253 ideas
20866 | Wise men participate in politics, especially if it shows moral progress [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
20854 | Wise men are never astonished at things which other people take to be wonders [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20815 | No wise man has yet been discovered [Stoic school, by Cicero] |
20806 | Stoic physics concerns cosmos, elements and causes (with six detailed divisions) [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20839 | Ethics studies impulse, good, passion, virtue, goals, value, action, appropriateness, encouragement [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20867 | True philosophising is not memorising ideas, but living by them [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
21675 | Some facts are indispensable for an effect, and others actually necessitate the effect [Stoic school, by Cicero] |
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
21810 | The Stoics distinguished spoken logos from logos within the mind [Stoic school, by Plotinus] |
20775 | Stoics study canons, criteria and definitions, in order to find the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
21393 | Stoics believed that rational capacity in man (logos) is embodied in the universe [Stoic school, by Long] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
20776 | Dialectics is mastery of question and answer form [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
20849 | Falsehoods corrupt a mind, producing passions and instability [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
20823 | The truth bearers are said to be the signified, or the signifier, or the meaning of the signifier [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
20778 | Stoics like syllogisms, for showing what is demonstrative, which corrects opinions [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
21400 | Stoics avoided universals by paraphrasing 'Man is...' as 'If something is a man, then it is...' [Stoic school, by Long] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
20788 | The contradictory of a contradictory is an affirmation [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
21594 | Stoics applied bivalence to sorites situations, so everyone is either vicious or wholly virtuous [Stoic school, by Williamson] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
20824 | Stoics have four primary categories: substrates, qualities, dispositions, relative dispositions [Stoic school, by Simplicius] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
20817 | Platonic Forms are just our thoughts [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch] |
6037 | Stoics say matter has qualities, and substance underlies it, with no form or qualities [Stoic school, by Chalcidius] |
20826 | How is separateness possible, if separated things are always said to be united? [Alexander on Stoic school] |
20825 | How is divisibility possible, if stoics say things remain united when they are divided? [Alexander on Stoic school] |
20872 | Stoics say wholes are more than parts, but entirely consist of parts [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
20790 | A proposition is possible if it is true when nothing stops it being true [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
20789 | Conditionals are false if the falsehood of the conclusion does not conflict with the antecedent [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20783 | Knowledge is a secure grasp of presentations which cannot be reversed by argument [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
20868 | Two sorts of opinion: either poorly grounded belief, or weak belief [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
20784 | There are non-sensible presentations, which come to us through the intellect [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20803 | Stoics say we are born like a blank sheet of paper; the first concepts on it are sensations [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch] |
6025 | At birth the soul is a blank sheet ready to be written on [Stoic school, by Aetius] |
20781 | Non-graspable presentations are from what doesn't exist, or are not clear and distinct [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20792 | Stoic perception is a presentation to which one voluntarily assents [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
20805 | All our concepts come from experience, directly, or by expansion, reduction or compounding [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
20782 | Dialectic is a virtue which contains other virtues [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
1772 | For Stoics knowledge is an assertion which never deviates from the truth [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
20779 | Demonstration derives what is less clear from what is clear [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
23251 | The Stoics think that soul in the narrow sense is nothing but reason [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
20809 | Eight parts of the soul: five senses, seeds, speech and reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
23321 | Division of the soul divides a person, reducing responsibility for the nonrational part [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
23267 | Stoics say the soul is a mixture of air and fire [Stoic school, by Galen] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
20785 | Our conceptions arise from experience, similarity, analogy, transposition, composition and opposition [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
7502 | For Stoics the true self is defined by what I can be master of [Stoic school, by Foucault] |
23327 | Stoics expanded the idea of compulsion, and contracted what counts as one's own actions [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
7672 | The free will problem was invented by the Stoics [Stoic school, by Berlin] |
23315 | The nearest to ancient determinism is Stoic fate, but that is controlled by a sympathetic God [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
4014 | Stoics classify passions according to the opinion of good and bad which they imply [Stoic school, by Taylor,C] |
23988 | There are four basic emotions: pleasure or delight, distress, appetite, and fear [Stoic school, by Cicero] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
6594 | Stoics said that correct judgement needs an invincible criterion of truth [Stoic school, by Fogelin] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
20804 | Concepts are intellectual phantasms [Stoic school, by Ps-Plutarch] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
20786 | Predicates are incomplete 'lekta' [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
23322 | Humans have rational impressions, which are conceptual, and are true or false [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
20777 | Rhetoric has three types, four modes, and four sections [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
23323 | Earlier Stoics speak of assent, but not of choice, let alone of a will [Stoic school, by Frede,M] |
6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
23305 | Stoics said responsibility depends on rationality [Stoic school, by Sorabji] |
1907 | Stoics use 'kalon' (beautiful) as a synonym for 'agathon' (good) [Bury on Stoic school] |
22757 | Stoics say that folly alone is evil [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
20846 | Prime values apply to the life in agreement; useful values apply to the natural life [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20847 | The appraiser's value is what is set by someone experienced in the facts [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20870 | The goal is to live consistently with the constitution of a human being [Stoic school, by Clement] |
22238 | Stoics said health is an 'indifferent', but they still considered it preferable [Stoic school, by Pormann] |
20861 | The health of the soul is a good blend of beliefs [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
3553 | Stoic morality says that one's own happiness will lead to impartiality [Stoic school, by Annas] |
20851 | Virtuous men do not feel sexual desire, which merely focuses on physical beauty [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
7499 | Stoicism was an elitist option to lead a beautiful life [Stoic school, by Foucault] |
20843 | Final goods: confidence, prudence, freedom, enjoyment and no pain, good spirits, virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
22753 | Happiness for the Stoics was an equable flow of life [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
20865 | Happiness is the end and goal, achieved by living virtuously, in agreement, and according to nature [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
20840 | Stoics say pleasure is at most a byproduct of finding what is suitable for us [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20852 | Rapture is a breakdown of virtue [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
6895 | If humans are citizens of the world (not just a state) then virtue is all good human habits [Stoic school, by Mautner] |
20848 | An appropriate action is one that can be defended, perhaps by its consistency. [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20844 | Honour is just, courageous, orderly or knowledgeable. It is praiseworthy, or functions well [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
4012 | The Stoics rejected entirely the high value that had been placed on contemplation [Stoic school, by Taylor,C] |
5073 | Stoics do not despise external goods, but subject them to reason, and not to desire [Taylor,R on Stoic school] |
20862 | Crafts like music and letters are virtuous conditions, and they accord with virtue [Stoic school, by Stobaeus] |
5072 | For Stoics, obligations are determined by social role [Taylor,R on Stoic school] |
21396 | Man is distinguished by knowing conditional truths, because impressions are connected [Stoic school, by Long] |
1781 | Stoics favour a mixture of democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
21384 | The Stoics saw the whole world as a city [Stoic school, by Long] |
20859 | The best government blends democracy, monarchy and aristocracy [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
3561 | Stoics originated the concept of natural law, as agreed correct reasoning [Stoic school, by Annas] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
3046 | Stoics say a wise man will commit suicide if he has a good enough reason [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
20858 | Suicide is reasonable, for one's country or friends, or because of very bad health [Stoic school, by Diog. Laertius] |
3556 | Stoic 'nature' is deterministic, physical and teleological [Stoic school, by Annas] |
22743 | Unlike Epicurus, Stoics distinguish the Whole from the All, with the latter including the void [Stoic school, by Sext.Empiricus] |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
13296 | The cosmos has two elements - passive matter, and active cause (or reason) which shapes it [Stoic school, by Seneca] |
20827 | The cosmos is regularly consumed and reorganised by the primary fire [Stoic school, by Aristocles] |
7815 | Early Stoics called the logos 'god', meaning not a being, but the principle of the universe [Stoic school] |
6038 | Stoics say god is matter, or an inseparable quality of it, or is the power within it [Stoic school, by Chalcidius] |
1470 | Belief in an afterlife may be unverifiable in this life, but it will be verifiable after death [Hick, by PG] |
1471 | It may be hard to verify that we have become immortal, but we could still then verify religious claims [Hick, by PG] |
1469 | Some things (e.g. a section of the expansion of PI) can be verified but not falsified [Hick, by PG] |
20829 | Virtuous souls endure till the end, foolish souls for a short time, animal souls not at all [Stoic school, by Eusebius] |
6039 | Stoics say virtuous souls last till everything ends in fire, but foolish ones fade away [Stoic school, by ] |