405 ideas
| 7504 | Modern science comes from Descartes' view that knowledge doesn't need moral purity [Descartes, by Foucault] |
| 3600 | Slow and accurate thought makes the greatest progress [Descartes] |
| 3656 | The greatest good for a state is true philosophers [Descartes] |
| 24032 | Clever scholars can obscure things which are obvious even to peasants [Descartes] |
| 3601 | Most things in human life seem vain and useless [Descartes] |
| 3602 | Almost every daft idea has been expressed by some philosopher [Descartes] |
| 21962 | Metaphysics is the roots of the tree of science [Descartes] |
| 24033 | Most scholastic disputes concern words, where agreeing on meanings would settle them [Descartes] |
| 8349 | The best way to do ontology is to make sense of our normal talk [Davidson] |
| 3653 | My Meditations are the complete foundation of my physics [Descartes] |
| 1569 | Descartes impoverished the classical idea of logos, and it no longer covered human experience [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 24024 | The secret of the method is to recognise which thing in a series is the simplest [Descartes] |
| 2248 | Reason says don't assent to uncertain principles, just as much as totally false ones [Descartes] |
| 3603 | Methodical thinking is cautious, analytical, systematic, and panoramic [Descartes, by PG] |
| 8868 | Objective truth arises from interpersonal communication [Davidson] |
| 3969 | There are no ultimate standards of rationality, since we only assess others by our own standard [Davidson] |
| 3972 | Truth and objectivity depend on a community of speakers to interpret what they mean [Davidson] |
| 24018 | One truth leads us to another [Descartes] |
| 2857 | Since Plato all philosophers have followed the herd, except Descartes, stuck in superficial reason [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 3659 | I know the truth that God exists and is the author of truth [Descartes] |
| 3641 | It is circular to make truth depend on believing God's existence is true [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 4524 | Descartes is right that in the Christian view only God can guarantee the reliability of senses [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 3612 | Clear and distinct conceptions are true because a perfect God exists [Descartes] |
| 2290 | Once it is clear that there is a God who is no deceiver, I conclude that clear and distinct perceptions must be true [Descartes] |
| 6396 | A sentence is held true because of a combination of meaning and belief [Davidson] |
| 4736 | Truth is such a transcendentally clear notion that it cannot be further defined [Descartes] |
| 23295 | Truth cannot be reduced to anything simpler [Davidson] |
| 19160 | A comprehensive theory of truth probably includes a theory of predication [Davidson] |
| 23284 | Plato's Forms confused truth with the most eminent truths, so only Truth itself is completely true [Davidson] |
| 23286 | Truth can't be a goal, because we can neither recognise it nor confim it [Davidson] |
| 19151 | Antirealism about truth prevents its use as an intersubjective standard [Davidson] |
| 23291 | Without truth, both language and thought are impossible [Davidson] |
| 8188 | Davidson takes truth to attach to individual sentences [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 3610 | Truth is clear and distinct conception - of which it is hard to be sure [Descartes] |
| 2266 | My general rule is that everything that I perceive clearly and distinctly is true [Descartes] |
| 4301 | Someone may think a thing is 'clear and distinct', but be wrong [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 19144 | 'Epistemic' truth depends what rational creatures can verify [Davidson] |
| 19044 | Saying truths fit experience adds nothing to truth; nothing makes sentences true [Davidson] |
| 18702 | Names, descriptions and predicates refer to things; without that, language and thought are baffling [Davidson] |
| 23292 | Correspondence can't be defined, but it shows how truth depends on the world [Davidson] |
| 18902 | Correspondence theories can't tell you what truths correspond to [Davidson] |
| 23298 | Neither Aristotle nor Tarski introduce the facts needed for a correspondence theory [Davidson] |
| 19148 | There is nothing interesting or instructive for truths to correspond to [Davidson] |
| 19166 | The Slingshot assumes substitutions give logical equivalence, and thus identical correspondence [Davidson] |
| 19167 | Two sentences can be rephrased by equivalent substitutions to correspond to the same thing [Davidson] |
| 19081 | Coherence with a set of propositions suggests we can know the proposition corresponds [Davidson, by Donnellan] |
| 19150 | Coherence truth says a consistent set of sentences is true - which ties truth to belief [Davidson] |
| 4298 | All items of possible human knowledge are interconnected, and can be reached by inference [Descartes] |
| 19145 | We can explain truth in terms of satisfaction - but also explain satisfaction in terms of truth [Davidson] |
| 19146 | Satisfaction is a sort of reference, so maybe we can define truth in terms of reference? [Davidson] |
| 19174 | Axioms spell out sentence satisfaction. With no free variables, all sequences satisfy the truths [Davidson] |
| 23288 | When Tarski defines truth for different languages, how do we know it is a single concept? [Davidson] |
| 23297 | The language to define truth needs a finite vocabulary, to make the definition finite [Davidson] |
| 19136 | Many say that Tarski's definitions fail to connect truth to meaning [Davidson] |
| 19139 | Tarski does not tell us what his various truth predicates have in common [Davidson] |
| 19147 | Truth is the basic concept, because Convention-T is agreed to fix the truths of a language [Davidson] |
| 19172 | To define a class of true sentences is to stipulate a possible language [Davidson] |
| 23296 | We can elucidate indefinable truth, but showing its relation to other concepts [Davidson] |
| 19153 | Truth is basic and clear, so don't try to replace it with something simpler [Davidson] |
| 23287 | Disquotation only accounts for truth if the metalanguage contains the object language [Davidson] |
| 19170 | Tarski is not a disquotationalist, because you can assign truth to a sentence you can't quote [Davidson] |
| 10054 | Arithmetic and geometry achieve some certainty without worrying about existence [Descartes] |
| 7332 | There is a huge range of sentences of which we do not know the logical form [Davidson] |
| 18914 | Davidson controversially proposed to quantify over events [Davidson, by Engelbretsen] |
| 19140 | 'Satisfaction' is a generalised form of reference [Davidson] |
| 2252 | Surely maths is true even if I am dreaming? [Descartes] |
| 2430 | I can learn the concepts of duration and number just from observing my own thoughts [Descartes] |
| 13445 | Descartes showed a one-one order-preserving match between points on a line and the real numbers [Descartes, by Hart,WD] |
| 24035 | Unity is something shared by many things, so in that respect they are equals [Descartes] |
| 24036 | I can only see the proportion of two to three if there is a common measure - their unity [Descartes] |
| 17536 | If it can't be expressed mathematically, it can't occur in nature? [Heisenberg] |
| 21963 | It is possible that an omnipotent God might make one and two fail to equal three [Descartes] |
| 24029 | Among the simples are the graspable negations, such as rest and instants [Descartes] |
| 7771 | We need 'events' to explain adverbs, which are adjectival predicates of events [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 8860 | Language-learning is not good enough evidence for the existence of events [Yablo on Davidson] |
| 7949 | Varied descriptions of an event will explain varied behaviour relating to it [Davidson, by Macdonald,C] |
| 8348 | If we don't assume that events exist, we cannot make sense of our common talk [Davidson] |
| 9843 | You can't identify events by causes and effects, as the event needs to be known first [Dummett on Davidson] |
| 14602 | Events can only be individuated causally [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 14004 | We need events for action statements, causal statements, explanation, mind-and-body, and adverbs [Davidson, by Bourne] |
| 8278 | The claim that events are individuated by their causal relations to other events is circular [Lowe on Davidson] |
| 3644 | Two things being joined together doesn't prove they are the same [Descartes] |
| 17545 | Quantum theory shows that exact science does not need dogmatic realism [Heisenberg] |
| 17538 | Quantum theory does not introduce minds into atomic events [Heisenberg] |
| 23285 | If we try to identify facts precisely, they all melt into one (as the Slingshot Argument proves) [Davidson] |
| 15002 | If the best theory of adverbs refers to events, then our ontology should include events [Davidson, by Sider] |
| 19173 | Treating predicates as sets drops the predicate for a new predicate 'is a member of', which is no help [Davidson] |
| 16635 | Incorporeal substances are powers or forces [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 17534 | A 'probability wave' is a quantitative version of Aristotle's potential, a mid-way type of reality [Heisenberg] |
| 16744 | All powers can be explained by obvious features like size, shape and motion of matter [Descartes] |
| 5016 | Five universals: genus, species, difference, property, accident [Descartes] |
| 5015 | A universal is a single idea applied to individual things that are similar to one another [Descartes] |
| 2297 | If I can separate two things in my understanding, then God can separate them in reality [Descartes] |
| 3626 | Knowing the attributes is enough to reveal a substance [Descartes] |
| 16630 | If we perceive an attribute, we infer the existence of some substance [Descartes] |
| 17553 | We can retain the idea of 'substance', as indestructible mass or energy [Heisenberg] |
| 5013 | A substance needs nothing else in order to exist [Descartes] |
| 3628 | Substance cannot be conceived or explained to others [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 16774 | Descartes thinks distinguishing substances from aggregates is pointless [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 17544 | Basic particles have a mathematical form, which is more important than their substance [Heisenberg] |
| 16631 | If we remove surface qualities from wax, we have an extended, flexible, changeable thing [Descartes] |
| 17865 | Descartes gives an essence by an encapsulating formula [Descartes, by Almog] |
| 16633 | A substance has one principal property which is its nature and essence [Descartes] |
| 12251 | Substantial forms are not understood, and explain nothing [Descartes] |
| 19142 | Probability can be constrained by axioms, but that leaves open its truth nature [Davidson] |
| 24030 | 3+4=7 is necessary because we cannot conceive of seven without including three and four [Descartes] |
| 2301 | We know by thought that what is done cannot be undone [Descartes] |
| 3642 | Pythagoras' Theorem doesn't cease to be part of the essence of triangles just because we doubt it [Arnauld on Descartes] |
| 11145 | Having a belief involves the possibility of being mistaken [Davidson] |
| 3605 | We can believe a thing without knowing we believe it [Descartes] |
| 8806 | The concepts of belief and truth are linked, since beliefs are meant to fit reality [Davidson] |
| 20190 | Belief is not an intellectual state or act, because propositions are affirmed or denied by the will [Descartes, by Zagzebski] |
| 6397 | The concept of belief can only derive from relationship to a speech community [Davidson] |
| 8867 | A belief requires understanding the distinctions of true-and-false, and appearance-and-reality [Davidson] |
| 24019 | If we accept mere probabilities as true we undermine our existing knowledge [Descartes] |
| 9807 | In pursuing truth, anything less certain than mathematics is a waste of time [Descartes] |
| 1583 | In morals Descartes accepts the conventional, but rejects it in epistemology [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 1585 | Descartes tried to model reason on maths instead of 'logos' [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 1582 | Labelling slightly doubtful things as false is irrational [Roochnik on Descartes] |
| 2256 | Maybe there is only one certain fact, which is that nothing is certain [Descartes] |
| 3657 | Understanding, not the senses, gives certainty [Descartes] |
| 2260 | If I don't think, there is no reason to think that I exist [Descartes] |
| 3658 | Total doubt can't include your existence while doubting [Descartes] |
| 6914 | Descartes transformed 'God is thinkable, so he exists' into 'I think, so I exist' [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 4641 | In the Meditations version of the Cogito he says "I am; I exist", which avoids presenting it as an argument [Descartes, by Baggini /Fosl] |
| 5005 | I think, therefore I am, because for a thinking thing to not exist is a contradiction [Descartes] |
| 5006 | 'Thought' is all our conscious awareness, including feeling as well as understanding [Descartes] |
| 24020 | We all see intuitively that we exist, where intuition is attentive, clear and distinct rational understanding [Descartes] |
| 24031 | When Socrates doubts, he know he doubts, and that truth is possible [Descartes] |
| 6929 | Modern philosophy set the self-conscious ego in place of God [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 3849 | "I think therefore I am" is the absolute truth of consciousness [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 2258 | I must even exist if I am being deceived by something [Descartes] |
| 2259 | "I am, I exist" is necessarily true every time I utter it or conceive it in my mind [Descartes] |
| 3160 | The Cogito is a transcendental argument, not a piece of a priori knowledge [Rey on Descartes] |
| 3607 | In thinking everything else false, my own existence remains totally certain [Descartes] |
| 3622 | The Cogito is not a syllogism but a self-evident intuition [Descartes] |
| 3623 | The Cogito only works if you already understand what thought and existence are [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 1369 | It is a precondition of the use of the word 'I' that I exist [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 5360 | The thing which experiences may be momentary, and change with the next experience [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2870 | 'I think' assumes I exist, that thinking is known and caused, and that I am doing it [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5188 | A thought doesn't imply other thoughts, or enough thoughts to make up a self [Ayer on Descartes] |
| 3624 | That I perform an activity (thinking) doesn't prove what type of thing I am [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3120 | Autistic children seem to use the 'I' concept without seeing themselves as thinkers [Segal on Descartes] |
| 4526 | The Cogito assumes a priori the existence of substance, when actually it is a grammatical custom [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 5579 | How can we infer that all thinking involves self-consciousness, just from my own case? [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5580 | My self is not an inference from 'I think', but a presupposition of it [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5587 | We cannot give any information a priori about the nature of the 'thing that thinks' [Kant on Descartes] |
| 5588 | The fact that I am a subject is not enough evidence to show that I am a substantial object [Kant on Descartes] |
| 13923 | Descartes' claim to know his existence before his essence is misleading or absurd [Descartes, by Lowe] |
| 6930 | Modern self-consciousness is a doubtful abstraction; only senses and feelings are certain [Feuerbach on Descartes] |
| 1117 | The Cogito proves subjective experience is basic, but makes false claims about the Self [Russell on Descartes] |
| 2873 | Maybe 'I' am not the thinker, but something produced by thought [Nietzsche on Descartes] |
| 2261 | My perceiving of things may be false, but my seeming to perceive them cannot be false [Descartes] |
| 2257 | I myself could be the author of all these self-delusions [Descartes] |
| 24025 | Clear and distinct truths must be known all at once (unlike deductions) [Descartes] |
| 24022 | Our souls possess divine seeds of knowledge, which can bear spontaneous fruit [Descartes] |
| 3630 | Our thinking about external things doesn't disprove the existence of innate ideas [Descartes] |
| 5012 | 'Nothing comes from nothing' is an eternal truth found within the mind [Descartes] |
| 2602 | What experience could prove 'If a=c and b=c then a=b'? [Descartes] |
| 2279 | A triangle has a separate non-invented nature, shown by my ability to prove facts about it [Descartes] |
| 3617 | I aim to find the principles and causes of everything, using the seeds within my mind [Descartes] |
| 6490 | For Descartes, objects have one primary quality, which is geometrical [Descartes, by Robinson,H] |
| 22593 | Our sensation of light may not be the same as what produces the sensation [Descartes] |
| 7400 | Descartes said images can refer to objects without resembling them (as words do) [Descartes, by Tuck] |
| 2295 | Why does pain make us sad? [Descartes] |
| 3627 | Dogs can make the same judgements as us about variable things [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2265 | We perceive objects by intellect, not by senses or imagination [Descartes] |
| 3611 | Understanding, rather than imagination or senses, gives knowledge [Descartes] |
| 2263 | The wax is not perceived by the senses, but by the mind alone [Descartes] |
| 2264 | We don't 'see' men in heavy clothes, we judge them to be men [Descartes] |
| 8252 | Davidson believes experience is non-conceptual, and outside the space of reasons [Davidson, by McDowell] |
| 6400 | Without the dualism of scheme and content, not much is left of empiricism [Davidson] |
| 8255 | Davidson says the world influences us causally; I say it influences us rationally [McDowell on Davidson] |
| 24034 | If someone had only seen the basic colours, they could deduce the others from resemblance [Descartes] |
| 23294 | It is common to doubt truth when discussing it, but totally accept it when discussing knowledge [Davidson] |
| 8804 | Reasons for beliefs are not the same as evidence [Davidson] |
| 24021 | The method starts with clear intuitions, followed by a process of deduction [Descartes] |
| 3606 | I was searching for reliable rock under the shifting sand [Descartes] |
| 2247 | To achieve good science we must rebuild from the foundations [Descartes] |
| 2255 | Only one certainty is needed for progress (like a lever's fulcrum) [Descartes] |
| 5004 | We can know basic Principles without further knowledge, but not the other way round [Descartes] |
| 8802 | Sensations lack the content to be logical; they cause beliefs, but they cannot justify them [Davidson] |
| 8801 | Coherent justification says only beliefs can be reasons for holding other beliefs [Davidson] |
| 2251 | Even if my body and objects are imaginary, there may be simpler things which are true [Descartes] |
| 6347 | Descartes can't begin again, because sceptics doubt cognitive processes as well as beliefs [Pollock/Cruz on Descartes] |
| 2296 | If pain is felt in a lost limb, I cannot be certain that a felt pain exists in my real limbs [Descartes] |
| 3620 | We correct sense errors with other senses, not intellect [Mersenne on Descartes] |
| 3619 | The senses can only report, so perception errors are in the judgment [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2249 | It is prudent never to trust your senses if they have deceived you even once [Descartes] |
| 3621 | Only judgement decides which of our senses are reliable [Descartes] |
| 2253 | God may have created nothing, but made his creation appear to me as it does now [Descartes] |
| 2254 | To achieve full scepticism, I imagine a devil who deceives me about the external world and my own body and senses [Descartes] |
| 2305 | Waking actions are joined by memory to all our other actions, unlike actions of which we dream [Descartes] |
| 3604 | When rebuilding a house, one needs alternative lodgings [Descartes] |
| 2294 | I can only sense an object if it is present, and can't fail to sense it when it is [Descartes] |
| 8805 | Skepticism is false because our utterances agree, because they are caused by the same objects [Davidson] |
| 10347 | Objectivity is intersubjectivity [Davidson] |
| 6398 | Different points of view make sense, but they must be plotted on a common background [Davidson] |
| 3618 | Only experiments can settle disagreements between rival explanations [Descartes] |
| 8347 | Explanations typically relate statements, not events [Davidson] |
| 17550 | We give a mathematical account of a system of natural connections in order to clarify them [Heisenberg] |
| 6552 | You can only explain the qualities of large objects using entities which lack those qualities [Heisenberg] |
| 3960 | There are no such things as minds, but people have mental properties [Davidson] |
| 4862 | Can the pineal gland be moved more slowly or quickly by the mind than by animal spirits? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 8866 | If we know other minds through behaviour, but not our own, we should assume they aren't like me [Davidson] |
| 3850 | We discovers others as well as ourselves in the Cogito [Sartre on Descartes] |
| 10346 | Knowing other minds rests on knowing both one's own mind and the external world [Davidson, by Dummett] |
| 2302 | Faculties of the mind aren't parts, as one mind uses them [Descartes] |
| 3615 | Little reason is needed to speak, so animals have no reason at all [Descartes] |
| 24027 | Nerves and movement originate in the brain, where imagination moves them [Descartes] |
| 5014 | We can understand thinking occuring without imagination or sensation [Descartes] |
| 16634 | I can't be unaware of anything which is in me [Descartes] |
| 3151 | Descartes put thought at the centre of the mind problem, but we put sensation [Rey on Descartes] |
| 24026 | Our four knowledge faculties are intelligence, imagination, the senses, and memory [Descartes] |
| 21800 | Descartes mentions many cognitive faculties, but reduces them to will and intellect [Descartes, by Schmid] |
| 1399 | Imagination and sensation are non-essential to mind [Descartes] |
| 19169 | Predicates are a source of generality in sentences [Davidson] |
| 4042 | Metaphysics requires the idea of people (speakers) located in space and time [Davidson] |
| 1400 | Some cause must unite the separate temporal sections of a person [Descartes] |
| 3609 | I am a thinking substance, which doesn't need a place or material support [Descartes] |
| 1401 | Since I only observe myself to be thinking, I conclude that that is my essence [Descartes] |
| 2299 | I can exist without imagination and sensing, but they can't exist without me [Descartes] |
| 6907 | For Descartes a person's essence is the mind because objects are perceived by mind, not senses [Descartes, by Feuerbach] |
| 5017 | In thinking we shut ourselves off from other substances, showing our identity and separateness [Descartes] |
| 2283 | Our 'will' just consists of the feeling that when we are motivated to do something, there are no external pressures [Descartes] |
| 5010 | Our free will is so self-evident to us that it must be a basic innate idea [Descartes] |
| 3789 | The more reasons that compel me, the freer I am [Descartes] |
| 2282 | My capacity to make choices with my free will extends as far as any faculty ever could [Descartes] |
| 4310 | We have inner awareness of our freedom [Descartes] |
| 24028 | The force by which we know things is spiritual, and quite distinct from the body [Descartes] |
| 3608 | I can deny my body and the world, but not my own existence [Descartes] |
| 3613 | Reason is universal in its responses, but a physical machine is constrained by its organs [Descartes] |
| 2276 | The mind is a non-extended thing which thinks [Descartes] |
| 2298 | Mind is not extended, unlike the body [Descartes] |
| 3423 | Descartes is a substance AND property dualist [Descartes, by Kim] |
| 2303 | The mind is utterly indivisible [Descartes] |
| 5011 | There are two ultimate classes of existence: thinking substance and extended substance [Descartes] |
| 3616 | The soul must unite with the body to have appetites and sensations [Descartes] |
| 6153 | Interaction between mental and physical seems to violate the principle of conservation of energy [Rowlands on Descartes] |
| 6553 | Descartes discussed the interaction problem, and compared it with gravity [Descartes, by Lycan] |
| 3654 | The pineal gland links soul to body, and unites the two symmetrical sides of the body [Descartes, by PG] |
| 3625 | The 'thinking thing' may be the physical basis of the mind [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 2552 | Knowing different aspects of brain/mind doesn't make them different [Rorty on Descartes] |
| 4305 | Descartes gives no clear criterion for individuating mental substances [Cottingham on Descartes] |
| 4861 | Does Descartes have a clear conception of how mind unites with body? [Spinoza on Descartes] |
| 6540 | Even Descartes may concede that mental supervenes on neuroanatomical [Lycan on Descartes] |
| 7733 | Superman's strength is indubitable, Clark Kent's is doubtful, so they are not the same? [Maslin on Descartes] |
| 4983 | There are no rules linking thought and behaviour, because endless other thoughts intervene [Davidson] |
| 3529 | Reduction is impossible because mind is holistic and brain isn't [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3964 | If the mind is an anomaly, this makes reduction of the mental to the physical impossible [Davidson] |
| 2307 | Anomalous monism says nothing at all about the relationship between mental and physical [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 5497 | Mind is outside science, because it is humanistic and partly normative [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 4081 | Anomalous monism says causes are events, so the mental and physical are identical, without identical properties [Davidson, by Crane] |
| 2321 | If rule-following and reason are 'anomalies', does that make reductionism impossible? [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3961 | Obviously all mental events are causally related to physical events [Davidson] |
| 3404 | Davidson claims that mental must be physical, to make mental causation possible [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3963 | There are no strict psychophysical laws connecting mental and physical events [Davidson] |
| 3965 | Mental entities do not add to the physical furniture of the world [Davidson] |
| 3405 | If mental causation is lawless, it is only possible if mental events have physical properties [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 3966 | The correct conclusion is ontological monism combined with conceptual dualism [Davidson] |
| 5018 | Even if tightly united, mind and body are different, as God could separate them [Descartes] |
| 16041 | Supervenience of the mental means physical changes mental, and mental changes physical [Davidson] |
| 6620 | Davidson sees identity as between events, not states, since they are related in causation [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 6383 | Cause unites our picture of the universe; without it, mental and physical will separate [Davidson] |
| 3643 | The concept of mind excludes body, and vice versa [Descartes] |
| 3429 | Multiple realisability was worse news for physicalism than anomalous monism was [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 6392 | Thought depends on speech [Davidson] |
| 5686 | In some thoughts I grasp a subject, but also I will or fear or affirm or deny it [Descartes] |
| 4015 | For Descartes passions are God-given preservers of the mind-body union [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 23989 | There are six primitive passions: wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and sadness [Descartes, by Goldie] |
| 4313 | Are there a few primary passions (say, joy, sadness and desire)? [Descartes, by Cottingham] |
| 3967 | Absence of all rationality would be absence of thought [Davidson] |
| 4017 | Descartes created the modern view of rationality, as an internal feature instead of an external vision [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 2284 | I make errors because my will extends beyond my understanding [Descartes] |
| 5007 | Most errors of judgement result from an inaccurate perception of the facts [Descartes] |
| 6393 | A creature doesn't think unless it interprets another's speech [Davidson] |
| 6386 | In no important way can psychology be reduced to the physical sciences [Davidson] |
| 3614 | A machine could speak in response to physical stimulus, but not hold a conversation [Descartes] |
| 5685 | True ideas are images, such as of a man, a chimera, or God [Descartes] |
| 3974 | Our meanings are partly fixed by events of which we may be ignorant [Davidson] |
| 6175 | External identification doesn't mean external location, as with sunburn [Davidson, by Rowlands] |
| 8872 | It is widely supposed that externalism cannot be reconciled with first-person authority [Davidson] |
| 8874 | It is hard to interpret a speaker's actions if we take a broad view of the content [Davidson] |
| 3629 | All ideas are adventitious, and come from the senses [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 3631 | A blind man may still contain the idea of colour [Descartes] |
| 2600 | The mind's innate ideas are part of its capacity for thought [Descartes] |
| 2273 | The ideas of God and of my self are innate in me [Descartes] |
| 2285 | I can think of innumerable shapes I have never experienced [Descartes] |
| 2601 | Qualia must be innate, because physical motions do not contain them [Descartes] |
| 2286 | The idea of a supremely perfect being is within me, like the basic concepts of mathematics [Descartes] |
| 11144 | Concepts are only possible in a language community [Davidson] |
| 6387 | A minimum requirement for a theory of meaning is that it include an account of truth [Davidson] |
| 19149 | If we reject corresponding 'facts', we should also give up the linked idea of 'representations' [Davidson] |
| 19163 | You only understand an order if you know what it is to obey it [Davidson] |
| 15160 | Davidson rejected ordinary meaning, and just used truth and reference instead [Davidson, by Soames] |
| 14612 | Davidson aimed to show that language is structured by first-order logic [Davidson, by Smart] |
| 4041 | Sentences held true determine the meanings of the words they contain [Davidson] |
| 6391 | A theory of truth tells us how communication by language is possible [Davidson] |
| 23289 | Knowing the potential truth conditions of a sentence is necessary and sufficient for understanding [Davidson] |
| 19152 | Utterances have the truth conditions intended by the speaker [Davidson] |
| 19162 | Meaning involves use, but a sentence has many uses, while meaning stays fixed [Davidson] |
| 6395 | An understood sentence can be used for almost anything; it isn't language if it has only one use [Davidson] |
| 23290 | It could be that the use of a sentence is explained by its truth conditions [Davidson] |
| 19131 | We recognise sentences at once as linguistic units; we then figure out their parts [Davidson] |
| 6394 | The pattern of sentences held true gives sentences their meaning [Davidson] |
| 6388 | Is reference the key place where language and the world meet? [Davidson] |
| 6390 | With a holistic approach, we can give up reference in empirical theories of language [Davidson] |
| 6389 | To explain the reference of a name, you must explain its sentence-role, so reference can't be defined nonlinguistically [Davidson] |
| 19156 | Modern predicates have 'places', and are sentences with singular terms deleted from the places [Davidson] |
| 19176 | The concept of truth can explain predication [Davidson] |
| 7772 | Compositionality explains how long sentences work, and truth conditions are the main compositional feature [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 19133 | If you assign semantics to sentence parts, the sentence fails to compose a whole [Davidson] |
| 7327 | Davidson thinks Frege lacks an account of how words create sentence-meaning [Davidson, by Miller,A] |
| 7331 | A theory of meaning comes down to translating sentences into Fregean symbolic logic [Davidson, by Macey] |
| 19132 | Top-down semantic analysis must begin with truth, as it is obvious, and explains linguistic usage [Davidson] |
| 7769 | You can state truth-conditions for "I am sick now" by relativising it to a speaker at a time [Davidson, by Lycan] |
| 19158 | 'Humanity belongs to Socrates' is about humanity, so it's a different proposition from 'Socrates is human' [Davidson] |
| 3968 | Propositions explain nothing without an explanation of how sentences manage to name them [Davidson] |
| 8870 | Content of thought is established through communication, so knowledge needs other minds [Davidson] |
| 3970 | Thought is only fully developed if we communicate with others [Davidson] |
| 6179 | Should we assume translation to define truth, or the other way around? [Blackburn on Davidson] |
| 6399 | Criteria of translation give us the identity of conceptual schemes [Davidson] |
| 8869 | The principle of charity attributes largely consistent logic and largely true beliefs to speakers [Davidson] |
| 3971 | There is simply no alternative to the 'principle of charity' in interpreting what others do [Davidson] |
| 19154 | The principle of charity says an interpreter must assume the logical constants [Davidson] |
| 18703 | Davidson's Cogito: 'I think, therefore I am generally right' [Davidson, by Button] |
| 7775 | Understanding a metaphor is a creative act, with no rules [Davidson] |
| 19161 | We indicate use of a metaphor by its obvious falseness, or trivial truth [Davidson] |
| 7776 | Metaphors just mean what their words literally mean [Davidson] |
| 7777 | We accept a metaphor when we see the sentence is false [Davidson] |
| 20020 | If one action leads directly to another, they are all one action [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20072 | We explain an intention by giving an account of acting with an intention [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20076 | An intending is a judgement that the action is desirable [Davidson] |
| 20074 | We can keep Davidson's account of intentions in action, by further explaining prior intentions [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 20024 | Davidson gave up reductive accounts of intention, and said it was a primitive [Davidson, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 20037 | Merely willing to walk leads to our walking [Descartes] |
| 6385 | The causally strongest reason may not be the reason the actor judges to be best [Davidson] |
| 20045 | Acting for a reason is a combination of a pro attitude, and a belief that the action is appropriate [Davidson] |
| 6384 | The notion of cause is essential to acting for reasons, intentions, agency, akrasia, and free will [Davidson] |
| 23734 | The best explanation of reasons as purposes for actions is that they are causal [Davidson, by Smith,M] |
