219 ideas
22701 | Jokes can sometimes be funny because they are offensive [Jacobson,D] |
13395 | If an analysis shows the features of a concept, it doesn't seem to 'reduce' the concept [Jubien] |
8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
9967 | 'Impure' sets have a concrete member, while 'pure' (abstract) sets do not [Jubien] |
13378 | It is a mistake to think that the logic developed for mathematics can clarify language and philosophy [Jubien] |
7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
13402 | We only grasp a name if we know whether to apply it when the bearer changes [Jubien] |
13405 | The baptiser picks the bearer of a name, but social use decides the category [Jubien] |
13399 | Examples show that ordinary proper names are not rigid designators [Jubien] |
13398 | We could make a contingent description into a rigid and necessary one by adding 'actual' to it [Jubien] |
18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
11115 | 'All horses' either picks out the horses, or the things which are horses [Jubien] |
13392 | Philosophers reduce complex English kind-quantifiers to the simplistic first-order quantifier [Jubien] |
19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
9968 | A model is 'fundamental' if it contains only concrete entities [Jubien] |
9965 | There couldn't just be one number, such as 17 [Jubien] |
9966 | The subject-matter of (pure) mathematics is abstract structure [Jubien] |
9963 | If we all intuited mathematical objects, platonism would be agreed [Jubien] |
9962 | How can pure abstract entities give models to serve as interpretations? [Jubien] |
9964 | Since mathematical objects are essentially relational, they can't be picked out on their own [Jubien] |
13404 | To exist necessarily is to have an essence whose own essence must be instantiated [Jubien] |
7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
13386 | If objects are just conventional, there is no ontological distinction between stuff and things [Jubien] |
23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
13403 | The category of Venus is not 'object', or even 'planet', but a particular class of good-sized object [Jubien] |
19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
11116 | Being a physical object is our most fundamental category [Jubien] |
9969 | The empty set is the purest abstract object [Jubien] |
13375 | The idea that every entity must have identity conditions is an unfortunate misunderstanding [Jubien] |
11117 | Haecceities implausibly have no qualities [Jubien] |
13393 | Any entity has the unique property of being that specific entity [Jubien] |
13388 | It is incoherent to think that a given entity depends on its kind for its existence [Jubien] |
13384 | Objects need conventions for their matter, their temporal possibility, and their spatial possibility [Jubien] |
13385 | Basically, the world doesn't have ready-made 'objects'; we carve objects any way we like [Jubien] |
13383 | If the statue is loved and the clay hated, that is about the object first qua statue, then qua clay [Jubien] |
13400 | If one entity is an object, a statue, and some clay, these come apart in at least three ways [Jubien] |
13401 | The idea of coincident objects is a last resort, as it is opposed to commonsense naturalism [Jubien] |
13380 | Parts seem to matter when it is just an object, but not matter when it is a kind of object [Jubien] |
13376 | We should not regard essentialism as just nontrivial de re necessity [Jubien] |
13381 | Thinking of them as 'ships' the repaired ship is the original, but as 'objects' the reassembly is the original [Jubien] |
13382 | Rearranging the planks as a ship is confusing; we'd say it was the same 'object' with a different arrangement [Jubien] |
13379 | If two objects are indiscernible across spacetime, how could we decide whether or not they are the same? [Jubien] |
13394 | Entailment does not result from mutual necessity; mutual necessity ensures entailment [Jubien] |
11119 | De re necessity is just de dicto necessity about object-essences [Jubien] |
19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
13391 | Modality concerns relations among platonic properties [Jubien] |
13374 | To analyse modality, we must give accounts of objects, properties and relations [Jubien] |
11118 | Modal propositions transcend the concrete, but not the actual [Jubien] |
11108 | Your properties, not some other world, decide your possibilities [Jubien] |
11111 | Modal truths are facts about parts of this world, not about remote maximal entities [Jubien] |
11105 | We have no idea how many 'possible worlds' there might be [Jubien] |
11107 | If there are no other possible worlds, do we then exist necessarily? [Jubien] |
11106 | If all possible worlds just happened to include stars, their existence would be necessary [Jubien] |
11112 | Possible worlds just give parallel contingencies, with no explanation at all of necessity [Jubien] |
11109 | If other worlds exist, then they are scattered parts of the actual world [Jubien] |
11113 | Worlds don't explain necessity; we use necessity to decide on possible worlds [Jubien] |
13389 | The love of possible worlds is part of the dream that technical logic solves philosophical problems [Jubien] |
13390 | Possible worlds don't explain necessity, because they are a bunch of parallel contingencies [Jubien] |
11110 | We mustn't confuse a similar person with the same person [Jubien] |
11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
13396 | Analysing mental concepts points to 'inclusionism' - that mental phenomena are part of the physical [Jubien] |
3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
13377 | First-order logic tilts in favour of the direct reference theory, in its use of constants for objects [Jubien] |
6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
22703 | We don't often respond to events in art as if they were real events [Jacobson,D] |
22702 | Audiences can be too moral [Jacobson,D] |
22696 | 'Autonomism' says the morality is irrelevant to the aesthetics [Jacobson,D] |
22697 | Moral defects of art can be among its aesthetic virtues [Jacobson,D] |
22700 | Immoral art encourages immoral emotions [Jacobson,D] |
22699 | Moderate moralism says moral qualities can sometimes also be aesthetic qualities [Jacobson,D] |
22698 | We can judge art ethically, or rate its ethical influence, or assess its quality via its ethics [Jacobson,D] |
3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |