Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Derek Parfit, A.W. Moore and Irving M. Copi

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21 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
21959 Metaphysics is the most general attempt to make sense of things [Moore,AW]
2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
5515 Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5516 Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 6. Dispositions / b. Dispositions and powers
12312 The real essence of a thing is its powers, or 'dispositional properties' [Copi]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 8. Essence as Explanatory
10937 Essential properties are the 'deepest' ones which explain the others [Copi, by Rami]
9. Objects / D. Essence of Objects / 13. Nominal Essence
12308 In modern science, nominal essence is intended to be real essence [Copi]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 11. End of an Object
12303 Within the four types of change, essential attributes are those whose loss means destruction [Copi]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / b. Transcendental idealism
21958 Appearances are nothing beyond representations, which is transcendental ideality [Moore,AW]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3539 Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
5514 Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
1393 One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
5521 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
5522 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
1392 If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
5519 It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
5520 If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
1391 Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
5518 It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
9762 We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
12307 Modern science seeks essences, and is getting closer to them [Copi]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / d. Knowing essences
12310 Real essences are scientifically knowable, but so are non-essential properties [Copi]