107 ideas
19695 | The devil was wise as an angel, and lost no knowledge when he rebelled [Whitcomb] |
23657 | The existence of tensed verbs shows that not all truths are necessary truths [Reid] |
4767 | Traditionally, rational beliefs are those which are justified by reasons [Psillos] |
23655 | An ad hominem argument is good, if it is shown that the man's principles are inconsistent [Reid] |
4810 | Valid deduction is monotonic - that is, it remains valid if further premises are added [Psillos] |
23634 | Accepting the existence of anything presupposes the notion of existence [Reid] |
4768 | The 'epistemic fallacy' is inferring what does exist from what can be known to exist [Psillos] |
14933 | Scientific properties are defined by the laws that embody them [Psillos, by Ladyman/Ross] |
23664 | Powers are quite distinct and simple, and so cannot be defined [Reid] |
23669 | Thinkers say that matter has intrinsic powers, but is also passive and acted upon [Reid] |
17996 | Powers are claimed to be basic because fundamental particles lack internal structure [Psillos] |
23666 | It is obvious that there could not be a power without a subject which possesses it [Reid] |
23651 | Universals are not objects of sense and cannot be imagined - but can be conceived [Reid] |
23650 | Only individuals exist [Reid] |
23649 | No one thinks two sheets possess a single whiteness, but all agree they are both white [Reid] |
23647 | Objects have an essential constitution, producing its qualities, which we are too ignorant to define [Reid] |
1350 | Continuity is needed for existence, otherwise we would say a thing existed after it ceased to exist [Reid] |
21322 | We treat slowly changing things as identical for the sake of economy in language [Reid] |
21320 | Identity is familiar to common sense, but very hard to define [Reid] |
1367 | Identity can only be affirmed of things which have a continued existence [Reid] |
11874 | Real identity admits of no degrees [Reid] |
11958 | Impossibilites are easily conceived in mathematics and geometry [Reid, by Molnar] |
23659 | If someone denies that he is thinking when he is conscious of it, we can only laugh [Reid] |
23662 | The existence of ideas is no more obvious than the existence of external objects [Reid] |
23661 | We are only aware of other beings through our senses; without that, we are alone in the universe [Reid] |
23635 | Truths are self-evident to sensible persons who understand them clearly without prejudice [Reid] |
7631 | Sensation is not committed to any external object, but perception is [Reid] |
23637 | Primary qualities are the object of mathematics [Reid] |
23638 | Secondary qualities conjure up, and are confused with, the sensations which produce them [Reid] |
23639 | It is unclear whether a toothache is in the mind or in the tooth, but the word has a single meaning [Reid] |
6492 | Reid is seen as the main direct realist of the eighteenth century [Reid, by Robinson,H] |
23633 | Many truths seem obvious, and point to universal agreement - which is what we find [Reid] |
23654 | In obscure matters the few must lead the many, but the many usually lead in common sense [Reid] |
23643 | We all trust our distinct memories (but not our distinct imaginings) [Reid] |
23660 | The theory of ideas, popular with philosophers, means past existence has to be proved [Reid] |
23644 | Without memory we could have no concept of duration [Reid] |
23641 | People dislike believing without evidence, and try to avoid it [Reid] |
23642 | If non-rational evidence reaches us, it is reason which then makes use of it [Reid] |
23549 | We treat testimony with a natural trade off of belief and caution [Reid, by Fricker,M] |
4807 | A good barometer will predict a storm, but not explain it [Psillos] |
4808 | If we say where Mars was two months ago, we offer an explanation without a prediction [Psillos] |
4811 | Induction (unlike deduction) is non-monotonic - it can be invalidated by new premises [Psillos] |
4812 | Explanation is either showing predictability, or showing necessity, or showing causal relations [Psillos] |
4802 | Just citing a cause does not enable us to understand an event; we also need a relevant law [Psillos] |
4804 | The 'covering law model' says only laws can explain the occurrence of single events [Psillos] |
4805 | If laws explain the length of a flagpole's shadow, then the shadow also explains the length of the pole [Psillos] |
4395 | There are non-causal explanations, most typically mathematical explanations [Psillos] |
4806 | An explanation can just be a 'causal story', without laws, as when I knock over some ink [Psillos] |
4404 | Maybe explanation is entirely relative to the interests and presuppositions of the questioner [Psillos] |
4803 | An explanation is the removal of the surprise caused by the event [Psillos] |
1356 | A person is a unity, and doesn't come in degrees [Reid] |
23658 | Consciousness is an indefinable and unique operation [Reid] |
23665 | Consciousness is the power of mind to know itself, and minds are grounded in powers [Reid] |
4769 | It is hard to analyse causation, if it is presupposed in our theory of the functioning of the mind [Psillos] |
1359 | Personal identity is the basis of all rights, obligations and responsibility [Reid] |
