745 ideas
21584 | A sense of timelessness is essential to wisdom [Russell] |
9777 | Kant was the first philosopher [Zizek] |
11006 | Russell started a whole movement in philosophy by providing an analysis of descriptions [Read on Russell] |
5361 | Philosophers must get used to absurdities [Russell] |
9778 | There is no dialogue in philosophy [Zizek] |
5368 | Philosophy verifies that our hierarchy of instinctive beliefs is harmonious and consistent [Russell] |
23025 | Philosophers should be more inductive, and test results by their conclusions, not their self-evidence [Russell] |
9779 | Philosophy is transcendental questioning (not supporting science or constructing ontology) [Zizek] |
17641 | Discoveries in mathematics can challenge philosophy, and offer it a new foundation [Russell] |
21572 | Philosophical disputes are mostly hopeless, because philosophers don't understand each other [Russell] |
5432 | Metaphysics cannot give knowledge of the universe as a whole [Russell] |
21571 | Philosophical systems are interesting, but we now need a more objective scientific philosophy [Russell] |
21574 | Hegel's confusions over 'is' show how vast systems can be built on simple errors [Russell] |
21587 | Philosophers sometimes neglect truth and distort facts to attain a nice system [Russell] |
21582 | Physicists accept particles, points and instants, while pretending they don't do metaphysics [Russell] |
6095 | The business of metaphysics is to describe the world [Russell] |
14122 | Analysis gives us nothing but the truth - but never the whole truth [Russell] |
6118 | Philosophy is logical analysis, followed by synthesis [Russell] |
6420 | Only by analysing is progress possible in philosophy [Russell] |
6432 | Analysis gives new knowledge, without destroying what we already have [Russell] |
14109 | The study of grammar is underestimated in philosophy [Russell] |
7529 | All philosophy should begin with an analysis of propositions [Russell] |
14456 | 'Socrates is human' expresses predication, and 'Socrates is a man' expresses identity [Russell] |
21552 | Common speech is vague; its vocabulary and syntax must be modified, for precision [Russell] |
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
21546 | We can't sharply distinguish variables, domains and values, if symbols frighten us [Russell] |
21573 | When problems are analysed properly, they are either logical, or not philosophical at all [Russell] |
6116 | A logical language would show up the fallacy of inferring reality from ordinary language [Russell] |
14165 | Analysis falsifies, if when the parts are broken down they are not equivalent to their sum [Russell] |
5434 | Philosophy is similar to science, and has no special source of wisdom [Russell] |
6117 | Philosophy should be built on science, to reduce error [Russell] |
8378 | Philosophers usually learn science from each other, not from science [Russell] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
17638 | If one proposition is deduced from another, they are more certain together than alone [Russell] |
5396 | Three Laws of Thought: identity, contradiction, and excluded middle [Russell] |
5405 | The law of contradiction is not a 'law of thought', but a belief about things [Russell] |
17632 | Non-contradiction was learned from instances, and then found to be indubitable [Russell] |
6106 | Reducing entities and premisses makes error less likely [Russell] |
14426 | A definition by 'extension' enumerates items, and one by 'intension' gives a defining property [Russell] |
21560 | Any linguistic expression may lack meaning when taken out of context [Russell] |
21551 | Empirical words need ostensive definition, which makes them egocentric [Russell] |
14115 | Definition by analysis into constituents is useless, because it neglects the whole [Russell] |
14159 | In mathematics definitions are superfluous, as they name classes, and it all reduces to primitives [Russell] |
14148 | Infinite regresses have propositions made of propositions etc, with the key term reappearing [Russell] |
18002 | As well as a truth value, propositions have a range of significance for their variables [Russell] |
21561 | 'The number one is bald' or 'the number one is fond of cream cheese' are meaningless [Russell] |
8468 | The sentence 'procrastination drinks quadruplicity' is meaningless, rather than false [Russell, by Orenstein] |
6437 | The theory of types makes 'Socrates and killing are two' illegitimate [Russell] |
5420 | Truth is a property of a belief, but dependent on its external relations, not its internal qualities [Russell] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
6442 | Truth belongs to beliefs, not to propositions and sentences [Russell] |
5419 | Truth and falsehood are properties of beliefs and statements [Russell] |
14102 | What is true or false is not mental, and is best called 'propositions' [Russell] |
5784 | In its primary and formal sense, 'true' applies to propositions, not beliefs [Russell] |
8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
5417 | A good theory of truth must make falsehood possible [Russell] |
16477 | Asserting not-p is saying p is false [Russell] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
5777 | The truth or falsehood of a belief depends upon a fact to which the belief 'refers' [Russell] |
6090 | Facts make propositions true or false, and are expressed by whole sentences [Russell] |
21544 | It seems that when a proposition is false, something must fail to subsist [Russell] |
18348 | Not only atomic truths, but also general and negative truths, have truth-makers [Russell, by Rami] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
6343 | For Russell, both propositions and facts are arrangements of objects, so obviously they correspond [Horwich on Russell] |
7395 | Truth as congruence may work for complex beliefs, but not for simple beliefs about existence [Joslin on Russell] |
5428 | Beliefs are true if they have corresponding facts, and false if they don't [Russell] |
5783 | Propositions of existence, generalities, disjunctions and hypotheticals make correspondence tricky [Russell] |
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
5421 | The coherence theory says falsehood is failure to cohere, and truth is fitting into a complete system of Truth [Russell] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
5422 | More than one coherent body of beliefs seems possible [Russell] |
5423 | If we suspend the law of contradiction, nothing will appear to be incoherent [Russell] |
5424 | Coherence is not the meaning of truth, but an important test for truth [Russell] |
14454 | An argument 'satisfies' a function φx if φa is true [Russell] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
14176 | "The death of Caesar is true" is not the same proposition as "Caesar died" [Russell] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
5401 | The mortality of Socrates is more certain from induction than it is from deduction [Russell] |
14453 | The Darapti syllogism is fallacious: All M is S, all M is P, so some S is P' - but if there is no M? [Russell] |
16484 | There are four experiences that lead us to talk of 'some' things [Russell] |
14113 | The null class is a fiction [Russell] |
6103 | Normally a class with only one member is a problem, because the class and the member are identical [Russell] |
14427 | We can enumerate finite classes, but an intensional definition is needed for infinite classes [Russell] |
14428 | Members define a unique class, whereas defining characteristics are numerous [Russell] |
14447 | Infinity says 'for any inductive cardinal, there is a class having that many terms' [Russell] |
14440 | We may assume that there are infinite collections, as there is no logical reason against them [Russell] |
14443 | The British parliament has one representative selected from each constituency [Russell] |
14445 | Choice shows that if any two cardinals are not equal, one must be the greater [Russell] |
14444 | Choice is equivalent to the proposition that every class is well-ordered [Russell] |
14446 | We can pick all the right or left boots, but socks need Choice to insure the representative class [Russell] |
18130 | Axiom of Reducibility: there is always a function of the lowest possible order in a given level [Russell, by Bostock] |
14459 | Reducibility: a family of functions is equivalent to a single type of function [Russell] |
21563 | The 'no classes' theory says the propositions just refer to the members [Russell] |
14461 | Propositions about classes can be reduced to propositions about their defining functions [Russell] |
15894 | Russell invented the naïve set theory usually attributed to Cantor [Russell, by Lavine] |
14126 | Order rests on 'between' and 'separation' [Russell] |
14127 | Order depends on transitive asymmetrical relations [Russell] |
8469 | Russell's proposal was that only meaningful predicates have sets as their extensions [Russell, by Orenstein] |
11064 | Classes can be reduced to propositional functions [Russell, by Hanna] |
7548 | Classes, grouped by a convenient property, are logical constructions [Russell] |
8745 | Classes are logical fictions, and are not part of the ultimate furniture of the world [Russell] |
6436 | I gradually replaced classes with properties, and they ended as a symbolic convenience [Russell] |
14121 | The part-whole relation is ultimate and indefinable [Russell] |
6110 | Subject-predicate logic (and substance-attribute metaphysics) arise from Aryan languages [Russell] |
21588 | Logic gives the method of research in philosophy [Russell] |
6107 | It is logic, not metaphysics, that is fundamental to philosophy [Russell] |
14452 | All the propositions of logic are completely general [Russell] |
16486 | The physical world doesn't need logic, but the mental world does [Russell] |
21495 | Theoretical and practical politics are both concerned with the best lives for individuals [Russell] |
14462 | In modern times, logic has become mathematical, and mathematics has become logical [Russell] |
5395 | Demonstration always relies on the rule that anything implied by a truth is true [Russell] |
14106 | Implication cannot be defined [Russell] |
14108 | It would be circular to use 'if' and 'then' to define material implication [Russell] |
14464 | Logic can be known a priori, without study of the actual world [Russell] |
14167 | The only classes are things, predicates and relations [Russell] |
10057 | Logic can only assert hypothetical existence [Russell] |
22329 | Logic is highly general truths abstracted from reality [Russell, by Glock] |
12444 | Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as zoology [Russell] |
10053 | Geometrical axioms imply the propositions, but the former may not be true [Russell] |
21539 | Excluded middle can be stated psychologically, as denial of p implies assertion of not-p [Russell] |
18944 | Russell's theories aim to preserve excluded middle (saying all sentences are T or F) [Sawyer on Russell] |
2947 | Questions wouldn't lead anywhere without the law of excluded middle [Russell] |
7758 | 'Elizabeth = Queen of England' is really a predication, not an identity-statement [Russell, by Lycan] |
6092 | In a logically perfect language, there will be just one word for every simple object [Russell] |
6101 | Romulus does not occur in the proposition 'Romulus did not exist' [Russell] |
6115 | Vagueness, and simples being beyond experience, are obstacles to a logical language [Russell] |
7528 | Leibniz bases everything on subject/predicate and substance/property propositions [Russell] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
23476 | Logical constants seem to be entities in propositions, but are actually pure form [Russell] |
23477 | We use logical notions, so they must be objects - but I don't know what they really are [Russell] |
21586 | The logical connectives are not objects, but are formal, and need a context [Russell] |
21597 | Logical connectives have the highest precision, yet are infected by the vagueness of true and false [Russell, by Williamson] |
14105 | There seem to be eight or nine logical constants [Russell] |
18722 | Negations are not just reversals of truth-value, since that can happen without negation [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
16489 | Is it possible to state every possible truth about the whole course of nature without using 'not'? [Russell] |
16479 | 'Or' expresses hesitation, in a dog at a crossroads, or birds risking grabbing crumbs [Russell] |
16481 | 'Or' expresses a mental state, not something about the world [Russell] |
16487 | Maybe the 'or' used to describe mental states is not the 'or' of logic [Russell] |
16480 | A disjunction expresses indecision [Russell] |
16483 | Disjunction may also arise in practice if there is imperfect memory. [Russell] |
14104 | Constants are absolutely definite and unambiguous [Russell] |
14114 | Variables don't stand alone, but exist as parts of propositional functions [Russell] |
5772 | The idea of a variable is fundamental [Russell] |
21566 | 'Propositional functions' are ambiguous until the variable is given a value [Russell] |
6102 | You can understand 'author of Waverley', but to understand 'Scott' you must know who it applies to [Russell] |
10423 | There are a set of criteria for pinning down a logically proper name [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
14458 | Asking 'Did Homer exist?' is employing an abbreviated description [Russell] |
4945 | Russell says names are not denotations, but definite descriptions in disguise [Russell, by Kripke] |
18942 | Russell says a name contributes a complex of properties, rather than an object [Russell, by Sawyer] |
7745 | Are names descriptions, if the description is unknown, false, not special, or contains names? [McCullogh on Russell] |
5386 | Proper names are really descriptions, and can be replaced by a description in a person's mind [Russell] |
7744 | Treat description using quantifiers, and treat proper names as descriptions [Russell, by McCullogh] |
10450 | Russell admitted that even names could also be used as descriptions [Russell, by Bach] |
14457 | Names are really descriptions, except for a few words like 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
18941 | Names don't have a sense, but are disguised definite descriptions [Russell, by Sawyer] |
15159 | The meaning of a logically proper name is its referent, but most names are not logically proper [Russell, by Soames] |
10449 | Logically proper names introduce objects; definite descriptions introduce quantifications [Russell, by Bach] |
6410 | The only real proper names are 'this' and 'that'; the rest are really definite descriptions. [Russell, by Grayling] |
2612 | Russell rewrote singular term names as predicates [Russell, by Ayer] |
7757 | "Nobody" is not a singular term, but a quantifier [Russell, by Lycan] |
18943 | Russell implies that all sentences containing empty names are false [Sawyer on Russell] |
6439 | Names are meaningless unless there is an object which they designate [Russell] |
10426 | A name has got to name something or it is not a name [Russell] |
7311 | The only genuine proper names are 'this' and 'that' [Russell] |
14455 | 'I met a unicorn' is meaningful, and so is 'unicorn', but 'a unicorn' is not [Russell] |
