57 ideas
5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
23805 | Some explanations offer to explain a mystery by a greater mystery [Schulte] |
3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
23792 | Phenomenal and representational character may have links, or even be united [Schulte] |
23795 | Naturalistic accounts of content cannot rely on primitive mental or normative notions [Schulte] |
23804 | Maybe we can explain mental content in terms of phenomenal properties [Schulte] |
23806 | Naturalist accounts of representation must match the views of cognitive science [Schulte] |
23793 | On the whole, referential content is seen as broad, and sense content as narrow [Schulte] |
23796 | Naturalists must explain both representation, and what is represented [Schulte] |
23802 | Conceptual role semantics says content is determined by cognitive role [Schulte] |
23797 | Cause won't explain content, because one cause can produce several contents [Schulte] |
23799 | Teleosemantics explains content in terms of successful and unsuccessful functioning [Schulte] |
23800 | Teleosemantic explanations say content is the causal result of naturally selected functions [Schulte] |
23798 | Information theories say content is information, such as smoke making fire probable [Schulte] |
9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |