61 ideas
| 19090 | If we can't check our language against experience, philosophy is just comparing beliefs and words [Rorty] |
| 2557 | Analytical philosophy seems to have little interest in how to tell a good analysis from a bad one [Rorty] |
| 2556 | Rational certainty may be victory in argument rather than knowledge of facts [Rorty] |
| 5515 | Imaginary cases are good for revealing our beliefs, rather than the truth [Parfit] |
| 4726 | Rorty seems to view truth as simply being able to hold one's view against all comers [Rorty, by O'Grady] |
| 2549 | For James truth is "what it is better for us to believe" rather than a correct picture of reality [Rorty] |
| 5516 | Reduction can be by identity, or constitution, or elimination [Parfit, by PG] |
| 2548 | If knowledge is merely justified belief, justification is social [Rorty] |
| 6599 | Knowing has no definable essence, but is a social right, found in the context of conversations [Rorty] |
| 2566 | You can't debate about whether to have higher standards for the application of words [Rorty] |
| 2553 | The mind is a property, or it is baffling [Rorty] |
| 2550 | Pain lacks intentionality; beliefs lack qualia [Rorty] |
| 2554 | Is intentionality a special sort of function? [Rorty] |
| 3539 | Personal identity is just causally related mental states [Parfit, by Maslin] |
| 5514 | Psychologists are interested in identity as a type of person, but philosophers study numerical identity [Parfit] |
| 1393 | One of my future selves will not necessarily be me [Parfit] |
| 5521 | If my brain-halves are transplanted into two bodies, I have continuity, and don't need identity [Parfit] |
| 5522 | Over a period of time what matters is not that 'I' persist, but that I have psychological continuity [Parfit] |
| 1392 | If we split like amoeba, we would be two people, neither of them being us [Parfit] |
| 5519 | It is fine to save two dying twins by merging parts of their bodies into one, and identity is irrelevant [Parfit] |
| 5520 | If two humans are merged surgically, the new identity is a purely verbal problem [Parfit] |
| 1391 | Concern for our own lives isn't the source of belief in identity, it is the result of it [Parfit] |
| 5518 | It doesn't matter whether I exist with half my components replaced (any more than an audio system) [Parfit] |
| 2565 | Nature has no preferred way of being represented [Rorty] |
| 2560 | Can meanings remain the same when beliefs change? [Rorty] |
| 2562 | A theory of reference seems needed to pick out objects without ghostly inner states [Rorty] |
| 2559 | Davidson's theory of meaning focuses not on terms, but on relations between sentences [Rorty] |
| 9762 | We should focus less on subjects of experience, and more on the experiences themselves [Parfit] |
| 2558 | Since Hegel we have tended to see a human as merely animal if it is outside a society [Rorty] |
| 20489 | Human beings can never really flourish in a long-term state of nature [Wolff,J] |
| 20483 | Collective rationality is individuals doing their best, assuming others all do the same [Wolff,J] |
| 20532 | Should love be the first virtue of a society, as it is of the family? [Wolff,J] |
| 20490 | For utilitarians, consent to the state is irrelevant, if it produces more happiness [Wolff,J] |
| 20493 | Social contract theory has the attracton of including everyone, and being voluntary [Wolff,J] |
| 20494 | Maybe voting in elections is a grant of legitimacy to the winners [Wolff,J] |
| 20500 | We can see the 'general will' as what is in the general interest [Wolff,J] |
| 20497 | How can dictators advance the interests of the people, if they don't consult them about interests? [Wolff,J] |
| 20506 | 'Separation of powers' allows legislative, executive and judicial functions to monitor one another [Wolff,J] |
| 20530 | Political choice can be by utility, or maximin, or maximax [Wolff,J] |
| 20487 | A realistic and less utopian anarchism looks increasingly like liberal democracy [Wolff,J] |
| 20488 | It is hard for anarchists to deny that we need experts [Wolff,J] |
| 20529 | Utilitarianism probably implies a free market plus welfare [Wolff,J] |
| 20510 | A system of democracy which includes both freedom and equality is almost impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 20511 | Democracy expresses equal respect (which explains why criminals forfeit the vote) [Wolff,J] |
| 20502 | Democracy has been seen as consistent with many types of inequality [Wolff,J] |
| 20496 | A true democracy could not tolerate slavery, exploitation or colonialism [Wolff,J] |
| 20498 | We should decide whether voting is for self-interests, or for the common good [Wolff,J] |
| 20499 | Condorcet proved that sensible voting leads to an emphatically right answer [Wolff,J] |
| 20509 | Occasional defeat is acceptable, but a minority that is continually defeated is a problem [Wolff,J] |
| 20524 | Market prices indicate shortages and gluts, and where the profits are to be made [Wolff,J] |
| 20518 | Liberty principles can't justify laws against duelling, incest between siblings and euthanasia [Wolff,J] |
| 20531 | Either Difference allows unequal liberty, or Liberty makes implementing Difference impossible [Wolff,J] |
| 20526 | Utilitarians argue for equal distribution because of diminishing utility of repetition [Wolff,J] |
| 20528 | Difference Principle: all inequalities should be in favour of the disadvantaged [Wolff,J] |
| 20503 | Political equality is not much use without social equality [Wolff,J] |
| 20512 | Standard rights: life, free speech, assembly, movement, vote, stand (plus shelter, food, health?) [Wolff,J] |
| 20513 | If natural rights are axiomatic, there is then no way we can defend them [Wolff,J] |
| 20514 | If rights are natural, rather than inferred, how do we know which rights we have? [Wolff,J] |
| 20522 | Utilitarians might say property ownership encourages the best use of the land [Wolff,J] |
| 20534 | Rights and justice are only the last resorts of a society, something to fall back on [Wolff,J] |
| 20492 | Following some laws is not a moral matter; trivial traffic rules, for example [Wolff,J] |