6411 | Critics say definite descriptions can refer, and may not embody both uniqueness and existence claims [Grayling on Russell] |
10433 | Definite descriptions fail to refer in three situations, so they aren't essentially referring [Russell, by Sainsbury] |
5385 | The phrase 'a so-and-so' is an 'ambiguous' description'; 'the so-and-so' (singular) is a 'definite' description [Russell] |
1608 | The theory of descriptions eliminates the name of the entity whose existence was presupposed [Russell, by Quine] |
7754 | Russell's theory explains non-existents, negative existentials, identity problems, and substitutivity [Russell, by Lycan] |
21529 | Russell showed how to define 'the', and thereby reduce the ontology of logic [Russell, by Lackey] |
6333 | The theory of definite descriptions reduces the definite article 'the' to the concepts of predicate logic [Russell, by Horwich] |
6412 | Russell implies that 'the baby is crying' is only true if the baby is unique [Grayling on Russell] |
7743 | Russell explained descriptions with quantifiers, where Frege treated them as names [Russell, by McCullogh] |
7310 | Russell avoids non-existent objects by denying that definite descriptions are proper names [Russell, by Miller,A] |
12006 | Denying definite description sentences are subject-predicate in form blocks two big problems [Russell, by Forbes,G] |
4569 | Russell says apparent referring expressions are really assertions about properties [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
11009 | Russell's theory must be wrong if it says all statements about non-existents are false [Read on Russell] |
21549 | The theory of descriptions lacks conventions for the scope of quantifiers [Lackey on Russell] |
12796 | Non-count descriptions don't threaten Russell's theory, which is only about singulars [Laycock on Russell] |
7532 | Denoting is crucial in Russell's account of mathematics, for identifying classes [Russell, by Monk] |
11988 | Russell's analysis means molecular sentences are ambiguous over the scope of the description [Kaplan on Russell] |
14137 | 'Any' is better than 'all' where infinite classes are concerned [Russell] |
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
6061 | Existence is entirely expressed by the existential quantifier [Russell, by McGinn] |
18273 | Logical truths are known by their extreme generality [Russell] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
17629 | Which premises are ultimate varies with context [Russell] |
17630 | The sources of a proof are the reasons why we believe its conclusion [Russell] |
17640 | Finding the axioms may be the only route to some new results [Russell] |
6109 | Some axioms may only become accepted when they lead to obvious conclusions [Russell] |
7557 | To solve Zeno's paradox, reject the axiom that the whole has more terms than the parts [Russell] |
14149 | The Achilles Paradox concerns the one-one correlation of infinite classes [Russell] |
21585 | The tortoise won't win, because infinite instants don't compose an infinitely long time [Russell] |
21565 | Richard's puzzle uses the notion of 'definition' - but that cannot be defined [Russell] |
15895 | Russell discovered the paradox suggested by Burali-Forti's work [Russell, by Lavine] |
13365 | Russell's Paradox is a stripped-down version of Cantor's Paradox [Priest,G on Russell] |
10711 | Russell's paradox means we cannot assume that every property is collectivizing [Potter on Russell] |
6407 | The class of classes which lack self-membership leads to a contradiction [Russell, by Grayling] |
21564 | Vicious Circle: what involves ALL must not be one of those ALL [Russell] |
21567 | 'All judgements made by Epimenedes are true' needs the judgements to be of the same type [Russell] |
16475 | A 'heterological' predicate can't be predicated of itself; so is 'heterological' heterological? Yes=no! [Russell] |
10059 | In mathematic we are ignorant of both subject-matter and truth [Russell] |
14152 | In geometry, Kant and idealists aimed at the certainty of the premisses [Russell] |
14154 | Geometry throws no light on the nature of actual space [Russell] |
14151 | Pure geometry is deductive, and neutral over what exists [Russell] |
14153 | In geometry, empiricists aimed at premisses consistent with experience [Russell] |
14155 | Two points have a line joining them (descriptive), a distance (metrical), and a whole line (projective) [Russell, by PG] |
14442 | If straight lines were like ratios they might intersect at a 'gap', and have no point in common [Russell] |
18254 | Russell's approach had to treat real 5/8 as different from rational 5/8 [Russell, by Dummett] |
14144 | Ordinals result from likeness among relations, as cardinals from similarity among classes [Russell] |
14438 | New numbers solve problems: negatives for subtraction, fractions for division, complex for equations [Russell] |
14128 | Some claim priority for the ordinals over cardinals, but there is no logical priority between them [Russell] |
14129 | Ordinals presuppose two relations, where cardinals only presuppose one [Russell] |
14132 | Properties of numbers don't rely on progressions, so cardinals may be more basic [Russell] |
13510 | Could a number just be something which occurs in a progression? [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
14141 | Ordinals are defined through mathematical induction [Russell] |
14142 | Ordinals are types of series of terms in a row, rather than the 'nth' instance [Russell] |
14139 | Transfinite ordinals don't obey commutativity, so their arithmetic is quite different from basic arithmetic [Russell] |
14145 | For Cantor ordinals are types of order, not numbers [Russell] |
14146 | We aren't sure if one cardinal number is always bigger than another [Russell] |
14135 | Real numbers are a class of rational numbers (and so not really numbers at all) [Russell] |
14436 | A series can be 'Cut' in two, where the lower class has no maximum, the upper no minimum [Russell] |
14439 | A complex number is simply an ordered couple of real numbers [Russell] |
14421 | Discovering that 1 is a number was difficult [Russell] |
14123 | Some quantities can't be measured, and some non-quantities are measurable [Russell] |
14158 | Quantity is not part of mathematics, where it is replaced by order [Russell] |
14120 | Counting explains none of the real problems about the foundations of arithmetic [Russell] |
14424 | Numbers are needed for counting, so they need a meaning, and not just formal properties [Russell] |
14118 | We can define one-to-one without mentioning unity [Russell] |
14441 | The formal laws of arithmetic are the Commutative, the Associative and the Distributive [Russell] |
14119 | We do not currently know whether, of two infinite numbers, one must be greater than the other [Russell] |
14133 | There are cardinal and ordinal theories of infinity (while continuity is entirely ordinal) [Russell] |
14420 | Infinity and continuity used to be philosophy, but are now mathematics [Russell] |
7556 | A collection is infinite if you can remove some terms without diminishing its number [Russell] |
14134 | Infinite numbers are distinguished by disobeying induction, and the part equalling the whole [Russell] |
14143 | ω names the whole series, or the generating relation of the series of ordinal numbers [Russell] |
14138 | You can't get a new transfinite cardinal from an old one just by adding finite numbers to it [Russell] |
14140 | For every transfinite cardinal there is an infinite collection of transfinite ordinals [Russell] |
17627 | It seems absurd to prove 2+2=4, where the conclusion is more certain than premises [Russell] |
10052 | Geometry is united by the intuitive axioms of projective geometry [Russell, by Musgrave] |
14431 | The definition of order needs a transitive relation, to leap over infinite intermediate terms [Russell] |
14124 | Axiom of Archimedes: a finite multiple of a lesser magnitude can always exceed a greater [Russell] |
7530 | Russell tried to replace Peano's Postulates with the simple idea of 'class' [Russell, by Monk] |
18246 | Dedekind failed to distinguish the numbers from other progressions [Shapiro on Russell] |
14422 | Any founded, non-repeating series all reachable in steps will satisfy Peano's axioms [Russell] |
14423 | '0', 'number' and 'successor' cannot be defined by Peano's axioms [Russell] |
14147 | Denying mathematical induction gave us the transfinite [Russell] |
14125 | Finite numbers, unlike infinite numbers, obey mathematical induction [Russell] |
14116 | Numbers were once defined on the basis of 1, but neglected infinities and + [Russell] |
14117 | Numbers are properties of classes [Russell] |
14425 | A number is something which characterises collections of the same size [Russell] |
14434 | What matters is the logical interrelation of mathematical terms, not their intrinsic nature [Russell] |
9977 | Ordinals can't be defined just by progression; they have intrinsic qualities [Russell] |
14162 | Mathematics doesn't care whether its entities exist [Russell] |
17628 | Arithmetic was probably inferred from relationships between physical objects [Russell] |
5399 | Maths is not known by induction, because further instances are not needed to support it [Russell] |
14465 | Maybe numbers are adjectives, since 'ten men' grammatically resembles 'white men' [Russell] |
13414 | For Russell, numbers are sets of equivalent sets [Russell, by Benacerraf] |
14103 | Pure mathematics is the class of propositions of the form 'p implies q' [Russell] |
6108 | Maths can be deduced from logical axioms and the logic of relations [Russell] |
6423 | We tried to define all of pure maths using logical premisses and concepts [Russell] |
21555 | For 'x is a u' to be meaningful, u must be one range of individuals (or 'type') higher than x [Russell] |
18003 | In 'x is a u', x and u must be of different types, so 'x is an x' is generally meaningless [Russell, by Magidor] |
10418 | Type theory seems an extreme reaction, since self-exemplification is often innocuous [Swoyer on Russell] |
10047 | Russell's improvements blocked mathematics as well as paradoxes, and needed further axioms [Russell, by Musgrave] |
23478 | Type theory means that features shared by different levels cannot be expressed [Morris,M on Russell] |
23457 | Type theory cannot identify features across levels (because such predicates break the rules) [Morris,M on Russell] |
21556 | Classes are defined by propositional functions, and functions are typed, with an axiom of reducibility [Russell, by Lackey] |
21718 | Ramified types can be defended as a system of intensional logic, with a 'no class' view of sets [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
21570 | Numbers are just verbal conveniences, which can be analysed away [Russell] |
6424 | Formalists say maths is merely conventional marks on paper, like the arbitrary rules of chess [Russell] |
6425 | Formalism can't apply numbers to reality, so it is an evasion [Russell] |
6104 | Numbers are classes of classes, and hence fictions of fictions [Russell] |
6426 | Intuitionism says propositions are only true or false if there is a method of showing it [Russell] |
21559 | We need rules for deciding which norms are predicative (unless none of them are) [Russell] |
18126 | A set does not exist unless at least one of its specifications is predicative [Russell, by Bostock] |
18128 | Russell is a conceptualist here, saying some abstracta only exist because definitions create them [Russell, by Bostock] |
18124 | Vicious Circle says if it is expressed using the whole collection, it can't be in the collection [Russell, by Bostock] |
21568 | A one-variable function is only 'predicative' if it is one order above its arguments [Russell] |
21558 | 'Predicative' norms are those which define a class [Russell] |
14449 | There is always something psychological about inference [Russell] |
14463 | Existence can only be asserted of something described, not of something named [Russell] |
11010 | Being is what belongs to every possible object of thought [Russell] |
14161 | Many things have being (as topics of propositions), but may not have actual existence [Russell] |
14173 | What exists has causal relations, but non-existent things may also have them [Russell] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
6402 | In 1927, Russell analysed force and matter in terms of events [Russell, by Grayling] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
16045 | General facts supervene on particular facts, but cannot be inferred from them [Russell, by Bennett,K] |
10968 | Russell gave up logical atomism because of negative, general and belief propositions [Russell, by Read] |
21684 | Atomic facts may be inferrable from others, but never from non-atomic facts [Russell] |
21708 | Russell's new logical atomist was of particulars, universals and facts (not platonic propositions) [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
19051 | Russell's atomic facts are actually compounds, and his true logical atoms are sense data [Russell, by Quine] |
6089 | Logical atomism aims at logical atoms as the last residue of analysis [Russell] |
6100 | Once you have enumerated all the atomic facts, there is a further fact that those are all the facts [Russell] |
6105 | Logical atoms aims to get down to ultimate simples, with their own unique reality [Russell] |
6113 | To mean facts we assert them; to mean simples we name them [Russell] |
6114 | 'Simples' are not experienced, but are inferred at the limits of analysis [Russell] |
21722 | Better to construct from what is known, than to infer what is unknown [Russell] |
21681 | Given all true atomic propositions, in theory every other truth can thereby be deduced [Russell] |
6419 | In 1899-1900 I adopted the philosophy of logical atomism [Russell] |
6438 | Complex things can be known, but not simple things [Russell] |
6472 | Continuity is a sufficient criterion for the identity of a rock, but not for part of a smooth fluid [Russell] |
21538 | If two people perceive the same object, the object of perception can't be in the mind [Russell] |
5370 | Space is neutral between touch and sight, so it cannot really be either of them [Russell] |
7545 | Visible things are physical and external, but only exist when viewed [Russell] |
14429 | Classes are logical fictions, made from defining characteristics [Russell] |
21709 | You can't name all the facts, so they are not real, but are what propositions assert [Russell] |
6111 | As propositions can be put in subject-predicate form, we wrongly infer that facts have substance-quality form [Russell] |
6434 | Facts are everything, except simples; they are either relations or qualities [Russell] |
18376 | Russell asserts atomic, existential, negative and general facts [Russell, by Armstrong] |
5418 | In a world of mere matter there might be 'facts', but no truths [Russell] |
22315 | There can't be a negative of a complex, which is negated by its non-existence [Potter on Russell] |
22316 | A positive and negative fact have the same constituents; their difference is primitive [Russell] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
5465 | Modern trope theory tries, like logical atomism, to reduce things to elementary states [Russell, by Ellis] |
9051 | Since natural language is not precise it cannot be in the province of logic [Russell, by Keefe/Smith] |
9054 | Vagueness is only a characteristic of representations, such as language [Russell] |
6060 | 'Existence' means that a propositional function is sometimes true [Russell] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
18775 | Russell showed that descriptions may not have ontological commitment [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
14163 | Four classes of terms: instants, points, terms at instants only, and terms at instants and points [Russell] |
7533 | The Theory of Description dropped classes and numbers, leaving propositions, individuals and universals [Russell, by Monk] |
21341 | Philosophers of logic and maths insisted that a vocabulary of relations was essential [Russell, by Heil] |
21534 | The only thing we can say about relations is that they relate [Russell] |
21540 | Relational propositions seem to be 'about' their terms, rather than about the relation [Russell] |
21562 | There is no complexity without relations, so no propositions, and no truth [Russell] |
5371 | Because we depend on correspondence, we know relations better than we know the items that relate [Russell] |
5407 | That Edinburgh is north of London is a non-mental fact, so relations are independent universals [Russell] |
21576 | With asymmetrical relations (before/after) the reduction to properties is impossible [Russell] |
14430 | If a relation is symmetrical and transitive, it has to be reflexive [Russell] |
10586 | 'Reflexiveness' holds between a term and itself, and cannot be inferred from symmetry and transitiveness [Russell] |
14432 | 'Asymmetry' is incompatible with its converse; a is husband of b, so b can't be husband of a [Russell] |
10585 | Symmetrical and transitive relations are formally like equality [Russell] |
9127 | Russell refuted Frege's principle that there is a set for each property [Russell, by Sorensen] |
21575 | When we attribute a common quality to a group, we can forget the quality and just talk of the group [Russell] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
6063 | Russell can't attribute existence to properties [McGinn on Russell] |
14327 | Trope theorists cannot explain how tropes resemble each other [Russell, by Mumford] |
5383 | Every complete sentence must contain at least one word (a verb) which stands for a universal [Russell] |
4428 | Propositions express relations (prepositions and verbs) as well as properties (nouns and adjectives) [Russell] |
5406 | Confused views of reality result from thinking that only nouns and adjectives represent universals [Russell] |
4479 | All universals are like the relation "is north of", in having no physical location at all [Russell, by Loux] |
4427 | Every sentence contains at least one word denoting a universal, so we need universals to know truth [Russell] |
21710 | We know a universal in 'yellow differs from blue' or 'yellow resembles blue less than green does' [Russell] |
4030 | Russell claims that universals are needed to explain a priori knowledge (as their relations) [Russell, by Mellor/Oliver] |
5409 | Normal existence is in time, so we must say that universals 'subsist' [Russell] |
5408 | If we identify whiteness with a thought, we can never think of it twice; whiteness is the object of a thought [Russell] |
4441 | 'Resemblance Nominalism' won't work, because the theory treats resemblance itself as a universal [Russell] |
6440 | Universals can't just be words, because words themselves are universals [Russell] |
4429 | If we consider whiteness to be merely a mental 'idea', we rob it of its universality [Russell] |
14732 | A perceived physical object is events grouped around a centre [Russell] |
6473 | Physical things are series of appearances whose matter obeys physical laws [Russell] |
7781 | I call an object of thought a 'term'. This is a wide concept implying unity and existence. [Russell] |
21536 | When I perceive a melody, I do not perceive the notes as existing [Russell] |
21531 | Common sense agrees with Meinong (rather than Russell) that 'Pegasus is a flying horse' is true [Lackey on Russell] |
18777 | If the King of France is not bald, and not not-bald, this violates excluded middle [Linsky,B on Russell] |
21545 | I prefer to deny round squares, and deal with the difficulties by the theory of denoting [Russell] |
21547 | On Meinong's principles 'the existent round square' has to exist [Russell] |
14166 | Unities are only in propositions or concepts, and nothing that exists has unity [Russell] |
21535 | Objects only exist if they 'occupy' space and time [Russell] |
14164 | The only unities are simples, or wholes composed of parts [Russell] |
14112 | A set has some sort of unity, but not enough to be a 'whole' [Russell] |
6465 | We need not deny substance, but there seems no reason to assert it [Russell] |
6471 | The assumption by physicists of permanent substance is not metaphysically legitimate [Russell] |
14733 | An object produces the same percepts with or without a substance, so that is irrelevant to science [Russell] |
14435 | The essence of individuality is beyond description, and hence irrelevant to science [Russell] |
14170 | Change is obscured by substance, a thing's nature, subject-predicate form, and by essences [Russell] |
14107 | Terms are identical if they belong to all the same classes [Russell] |
11849 | It at least makes sense to say two objects have all their properties in common [Wittgenstein on Russell] |
8375 | 'Necessary' is a predicate of a propositional function, saying it is true for all values of its argument [Russell] |
6099 | Modal terms are properties of propositional functions, not of propositions [Russell] |
16490 | Some facts about experience feel like logical necessities [Russell] |
22308 | Only the actual exists, so possibilities always reduce to actuality after full analysis [Russell] |
21533 | Contingency arises from tensed verbs changing the propositions to which they refer [Russell] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
12197 | Inferring q from p only needs p to be true, and 'not-p or q' to be true [Russell] |
14450 | All forms of implication are expressible as truth-functions [Russell] |
22303 | It makes no sense to say that a true proposition could have been false [Russell] |
5400 | In any possible world we feel that two and two would be four [Russell] |
14460 | If something is true in all possible worlds then it is logically necessary [Russell] |
5431 | Knowledge cannot be precisely defined, as it merges into 'probable opinion' [Russell] |
16482 | All our knowledge (if verbal) is general, because all sentences contain general words [Russell] |
6430 | In epistemology we should emphasis the continuity between animal and human minds [Russell] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
5780 | The three questions about belief are its contents, its success, and its character [Russell] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
5426 | Belief relates a mind to several things other than itself [Russell] |
5366 | We have an 'instinctive' belief in the external world, prior to all reflection [Russell] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
17637 | The most obvious beliefs are not infallible, as other obvious beliefs may conflict [Russell] |
5359 | Descartes showed that subjective things are the most certain [Russell] |
4758 | Naïve realism leads to physics, but physics then shows that naïve realism is false [Russell] |
21537 | I assume we perceive the actual objects, and not their 'presentations' [Russell] |
5377 | 'Acquaintance' is direct awareness, without inferences or judgements [Russell] |
6510 | Russell (1912) said phenomena only resemble reality in abstract structure [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
5372 | There is no reason to think that objects have colours [Russell] |
21580 | Science condemns sense-data and accepts matter, but a logical construction must link them [Russell] |
6466 | Where possible, logical constructions are to be substituted for inferred entities [Russell] |
6418 | Russell rejected phenomenalism because it couldn't account for causal relations [Russell, by Grayling] |
5373 | 'Idealism' says that everything which exists is in some sense mental [Russell] |
5362 | It is not illogical to think that only myself and my mental events exist [Russell] |
7554 | Self-evidence is often a mere will-o'-the-wisp [Russell] |
5412 | Some propositions are self-evident, but their implications may also be self-evident [Russell] |
5413 | Particular instances are more clearly self-evident than any general principles [Russell] |
5415 | As shown by memory, self-evidence comes in degrees [Russell] |
5416 | If self-evidence has degrees, we should accept the more self-evident as correct [Russell] |
5397 | The rationalists were right, because we know logical principles without experience [Russell] |
4430 | All a priori knowledge deals with the relations of universals [Russell] |
5411 | We can know some general propositions by universals, when no instance can be given [Russell] |
6514 | Russell's representationalism says primary qualities only show the structure of reality [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
6415 | After 1912, Russell said sense-data are last in analysis, not first in experience [Russell, by Grayling] |
5358 | 'Sense-data' are what are immediately known in sensation, such as colours or roughnesses [Russell] |
6417 | In 1921 Russell abandoned sense-data, and the gap between sensation and object [Russell, by Grayling] |
6474 | Seeing is not in itself knowledge, but is separate from what is seen, such as a patch of colour [Russell] |
6467 | No sensibile is ever a datum to two people at once [Russell] |
6483 | Russell held that we are aware of states of our own brain [Russell, by Robinson,H] |
8244 | Sense-data are qualities devoid of subjectivity, which are the basis of science [Russell, by Deleuze/Guattari] |
6462 | Sense-data are not mental, but are part of the subject-matter of physics [Russell] |
6463 | Sense-data are objects, and do not contain the subject as part, the way beliefs do [Russell] |
6464 | Sense-data are usually objects within the body, but are not part of the subject [Russell] |
7549 | If my body literally lost its mind, the object seen when I see a flash would still exist [Russell] |
7553 | Sense-data are purely physical [Russell] |
6459 | We do not know whether sense-data exist as objects when they are not data [Russell] |
6460 | 'Sensibilia' are identical to sense-data, without actually being data for any mind [Russell] |
6461 | Ungiven sense-data can no more exist than unmarried husbands [Russell] |
21583 | When sense-data change, there must be indistinguishable sense-data in the process [Russell] |
8854 | My 'acquaintance' with sense-data is nothing like my knowing New York [Williams,M on Russell] |
6458 | Individuating sense-data is difficult, because they divide when closely attended to [Russell] |
6469 | Sense-data may be subjective, if closing our eyes can change them [Russell] |
6476 | We cannot assume that the subject actually exists, so we cannot distinguish sensations from sense-data [Russell] |
6098 | Perception goes straight to the fact, and not through the proposition [Russell] |
21577 | Empirical truths are particular, so general truths need an a priori input of generality [Russell] |
7290 | If Russell rejects innate ideas and direct a priori knowledge, he is left with a tabula rasa [Russell, by Thompson] |
5357 | It is natural to begin from experience, and presumably that is the basis of knowledge [Russell] |
5382 | We are acquainted with outer and inner sensation, memory, Self, and universals [Russell, by PG] |
5389 | Knowledge by descriptions enables us to transcend private experience [Russell] |
16476 | For simple words, a single experience can show that they are true [Russell] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
6441 | Pragmatism judges by effects, but I judge truth by causes [Russell] |
21532 | Full empiricism is not tenable, but empirical investigation is always essential [Russell] |
5376 | I can know the existence of something with which nobody is acquainted [Russell] |
16485 | Perception can't prove universal generalisations, so abandon them, or abandon empiricism? [Russell] |
16488 | It is hard to explain how a sentence like 'it is not raining' can be found true by observation [Russell] |
6431 | Empiricists seem unclear what they mean by 'experience' [Russell] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
5414 | Images are not memory, because they are present, and memories are of the past [Russell] |
2792 | It is possible the world came into existence five minutes ago, complete with false memories [Russell] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
5430 | A true belief is not knowledge if it is reached by bad reasoning [Russell] |
5429 | True belief is not knowledge when it is deduced from false belief [Russell] |
6444 | True belief about the time is not knowledge if I luckily observe a stopped clock at the right moment [Russell] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
5378 | All knowledge (of things and of truths) rests on the foundations of acquaintance [Russell] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
17639 | Believing a whole science is more than believing each of its propositions [Russell] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
21579 | Objects are treated as real when they connect with other experiences in a normal way [Russell] |
22326 | Knowledge needs more than a sensitive response; the response must also be appropriate [Russell] |
5365 | Dreams can be explained fairly scientifically if we assume a physical world [Russell] |
21578 | Global scepticism is irrefutable, but can't replace our other beliefs, and just makes us hesitate [Russell] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
14433 | Mathematically expressed propositions are true of the world, but how to interpret them? [Russell] |
5391 | Science aims to find uniformities to which (within the limits of experience) there are no exceptions [Russell] |
17631 | Induction is inferring premises from consequences [Russell] |
5394 | We can't prove induction from experience without begging the question [Russell] |
5390 | Chickens are not very good at induction, and are surprised when their feeder wrings their neck [Russell] |
5392 | It doesn't follow that because the future has always resembled the past, that it always will [Russell] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
5363 | If the cat reappears in a new position, presumably it has passed through the intermediate positions [Russell] |
5367 | Belief in real objects makes our account of experience simpler and more systematic [Russell] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
5364 | It is hard not to believe that speaking humans are expressing thoughts, just as we do ourselves [Russell] |
6416 | Other minds seem to exist, because their testimony supports realism about the world [Russell, by Grayling] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
5379 | If we didn't know our own minds by introspection, we couldn't know that other people have minds [Russell] |
9780 | Consciousness is a malfunction of evolution [Zizek] |
21569 | It is good to generalise truths as much as possible [Russell] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
5410 | I learn the universal 'resemblance' by seeing two shades of green, and their contrast with red [Russell] |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
5381 | In seeing the sun, we are acquainted with our self, but not as a permanent person [Russell] |
5380 | In perceiving the sun, I am aware of sun sense-data, and of the perceiver of the data [Russell] |
7546 | A man is a succession of momentary men, bound by continuity and causation [Russell] |
6475 | In perception, the self is just a logical fiction demanded by grammar [Russell] |
5778 | If we object to all data which is 'introspective' we will cease to believe in toothaches [Russell] |
6433 | Behaviourists struggle to explain memory and imagination, because they won't admit images [Russell] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
5779 | There are distinct sets of psychological and physical causal laws [Russell] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
7550 | We could probably, in principle, infer minds from brains, and brains from minds [Russell] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
5369 | It is rational to believe in reality, despite the lack of demonstrative reasons for it [Russell] |
5375 | Knowledge of truths applies to judgements; knowledge by acquaintance applies to sensations and things [Russell] |
21711 | Russell's 'multiple relations' theory says beliefs attach to ingredients, not to propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
5427 | Truth is when a mental state corresponds to a complex unity of external constituents [Russell] |
6443 | Surprise is a criterion of error [Russell] |
21542 | Do incorrect judgements have non-existent, or mental, or external objects? [Russell] |
22306 | To explain false belief we should take belief as relating to a proposition's parts, not to the whole thing [Russell] |
5425 | In order to explain falsehood, a belief must involve several terms, not two [Russell] |
6097 | The theory of error seems to need the existence of the non-existent [Russell] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
21541 | The complexity of the content correlates with the complexity of the object [Russell] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
7531 | We don't assert private thoughts; the objects are part of what we assert [Russell] |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
5384 | A universal of which we are aware is called a 'concept' [Russell] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
10583 | Abstraction principles identify a common property, which is some third term with the right relation [Russell] |
10582 | The principle of Abstraction says a symmetrical, transitive relation analyses into an identity [Russell] |
10584 | A certain type of property occurs if and only if there is an equivalence relation [Russell] |
6112 | Meaning takes many different forms, depending on different logical types [Russell] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
13468 | Russell started philosophy of language, by declaring some plausible sentences to be meaningless [Russell, by Hart,WD] |
5388 | Every understood proposition is composed of constituents with which we are acquainted [Russell] |
6427 | Unverifiable propositions about the remote past are still either true or false [Russell] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
4567 | Russell argued with great plausibility that we rarely, if ever, refer with our words [Russell, by Cooper,DE] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
5810 | Referring is not denoting, and Russell ignores the referential use of definite descriptions [Donnellan on Russell] |
16385 | A definite description 'denotes' an entity if it fits the description uniquely [Russell, by Recanati] |
5774 | Denoting phrases are meaningless, but guarantee meaning for propositions [Russell] |
5775 | In 'Scott is the author of Waverley', denotation is identical, but meaning is different [Russell] |
16987 | By eliminating descriptions from primitive notation, Russell seems to reject 'sense' [Russell, by Kripke] |
5387 | It is pure chance which descriptions in a person's mind make a name apply to an individual [Russell] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
4570 | Russell assumes that expressions refer, but actually speakers refer by using expressions [Cooper,DE on Russell] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
9022 | Russell uses 'propositional function' to refer to both predicates and to attributes [Quine on Russell] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
16349 | Russell rejected sense/reference, because it made direct acquaintance with things impossible [Russell, by Recanati] |
7313 | 'Sense' is superfluous (rather than incoherent) [Russell, by Miller,A] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
7767 | The theory of definite descriptions aims at finding correct truth conditions [Russell, by Lycan] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
21550 | Science reduces indexicals to a minimum, but they can never be eliminated from empirical matters [Russell] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
5776 | A proposition is what we believe when we believe truly or falsely [Russell] |
14451 | Propositions are mainly verbal expressions of true or false, and perhaps also symbolic thoughts [Russell] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
14110 | Proposition contain entities indicated by words, rather than the words themselves [Russell] |
21543 | If p is false, then believing not-p is knowing a truth, so negative propositions must exist [Russell] |
6091 | Propositions don't name facts, because each fact corresponds to a proposition and its negation [Russell] |
5781 | Our important beliefs all, if put into words, take the form of propositions [Russell] |
5782 | A proposition expressed in words is a 'word-proposition', and one of images an 'image-proposition' [Russell] |
19164 | If propositions are facts, then false and true propositions are indistinguishable [Davidson on Russell] |
21726 | In graspable propositions the constituents are real entities of acquaintance [Russell] |
21702 | In 1918 still believes in nonlinguistic analogues of sentences, but he now calls them 'facts' [Russell, by Quine] |
6435 | You can believe the meaning of a sentence without thinking of the words [Russell] |
22307 | Propositions don't name facts, because two opposed propositions can match one fact [Russell] |
14111 | A proposition is a unity, and analysis destroys it [Russell] |
19157 | Russell said the proposition must explain its own unity - or else objective truth is impossible [Russell, by Davidson] |
7534 | In 1906, Russell decided that propositions did not, after all, exist [Russell, by Monk] |
21724 | The main aim of the multiple relations theory of judgement was to dispense with propositions [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
6094 | An inventory of the world does not need to include propositions [Russell] |
6096 | I no longer believe in propositions, especially concerning falsehoods [Russell] |
21712 | I know longer believe in shadowy things like 'that today is Wednesday' when it is actually Tuesday [Russell] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
16491 | If we define 'this is not blue' as disbelief in 'this is blue', we eliminate 'not' as an ingredient of facts [Russell] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
6093 | The names in a logically perfect language would be private, and could not be shared [Russell] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
16478 | A mother cat is paralysed if equidistant between two needy kittens [Russell] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
21740 | I doubt whether ethics is part of philosophy [Russell] |
23154 | We divide mankind into friend and foe, and cooperate with one and compete with the other [Russell] |
21741 | 'You ought to do p' primarily has emotional content, expressing approval [Russell] |
9781 | Tolerance and love are strategies to avoid encountering our neighbours [Zizek] |
21746 | Unlike hate, all desires can be satisfied by love [Russell] |
21747 | Goodness is a combination of love and knowledge [Russell] |
21743 | In wartime, happiness is hating the enemy, because it gives the war a purpose [Russell] |
20180 | A happy and joyous life must largely be a quiet life [Russell] |
21742 | Originally virtue was obedience, to gods, government, or custom [Russell] |
21517 | Individuals need creativity, reverence for others, and self-respect [Russell] |
21745 | Act so as to produce harmonious rather than discordant desires [Russell] |
5398 | Judgements of usefulness depend on judgements of value [Russell] |
20177 | Boredom always involves not being fully occupied [Russell] |
20179 | Happiness involves enduring boredom, and the young should be taught this [Russell] |
20176 | Boredom is an increasingly strong motivating power [Russell] |
20178 | Life is now more interesting, but boredom is more frightening [Russell] |
23153 | Gradually loyalty to a creed increased, which could even outweigh nationality [Russell] |
23152 | Increasingly war expands communities, and unifies them through fear [Russell] |
23155 | In early societies the leaders needed cohesion, but the rest just had to obey [Russell] |
23156 | The economic and political advantages of great size seem to have no upper limit [Russell] |
23157 | Government has a negative purpose, to prevent trouble, and a positive aim of realising our desires [Russell] |
23151 | A monarch is known to everyone in the group, and can thus unite large groups [Russell] |
21522 | Democracy is inadequate without a great deal of devolution [Russell] |
21523 | We would not want UK affairs to be settled by a world parliament [Russell] |
23167 | Power should be with smaller bodies, as long as it doesn't restrict central powers [Russell] |
21521 | Anarchy does not maximise liberty [Russell] |
23163 | In an anarchy universities, research, books, and even seaside holidays, would be impossible [Russell] |
23168 | A state is essential, to control greedy or predatory impulses [Russell] |
21528 | Groups should be autonomous, with a neutral authority as arbitrator [Russell] |
21527 | On every new question the majority is always wrong at first [Russell] |
23166 | In democracy we are more aware of being governed than of our tiny share in government [Russell] |
23169 | Democratic institutions become impossible in a fanatical democracy [Russell] |
21526 | Unfortunately ordinary voters can't detect insincerity [Russell] |
23170 | Liberal opinions are tentative rather than dogmatic, and are always responsive to new evidence [Russell] |
23172 | Empiricist Liberalism is the only view for someone who favours scientific evidence and happiness [Russell] |
23171 | Empiricism is ethically superior, because dogmatism favours persecution and hatred [Russell] |
21525 | When the state is the only employer, there is no refuge from the prejudices of other people [Russell] |
23162 | Managers are just as remote from workers under nationalisation as under capitalism [Russell] |
23165 | Socialists say economic justice needs some state control of industries, and of foreign trade [Russell] |
23160 | Being a slave of society is hardly better than being a slave of a despot [Russell] |
21518 | Men unite in pursuit of material things, and idealise greed as part of group loyalty [Russell] |
23158 | Slavery began the divorce between the work and the purposes of the worker [Russell] |
21519 | We need security and liberty, and then encouragement of creativity [Russell] |
23161 | Slaves can be just as equal as free people [Russell] |
23159 | Scarce goods may be denied entirely, to avoid their unequal distribution [Russell] |
21524 | The right to own land gives a legal right to a permanent income [Russell] |
23164 | Modern justice is seen as equality, apart from modest extra rewards for exceptional desert [Russell] |
21744 | Legally curbing people's desires is inferior to improving their desires [Russell] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14175 | We can drop 'cause', and just make inferences between facts [Russell] |
14172 | Moments and points seem to imply other moments and points, but don't cause them [Russell] |
4396 | The law of causality is a source of confusion, and should be dropped from philosophy [Russell] |
8376 | If causes are contiguous with events, only the last bit is relevant, or the event's timing is baffling [Russell] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
8380 | Striking a match causes its igniting, even if it sometimes doesn't work [Russell] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
17633 | The law of gravity has many consequences beyond its grounding observations [Russell] |
8379 | In causal laws, 'events' must recur, so they have to be universals, not particulars [Russell] |
8381 | The constancy of scientific laws rests on differential equations, not on cause and effect [Russell] |
14174 | The laws of motion and gravitation are just parts of the definition of a kind of matter [Russell] |
5393 | We can't know that our laws are exceptionless, or even that there are any laws [Russell] |
14168 | Occupying a place and change are prior to motion, so motion is just occupying places at continuous times [Russell] |
4786 | Russell's 'at-at' theory says motion is to be at the intervening points at the intervening instants [Russell, by Psillos] |
14171 | Force is supposed to cause acceleration, but acceleration is a mathematical fiction [Russell] |
6470 | Matter is the limit of appearances as distance from the object diminishes [Russell] |
7551 | Matter is a logical construction [Russell] |
7547 | Matter requires a division into time-corpuscles as well as space-corpuscles [Russell] |
21706 | At first matter is basic and known by sense-data; later Russell says matter is constructed [Russell, by Linsky,B] |
6468 | There is 'private space', and there is also the 'space of perspectives' [Russell] |
7552 | Six dimensions are needed for a particular, three within its own space, and three to locate that space [Russell] |
14160 | Space is the extension of 'point', and aggregates of points seem necessary for geometry [Russell] |
21581 | We never experience times, but only succession of events [Russell] |
14156 | Mathematicians don't distinguish between instants of time and points on a line [Russell] |
22891 | We could be aware of time if senses briefly vibrated, extending their experience of movement [Russell, by Bardon] |
14169 | The 'universe' can mean what exists now, what always has or will exist [Russell] |
2609 | If God's decrees are good, and this is not a mere tautology, then goodness is separate from God's decrees [Russell] |
5773 | The ontological argument begins with an unproven claim that 'there exists an x..' [Russell] |
6119 | You can discuss 'God exists', so 'God' is a description, not a name [Russell] |
21520 | That our heaven is a dull place reflects the misery of excessive work in life [Russell] |