267 ideas
| 3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
| 12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
| 12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
| 12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
| 12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
| 3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 8988 | Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton] |
| 8987 | On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton] |
| 8992 | Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton] |
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| 3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
| 3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
| 18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
| 3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
| 18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
| 23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
| 23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
| 23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
| 19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
| 8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
| 23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
| 18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
| 19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
| 19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
| 3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
| 19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
| 19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
| 19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
| 19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
| 19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
| 19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
| 23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
| 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
| 5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| 18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
| 14235 | Saying 'they can become a set' is a tautology, because reference to 'they' implies a collection [Cargile] |
| 19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
| 3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
| 3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
| 7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
| 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
| 14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
| 8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
| 23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
| 15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
| 19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
| 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
| 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
| 19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
| 3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
| 3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| 4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
| 3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
| 3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
| 4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
| 3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
| 3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
| 19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
| 4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
| 4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
| 3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
| 3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
| 4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
| 4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
| 3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
| 3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
| 2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
| 5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
| 2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
| 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
| 16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
| 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
| 3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
| 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
| 3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
| 4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
| 5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
| 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
| 6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
| 8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
| 8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
| 19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
| 15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
| 14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
| 4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
| 19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
| 19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
| 19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
| 19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| 7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
| 19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| 3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| 3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
| 19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
| 7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
| 19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
| 7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
| 7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
| 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
| 20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
| 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
| 6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
| 23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
| 23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
| 20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
| 3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 12156 | Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton] |
| 12158 | Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton] |
| 18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
| 18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
| 12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
| 18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
| 18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
| 18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
| 18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
| 12165 | Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton] |
| 18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
| 12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton] |
| 12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
| 12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton] |
| 12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton] |
| 12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
| 12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
| 12164 | Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton] |
| 12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
| 4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
| 18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
| 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
| 4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
| 3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
| 4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
| 4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
| 4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
| 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
| 3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
| 4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
| 4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
| 3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
| 4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
| 4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
| 4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
| 4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
| 5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
| 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
| 8989 | The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton] |
| 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
| 8990 | So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton] |
| 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
| 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
| 5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
| 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
| 3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
| 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
| 18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
| 4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
| 4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
| 4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
| 4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
| 4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
| 4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
| 4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
| 4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
| 4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
| 4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
| 4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
| 4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
| 4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
| 4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
| 8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
| 3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
| 3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
| 3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |