32 ideas
| 4262 | If the only aim was consistent beliefs then new evidence and experiments would be irrelevant [Goldman] |
| 3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
| 18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
| 18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
| 18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
| 4045 | Children may have three innate principles which enable them to learn to count [Goldman] |
| 4044 | Rat behaviour reveals a considerable ability to count [Goldman] |
| 18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
| 18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
| 18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
| 4048 | Infant brains appear to have inbuilt ontological categories [Goldman] |
| 4043 | Elephants can be correctly identified from as few as three primitive shapes [Goldman] |
| 4049 | The way in which colour experiences are evoked is physically odd and unpredictable [Goldman] |
| 4047 | Gestalt psychology proposes inbuilt proximity, similarity, smoothness and closure principles [Goldman] |
| 1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
| 8830 | A belief can be justified when the person has forgotten the evidence for it [Goldman] |
| 6871 | We can't only believe things if we are currently conscious of their justification - there are too many [Goldman] |
| 6872 | Internalism must cover Forgotten Evidence, which is no longer retrievable from memory [Goldman] |
| 6874 | Internal justification needs both mental stability and time to compute coherence [Goldman] |
| 8832 | If justified beliefs are well-formed beliefs, then animals and young children have them [Goldman] |
| 6873 | Coherent justification seems to require retrieving all our beliefs simultaneously [Goldman] |
| 8829 | Justification depends on the reliability of its cause, where reliable processes tend to produce truth [Goldman] |
| 6875 | Reliability involves truth, and truth is external [Goldman] |
| 1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
| 18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
| 3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
| 18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
| 3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
| 8831 | Introspection is really retrospection; my pain is justified by a brief causal history [Goldman] |
| 18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
| 1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
| 1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |