27 ideas
7807 | The laws of thought are true, but they are not the axioms of logic [Bolzano, by George/Van Evra] |
3035 | Dialectic involves conversations with short questions and brief answers [Diog. Laertius] |
18696 | The vagueness of truthmaker claims makes it easier to run anti-realist arguments [Button] |
18701 | The coherence theory says truth is coherence of thoughts, and not about objects [Button] |
9987 | An aggregate in which order does not matter I call a 'set' [Bolzano] |
18694 | Permutation Theorem: any theory with a decent model has lots of models [Button] |
9618 | Bolzano wanted to reduce all of geometry to arithmetic [Bolzano, by Brown,JR] |
10856 | A truly infinite quantity does not need to be a variable [Bolzano] |
9830 | Bolzano began the elimination of intuition, by proving something which seemed obvious [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
17265 | Philosophical proofs in mathematics establish truths, and also show their grounds [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
18692 | Realists believe in independent objects, correspondence, and fallibility of all theories [Button] |
18693 | Indeterminacy arguments say if a theory can be made true, it has multiple versions [Button] |
18695 | An ideal theory can't be wholly false, because its consistency implies a true model [Button] |
9185 | Bolzano wanted to avoid Kantian intuitions, and prove everything that could be proved [Bolzano, by Dummett] |
1816 | Sceptics say demonstration depends on self-demonstrating things, or indemonstrable things [Diog. Laertius] |
1819 | Scepticism has two dogmas: that nothing is definable, and every argument has an opposite argument [Diog. Laertius] |
18700 | Cartesian scepticism doubts what is true; Kantian scepticism doubts that it is sayable [Button] |
3064 | When sceptics say that nothing is definable, or all arguments have an opposite, they are being dogmatic [Diog. Laertius] |
18698 | Predictions give the 'content' of theories, which can then be 'equivalent' or 'adequate' [Button] |
3033 | Induction moves from some truths to similar ones, by contraries or consequents [Diog. Laertius] |
18697 | A sentence's truth conditions are all the situations where it would be true [Button] |
22276 | Bolzano saw propositions as objective entities, existing independently of us [Bolzano, by Potter] |
17264 | Propositions are abstract structures of concepts, ready for judgement or assertion [Bolzano, by Correia/Schnieder] |
12232 | A 'proposition' is the sense of a linguistic expression, and can be true or false [Bolzano] |
12233 | The ground of a pure conceptual truth is only in other conceptual truths [Bolzano] |
1838 | Cyrenaic pleasure is a motion, but Epicurean pleasure is a condition [Diog. Laertius] |
1769 | Cynics believe that when a man wishes for nothing he is like the gods [Diog. Laertius] |