250 ideas
5196 | Philosophy is a department of logic [Ayer] |
5189 | Philosophers should abandon speculation, as philosophy is wholly critical [Ayer] |
7919 | Humeans rejected the a priori synthetic, and so rejected even Kantian metaphysics [Ayer, by Macdonald,C] |
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
5195 | Critics say analysis can only show the parts, and not their distinctive configuration [Ayer] |
5179 | Philosophy deals with the questions that scientists do not wish to handle [Ayer] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
5331 | You can't infer that because you have a hidden birth-mark, everybody else does [Ayer] |
19463 | Induction assumes some uniformity in nature, or that in some respects the future is like the past [Ayer] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
4749 | We cannot analyse the concept of 'truth', because it is simply a mark that a sentence is asserted [Ayer] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
5202 | Maths and logic are true universally because they are analytic or tautological [Ayer] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
6523 | Positivists regard ontology as either meaningless or stipulated [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
2611 | It is currently held that quantifying over something implies belief in its existence [Ayer] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
16520 | We see properties necessary for a kind (in the definition), but not for an individual [Ayer] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
5183 | Only tautologies can be certain; other propositions can only be probable [Ayer] |
19459 | To say 'I am not thinking' must be false, but it might have been true, so it isn't self-contradictory [Ayer] |
19460 | 'I know I exist' has no counterevidence, so it may be meaningless [Ayer] |
19461 | Knowing I exist reveals nothing at all about my nature [Ayer] |
6525 | Logical positivists could never give the sense-data equivalent of 'there is a table next door' [Robinson,H on Ayer] |
5170 | Material things are constructions from actual and possible occurrences of sense-contents [Ayer] |
8824 | No one has defended translational phenomenalism since Ayer in 1940 [Ayer, by Kim] |
2614 | Modern phenomenalism holds that objects are logical constructions out of sense-data [Ayer] |
5198 | We could verify 'a thing can't be in two places at once' by destroying one of the things [Ierubino on Ayer] |
2619 | Whether geometry can be applied to reality is an empirical question outside of geometry [Ayer] |
5197 | By changing definitions we could make 'a thing can't be in two places at once' a contradiction [Ayer] |
5204 | To say that a proposition is true a priori is to say that it is a tautology [Ayer] |
2615 | The concept of sense-data allows us to discuss appearances without worrying about reality [Ayer] |
6524 | Positivists prefer sense-data to objects, because the vocabulary covers both illusions and perceptions [Ayer, by Robinson,H] |
5193 | Causal and representative theories of perception are wrong as they refer to unobservables [Ayer] |
5200 | The main claim of rationalism is that thought is an independent source of knowledge [Ayer] |
4729 | Empiricism lacked a decent account of the a priori, until Ayer said it was entirely analytic [O'Grady on Ayer] |
5180 | All propositions (especially 'metaphysics') must begin with the senses [Ayer] |
5169 | My empiricism logically distinguishes analytic and synthetic propositions, and metaphysical verbiage [Ayer] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
5185 | It is further sense-experience which informs us of the mistakes that arise out of sense-experience [Ayer] |
5199 | Empiricism, it is said, cannot account for our knowledge of necessary truths [Ayer] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
5163 | Basic propositions refer to a single experience, are incorrigible, and conclusively verifiable [Ayer] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
21515 | Incoherence may be more important for enquiry than coherence [Olsson] |
21514 | Coherence is the capacity to answer objections [Olsson] |
21496 | Mere agreement of testimonies is not enough to make truth very likely [Olsson] |
21499 | Coherence is only needed if the information sources are not fully reliable [Olsson] |
21502 | A purely coherent theory cannot be true of the world without some contact with the world [Olsson] |
21512 | Extending a system makes it less probable, so extending coherence can't make it more probable [Olsson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
19464 | We only discard a hypothesis after one failure if it appears likely to keep on failing [Ayer] |
5190 | The induction problem is to prove generalisations about the future based on the past [Ayer] |
19462 | Induction passes from particular facts to other particulars, or to general laws, non-deductively [Ayer] |
5191 | We can't use the uniformity of nature to prove induction, as that would be circular [Ayer] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
5177 | Other minds are 'metaphysical' objects, because I can never observe their experiences [Ayer] |
5662 | Maybe induction could never prove the existence of something unobservable [Ayer] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
5178 | A conscious object is by definition one that behaves in a certain way, so behaviour proves consciousness [Ayer] |
2613 | The theory of other minds has no rival [Ayer] |
5167 | The argument from analogy fails, so the best account of other minds is behaviouristic [Ayer] |
5328 | Originally I combined a mentalistic view of introspection with a behaviouristic view of other minds [Ayer] |
5330 | Physicalism undercuts the other mind problem, by equating experience with 'public' brain events [Ayer] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
5664 | Consciousness must involve a subject, and only bodies identify subjects [Ayer] |
5172 | If the self is meaningful, it must be constructed from sense-experiences [Ayer] |
5325 | Is something an 'experience' because it relates to other experiences, or because it relates to a subject? [Ayer] |
5326 | Qualia must be united by a subject, because they lead to concepts and judgements [Ayer] |
5324 | Bodily identity and memory work together to establish personal identity [Ayer] |
5173 | Two experiences belong to one self if their contents belong with one body [Ayer] |
5176 | Empiricists can define personal identity as bodily identity, which consists of sense-contents [Ayer] |
5668 | People own conscious states because they are causally related to the identifying body [Ayer] |
5322 | Self-consciousness is not basic, because experiences are not instrinsically marked with ownership [Ayer] |
5661 | We identify experiences by their owners, so we can't define owners by their experiences [Ayer] |
5666 | Not all exerience can be remembered, as this would produce an infinite regress [Ayer] |
5665 | Memory is the best proposal as what unites bundles of experiences [Ayer] |
5327 | Temporal gaps in the consciousness of a spirit could not be bridged by memories [Ayer] |
5669 | Personal identity can't just be relations of experiences, because the body is needed to identify them [Ayer] |
5171 | The supposed 'gulf' between mind and matter is based on the senseless concept of 'substances' [Ayer] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
5329 | Why shouldn't we say brain depends on mind? Better explanation! [Ayer] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
5181 | A sentence is factually significant to someone if they know how to verify its proposition [Ayer] |
5184 | Factual propositions imply (in conjunction with a few other premises) possible experiences [Ayer] |
5186 | Tautologies and empirical hypotheses form the entire class of significant propositions [Ayer] |
5164 | A statement is meaningful if observation statements can be deduced from it [Ayer] |
5165 | Directly verifiable statements must entail at least one new observation statement [Ayer] |
5166 | The principle of verification is not an empirical hypothesis, but a definition [Ayer] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
5162 | Sentences only express propositions if they are meaningful; otherwise they are 'statements' [Ayer] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
2610 | Talk of propositions is just shorthand for talking about equivalent sentences [Ayer] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
6968 | Some people think there are ethical facts, but of a 'queer' sort [Ayer] |
6972 | A right attitude is just an attitude one is prepared to stand by [Ayer] |
6973 | Moral theories are all meta-ethical, and are neutral as regards actual conduct [Ayer] |
6974 | Moral judgements cannot be the logical consequence of a moral philosophy [Ayer] |
5205 | Moral intuition is worthless if there is no criterion to decide between intuitions [Ayer] |
6971 | I would describe intuitions of good as feelings of approval [Ayer] |
23725 | Ayer defends the emotivist version of expressivism [Ayer, by Smith,M] |
5206 | To say an act is wrong makes no further statement about it, but merely expresses disapproval [Ayer] |
6969 | Approval of historical or fictional murders gives us leave to imitate them [Ayer] |
6970 | Moral judgements are not expressions, but are elements in a behaviour pattern [Ayer] |
5168 | Moral approval and disapproval concerns classes of actions, rather than particular actions [Ayer] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
15251 | The attribution of necessity to causation is either primitive animism, or confusion with logical necessity [Ayer] |
5208 | A person with non-empirical attributes is unintelligible. [Ayer] |
5187 | When we ascribe an attribute to a thing, we covertly assert that it exists [Ayer] |
5207 | If theism is non-sensical, then so is atheism. [Ayer] |
5209 | The 'truths' expressed by theists are not literally significant [Ayer] |