21319 | I can hardly care about rational consequence if it wasn't me conceiving the antecedent [Reid] |
21323 | The identity of a thief is only known by similarity, but memory gives certainty in our own case [Reid] |
21321 | Memory reveals my past identity - but so does testimony of other witnesses [Reid] |
21324 | If consciousness is transferable 20 persons can be 1; forgetting implies 1 can be 20 [Reid] |
21325 | Boy same as young man, young man same as old man, old man not boy, if forgotten! [Reid] |
21327 | If a stolen horse is identified by similitude, its identity is not therefore merely similitude [Reid] |
1366 | If consciousness is personal identity, it is continually changing [Reid] |
1352 | Thoughts change continually, but the self doesn't [Reid] |
23681 | The first motion or effect cannot be produced necessarily, so the First Cause must be a free agent [Reid] |
23676 | A willed action needs reasonable understanding of what is to be done [Reid] |
23668 | Our own nature attributes free determinations to our own will [Reid] |
23680 | We are morally free, because we experience it, we are accountable, and we pursue projects [Reid] |
23652 | We must first conceive things before we can consider them [Reid] |
23656 | The structure of languages reveals a uniformity in basic human opinions [Reid] |
23630 | Only philosophers treat ideas as objects [Reid] |
23648 | First we notice and name attributes ('abstracting'); then we notice that subjects share them ('generalising') [Reid] |
23653 | If you can't distinguish the features of a complex object, your notion of it would be a muddle [Reid] |
23640 | Only mature minds can distinguish the qualities of a body [Reid] |
23629 | The ambiguity of words impedes the advancement of knowledge [Reid] |
23646 | Reference is by name, or a term-plus-circumstance, or ostensively, or by description [Reid] |
23645 | A word's meaning is the thing conceived, as fixed by linguistic experts [Reid] |
20051 | Reid said that agent causation is a unique type of causation [Reid, by Stout,R] |
23678 | A motive is merely an idea, like advice, and not a force for action [Reid] |
23663 | There are axioms of taste - such as a general consensus about a beautiful face [Reid] |
4770 | Nothing is more usual than to apply to external bodies every internal sensation which they occasion [Psillos] |
23674 | If an attempted poisoning results in benefits, we still judge the agent a poisoner [Reid] |
23675 | We shouldn't do to others what would be a wrong to us in similar circumstances [Reid] |
23672 | To be virtuous, we must care about duty [Reid] |
23673 | Every worthy man has a principle of honour, and knows what is honourable [Reid] |
23632 | Similar effects come from similar causes, and causes are only what are sufficient for the effects [Reid] |
4399 | Causes clearly make a difference, are recipes for events, explain effects, and are evidence [Psillos] |
4400 | Theories of causation are based either on regularity, or on intrinsic relations of properties [Psillos] |
4403 | We can't base our account of causation on explanation, because it is the wrong way round [Psillos] |
4789 | Three divisions of causal theories: generalist/singularist, intrinsic/extrinsic, reductive/non-reductive [Psillos] |
4790 | If causation is 'intrinsic' it depends entirely on the properties and relations of the cause and effect [Psillos] |
8383 | Day and night are constantly conjoined, but they don't cause one another [Reid, by Crane] |
23677 | We all know that mere priority or constant conjunction do not have to imply causation [Reid] |
4402 | Empiricists tried to reduce causation to explanation, which they reduced to logic-plus-a-law [Psillos] |
4774 | Counterfactual claims about causation imply that it is more than just regular succession [Psillos] |
23667 | Regular events don't imply a cause, without an innate conviction of universal causation [Reid] |
23679 | The principle of the law of nature is that matter is passive, and is acted upon [Reid] |
23670 | Scientists don't know the cause of magnetism, and only discover its regulations [Reid] |
23671 | Laws are rules for effects, but these need a cause; rules of navigation don't navigate [Reid] |
4793 | "All gold cubes are smaller than one cubic mile" is a true universal generalisation, but not a law [Psillos] |
4397 | Regularity doesn't seem sufficient for causation [Psillos] |
4792 | A Humean view of causation says it is regularities, and causal facts supervene on non-causal facts [Psillos] |
4801 | The regularity of a cock's crow is used to predict dawn, even though it doesn't cause it [Psillos] |
4401 | It is not a law of nature that all the coins in my pocket are euros, though it is a regularity [Psillos] |
4796 | Laws are sets of regularities within a simple and strong coherent system of wider regularities [Psillos] |
4799 | Dispositional essentialism can't explain its key distinction between essential and non-essential properties [Psillos] |
4780 | In some counterfactuals, the counterfactual event happens later than its consequent [Psillos] |
4791 | Counterfactual theories say causes make a difference - if c hadn't occurred, then e wouldn't occur [Psillos] |