Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Derek Parfit, Jacques Lenfant and Sally Haslanger

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22 ideas

2. Reason / E. Argument / 7. Thought Experiments
5515 Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 2. Aporiai
13931 By using aporiai as his start, Aristotle can defer to the wise, as well as to the many [Haslanger]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 2. Reduction
5516 Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
13925 Ontology disputes rest on more basic explanation disputes [Haslanger]
8. Modes of Existence / C. Powers and Dispositions / 4. Powers as Essence
12750 The question is whether force is self-sufficient in bodies, and essential, or dependent on something [Lenfant]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 3. Three-Dimensionalism
13924 The persistence of objects seems to be needed if the past is to explain the present [Haslanger]
13930 Persistence makes change and its products intelligible [Haslanger]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 5. Temporal Parts
13927 We must explain change amongst 'momentary entities', or else the world is inexplicable [Haslanger]
13928 If the things which exist prior to now are totally distinct, they need not have existed [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
13929 Natural explanations give the causal interconnections [Haslanger]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
13926 Best explanations, especially natural ones, need grounding, notably by persistent objects [Haslanger]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 5. Self as Associations
3539 Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 1. Identity and the Self
5514 Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
1393 One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit]
5521 If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit]
5522 Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 4. Split Consciousness
1392 If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit]
5519 It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit]
5520 If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
1391 Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit]
16. Persons / E. Rejecting the Self / 4. Denial of the Self
5518 It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
9762 We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit]