essential nature [Fichte] |
23229 | Nature is wholly interconnected, and the tiniest change affects everything [Fichte] |
22065 | Fichte reduces nature to a lifeless immobility [Schlegel,F on Fichte] |