Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dennis Whitcomb, Oliver,A/Smiley,T and Penelope Mackie

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29 ideas

1. Philosophy / A. Wisdom / 3. Wisdom Deflated
19695 The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / b. Empty (Null) Set
14239 The empty set is usually derived from Separation, but it also seems to need Infinity [Oliver/Smiley]
14240 The empty set is something, not nothing! [Oliver/Smiley]
14241 We don't need the empty set to express non-existence, as there are other ways to do that [Oliver/Smiley]
14242 Maybe we can treat the empty set symbol as just meaning an empty term [Oliver/Smiley]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 3. Types of Set / c. Unit (Singleton) Sets
14243 The unit set may be needed to express intersections that leave a single member [Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / G. Quantification / 6. Plural Quantification
14234 If you only refer to objects one at a time, you need sets in order to refer to a plurality [Oliver/Smiley]
14237 We can use plural language to refer to the set theory domain, to avoid calling it a 'set' [Oliver/Smiley]
5. Theory of Logic / I. Semantics of Logic / 3. Logical Truth
14245 Logical truths are true no matter what exists - but predicate calculus insists that something exists [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / A. Nature of Mathematics / 4. Using Numbers / g. Applying mathematics
14246 If mathematics purely concerned mathematical objects, there would be no applied mathematics [Oliver/Smiley]
6. Mathematics / B. Foundations for Mathematics / 6. Mathematics as Set Theory / a. Mathematics is set theory
14247 Sets might either represent the numbers, or be the numbers, or replace the numbers [Oliver/Smiley]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / a. Individuation
11897 A principle of individuation may pinpoint identity and distinctness, now and over time [Mackie,P]
11898 Individuation may include counterfactual possibilities, as well as identity and persistence [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Individuation / d. Individuation by haecceity
11883 A haecceity is the essential, simple, unanalysable property of being-this-thing [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 1. Essences of Objects
11889 Essentialism must avoid both reduplication of essences, and multiple occupancy by essences [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 3. Individual Essences
11877 An individual essence is the properties the object could not exist without [Mackie,P]
11882 No other object can possibly have the same individual essence as some object [Mackie,P]
11886 There are problems both with individual essences and without them [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 5. Essence as Kind
11909 Unlike Hesperus=Phosophorus, water=H2O needs further premisses before it is necessary [Mackie,P]
11899 Why are any sortals essential, and why are only some of them essential? [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
11906 The Kripke and Putnam view of kinds makes them explanatorily basic, but has modal implications [Mackie,P]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 12. Origin as Essential
11894 Origin is not a necessity, it is just 'tenacious'; we keep it fixed in counterfactual discussions [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / a. Transworld identity
11887 Transworld identity without individual essences leads to 'bare identities' [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / c. Counterparts
11890 De re modality without bare identities or individual essence needs counterparts [Mackie,P]
11892 Things may only be counterparts under some particular relation [Mackie,P]
11893 Possibilities for Caesar must be based on some phase of the real Caesar [Mackie,P]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 3. Transworld Objects / d. Haecceitism
11884 The theory of 'haecceitism' does not need commitment to individual haecceities [Mackie,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / k. Explanations by essence
11905 Locke's kind essences are explanatory, without being necessary to the kind [Mackie,P]
26. Natural Theory / B. Natural Kinds / 6. Necessity of Kinds
11907 Maybe the identity of kinds is necessary, but instances being of that kind is not [Mackie,P]