286 ideas
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
3822 | Theory involves accepting conclusions, and so is a special case of practical reason [Searle] |
3811 | Entailment and validity are relations, but inference is a human activity [Searle] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
3806 | Rationality is built into the intentionality of the mind, and its means of expression [Searle] |
3812 | Rationality is the way we coordinate our intentionality [Searle] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
3508 | Correspondence to the facts HAS to be the aim of enquiry [Searle] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
3809 | If complex logic requires rules, then so does basic logic [Searle] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
7746 | We don't normally think of names as having senses (e.g. we don't give definitions of them) [Searle] |
7747 | How can a proper name be correlated with its object if it hasn't got a sense? [Searle] |
7748 | 'Aristotle' means more than just 'an object that was christened "Aristotle"' [Searle] |
7749 | Reference for proper names presupposes a set of uniquely referring descriptions [Searle] |
7750 | Proper names are logically connected with their characteristics, in a loose way [Searle] |
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
3810 | In real reasoning semantics gives validity, not syntax [Searle] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
3473 | Reduction can be of things, properties, ideas or causes [Searle] |
5791 | Reduction is either by elimination, or by explanation [Searle] |
5799 | Eliminative reduction needs a gap between appearance and reality, as in sunsets [Searle] |
3841 | Users of 'supervenience' blur its causal and constitutive meanings [Searle] |
3532 | Solidity in a piston is integral to its structure, not supervenient [Maslin on Searle] |
3533 | Is supervenience just causality? [Searle, by Maslin] |
3454 | Reality is entirely particles in force fields [Searle] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
5790 | A property is 'emergent' if it is caused by elements of a system, when the elements lack the property [Searle] |
3471 | Some properties depend on components, others on their relations [Searle] |
3472 | Fully 'emergent' properties contradict our whole theory of causation [Searle] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
3833 | A belief is a commitment to truth [Searle] |
3837 | We can't understand something as a lie if beliefs aren't commitment to truth [Searle] |
3816 | Our beliefs are about things, not propositions (which are the content of the belief) [Searle] |
3491 | Beliefs are part of a network, and also exist against a background [Searle] |
3490 | Beliefs only make sense as part of a network of other beliefs [Searle] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
3828 | Thinking must involve a self, not just an "it" [Searle] |
3482 | Perception is a function of expectation [Searle] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
3493 | Memory is mainly a guide for current performance [Searle] |
3831 | Reasons can either be facts in the world, or intentional states [Searle] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
3830 | In the past people had a reason not to smoke, but didn't realise it [Searle] |
3832 | Causes (usually events) are not the same as reasons (which are never events) [Searle] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
3463 | We don't have a "theory" that other people have minds [Searle] |
3457 | Other minds are not inferred by analogy, but are our best explanation [Searle] |
3480 | We experience unity at an instant and across time [Searle] |
5792 | Explanation of how we unify our mental stimuli into a single experience is the 'binding problem' [Searle] |
5786 | A system is either conscious or it isn't, though the intensity varies a lot [Searle] |
5794 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, which only exists from a subjective viewpoint [Searle] |
5795 | There isn't one consciousness (information-processing) which can be investigated, and another (phenomenal) which can't [Searle] |
3479 | The mind experiences space, but it is not experienced as spatial [Searle] |
3470 | Conscious creatures seem able to discriminate better [Searle] |
3486 | Unconscious thoughts are those capable of causing conscious ones [Searle] |
3503 | Consciousness results directly from brain processes, not from some intermediary like information [Searle] |
3465 | Either there is intrinsic intentionality, or everything has it [Searle] |
3484 | Water flowing downhill can be described as if it had intentionality [Searle] |
3489 | Intentional phenomena only make sense within a background [Searle] |
3494 | Intentionality is defined in terms of representation [Searle] |
3481 | Consciousness is essential and basic to intentionality [Searle] |
5788 | The use of 'qualia' seems to imply that consciousness and qualia are separate [Searle] |
4088 | Pain is not intentional, because it does not represent anything beyond itself [Searle] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
3823 | Being held responsible for past actions makes no sense without personal identity [Searle] |
3821 | Giving reasons for action requires reference to a self [Searle] |
3824 | A 'self' must be capable of conscious reasonings about action [Searle] |
3834 | An intentional, acting, rational being must have a self [Searle] |
3825 | Action requires a self, even though perception doesn't [Searle] |
3829 | Selfs are conscious, enduring, reasonable, active, free, and responsible [Searle] |
3826 | A self must at least be capable of consciousness [Searle] |
3827 | The self is neither an experience nor a thing experienced [Searle] |
3820 | The bundle must also have agency in order to act, and a self to act rationally [Searle] |
3467 | Neither introspection nor privileged access makes sense [Searle] |
3483 | Introspection is just thinking about mental states, not a special sort of vision [Searle] |
3468 | I cannot observe my own subjectivity [Searle] |
20429 | Most of us are too close to our own motives to understand them [Fry] |
3817 | Free will is most obvious when we choose between several reasons for an action [Searle] |
3808 | Rational decision making presupposes free will [Searle] |
3818 | We freely decide whether to make a reason for action effective [Searle] |
3469 | Mind and brain don't interact if they are the same [Searle] |
3487 | Without internal content, a zombie's full behaviour couldn't be explained [Searle] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3458 | Mental states only relate to behaviour contingently, not necessarily [Searle] |
3485 | Wanting H2O only differs from wanting water in its mental component [Searle] |
3461 | Functionalists like the externalist causal theory of reference [Searle] |
2427 | Maybe understanding doesn't need consciousness, despite what Searle seems to think [Searle, by Chalmers] |
7389 | A program won't contain understanding if it is small enough to imagine [Dennett on Searle] |
7390 | If bigger and bigger brain parts can't understand, how can a whole brain? [Dennett on Searle] |
3496 | A program for Chinese translation doesn't need to understand Chinese [Searle] |
5789 | I now think syntax is not in the physics, but in the eye of the beholder [Searle] |
3499 | Computation presupposes consciousness [Searle] |
3501 | If we are computers, who is the user? [Searle] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
5798 | Consciousness has a first-person ontology, so it cannot be reduced without omitting something [Searle] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3455 | Property dualists tend to find the mind-body problem baffling [Searle] |
3475 | Property dualism denies reductionism [Searle] |
3456 | Consciousness is a brain property as liquidity is a water property [Searle] |
3453 | Property dualism is the reappearance of Cartesianism [Searle] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
5787 | There is non-event causation between mind and brain, as between a table and its solidity [Searle] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
3477 | If mind-brain supervenience isn't causal, this implies epiphenomenalism [Searle] |
3531 | Mental events can cause even though supervenient, like the solidity of a piston [Searle] |
3478 | Upwards mental causation makes 'supervenience' irrelevant [Searle] |
3476 | Mind and brain are supervenient in respect of cause and effect [Searle] |
3466 | Consciousness seems indefinable by conditions or categories [Searle] |
5797 | The pattern of molecules in the sea is much more complex than the complexity of brain neurons [Searle] |
3500 | Can the homunculus fallacy be beaten by recursive decomposition? [Searle] |
9317 | Searle argues that biology explains consciousness, but physics won't explain biology [Searle, by Kriegel/Williford] |
3474 | If mind is caused by brain, does this mean mind IS brain? [Searle] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
5796 | If tree rings contain information about age, then age contains information about rings [Searle] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
3497 | If mind is multiply realisable, it is possible that anything could realise it [Searle] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
3462 | We don't postulate folk psychology, we experience it [Searle] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
3498 | Computation isn't a natural phenomenon, it is a way of seeing phenomena [Searle] |
3492 | Content is much more than just sentence meaning [Searle] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
3464 | There is no such thing as 'wide content' [Searle] |
3506 | We explain behaviour in terms of actual internal representations in the agent [Searle] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
3451 | Meaning is derived intentionality [Searle] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
3450 | Philosophy of language is a branch of philosophy of mind [Searle] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
3507 | Universal grammar doesn't help us explain anything [Searle] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
3495 | Shared Background makes translation possible, though variation makes it hard [Searle] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
3814 | Preferences can result from deliberation, not just precede it [Searle] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
3840 | We don't accept practical reasoning if the conclusion is unpalatable [Searle] |
3815 | The essence of humanity is desire-independent reasons for action [Searle] |
3839 | Only an internal reason can actually motivate the agent to act [Searle] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
20424 | Imaginative life requires no action, so new kinds of perception and values emerge in art [Fry] |
20427 | Everyone reveals an aesthetic attitude, looking at something which only exists to be seen [Fry] |
20433 | 'Beauty' can either mean sensuous charm, or the aesthetic approval of art (which may be ugly) [Fry] |
20430 | In life we neglect 'cosmic emotion', but it matters, and art brings it to the fore [Fry] |
20431 | Art needs a mixture of order and variety in its sensations [Fry] |
20423 | If graphic arts only aim at imitation, their works are only trivial ingenious toys [Fry] |
20428 | Popular opinion favours realism, yet most people never look closely at anything! [Fry] |
20432 | When viewing art, rather than flowers, we are aware of purpose, and sympathy with its creator [Fry] |
20425 | In the cinema the emotions are weaker, but much clearer than in ordinary life [Fry] |
20426 | For pure moralists art must promote right action, and not just be harmless [Fry] |
3835 | If it is true, you ought to believe it [Searle] |
3836 | If this is a man, you ought to accept similar things as men [Searle] |
3505 | The function of a heart depends on what we want it to do [Searle] |
3838 | Promises hold because I give myself a reason, not because it is an institution [Searle] |
3813 | 'Ought' implies that there is a reason to do something [Searle] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
3504 | Chemistry entirely explains plant behaviour [Searle] |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
3502 | Mind involves fighting, fleeing, feeding and fornicating [Searle] |
3459 | You can only know the limits of knowledge if you know the other side of the limit [Searle] |