| 23737 | Reasons can give purposes to actions, without actually causing them [Smith,M on Davidson] |
| 20075 | Early Davidson says intentional action is caused by reasons [Davidson, by Stout,R] |
| 6664 | Reasons must be causes when agents act 'for' reasons [Davidson, by Lowe] |
| 19698 | Deviant causal chain: a reason causes an action, but isn't the reason for which it was performed [Davidson, by Neta] |
| 3395 | Davidson claims that what causes an action is the reason for doing it [Davidson, by Kim] |
| 5009 | We do not praise the acts of an efficient automaton, as their acts are necessary [Descartes] |
| 5008 | The greatest perfection of man is to act by free will, and thus merit praise or blame [Descartes] |
| 16763 | We don't die because the soul departs; the soul departs because the organs cease functioning [Descartes] |
| 1581 | Greeks elevate virtues enormously, but never explain them [Descartes] |
| 4016 | Descartes makes strength of will the central virtue [Descartes, by Taylor,C] |
| 3635 | Essence must be known before we discuss existence [Descartes] |
| 3973 | Without a teacher, the concept of 'getting things right or wrong' is meaningless [Davidson] |
| 19676 | Nature is devoid of thought [Descartes, by Meillassoux] |
| 15987 | Physics only needs geometry or abstract mathematics, which can explain and demonstrate everything [Descartes] |
| 2280 | Many causes are quite baffling, so it is absurd to deduce causes from final purposes [Descartes] |
| 12730 | We will not try to understand natural or divine ends, or final causes [Descartes] |
| 24023 | All the sciences searching for order and measure are related to mathematics [Descartes] |
| 16569 | The Hot, Cold, Wet and Dry of the philosophers need themselves to be explained [Descartes] |
| 16684 | Impenetrability only belongs to the essence of extension [Descartes] |
| 6518 | Matter can't just be Descartes's geometry, because a filler of the spaces is needed [Robinson,H on Descartes] |
| 16601 | Matter is not hard, heavy or coloured, but merely extended in space [Descartes] |
| 8873 | The cause of a usage determines meaning, but why is the microstructure of water relevant? [Davidson] |
| 10371 | Distinguish causation, which is in the world, from explanations, which depend on descriptions [Davidson, by Schaffer,J] |
| 8403 | Either facts, or highly unspecific events, serve better as causes than concrete events [Field,H on Davidson] |
| 3524 | Causation is either between events, or between descriptions of events [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 3526 | Whether an event is a causal explanation depends on how it is described [Davidson, by Maslin] |
| 8346 | Full descriptions can demonstrate sufficiency of cause, but not necessity [Davidson] |
| 2272 | There must be at least as much in the cause as there is in the effect [Descartes] |
| 4778 | A singular causal statement is true if it is held to fall under a law [Davidson, by Psillos] |
| 3962 | Cause and effect relations between events must follow strict laws [Davidson] |
| 17549 | Seven theories in science: mechanics, heat, electricity, quantum, particles, relativity, life [Heisenberg, by PG] |
| 16686 | God has established laws throughout nature, and implanted ideas of them within us [Descartes] |
| 20964 | Descartes said there was conservation of 'quantity of motion' [Descartes, by Papineau] |
| 17540 | Energy is that which moves, and is the substance from which everything is made [Heisenberg] |
| 17541 | Energy is an unchanging substance, having many forms, and causing all change [Heisenberg] |
| 17548 | Maxwell introduced real fields, which transferred forces from point to point [Heisenberg] |
| 17533 | Radiation interference needs waves, but radiation photoelectric effects needs particles [Heisenberg] |
| 17537 | Position is complementary to velocity or momentum, so the whole system is indeterminate [Heisenberg] |
| 17551 | It was formerly assumed that electromagnetic waves could not be a reality in themselves [Heisenberg] |
| 17532 | An atom's stability after collisions needs explaining (which Newton's mechanics can't do) [Heisenberg] |
| 17543 | So-called 'empty' space is the carrier of geometry and kinematics [Heisenberg] |
| 17552 | In relativity the length of the 'present moment' is relative to distance from the observer [Heisenberg] |
| 2289 | Nothing apart from God could have essential existence, and such a being must be unique and eternal [Descartes] |
| 2269 | God the creator is an intelligent, infinite, powerful substance [Descartes] |
| 2275 | It is self-evident that deception is a natural defect, so God could not be a deceiver [Descartes] |
| 3637 | Ideas in God's mind only have value if he makes it so [Descartes] |
| 2287 | Existence and God's essence are inseparable, like a valley and a mountain, or a triangle and its properties [Descartes] |
| 2274 | The idea of God in my mind is like the mark a craftsman puts on his work [Descartes] |
| 3639 | Necessary existence is a property which is uniquely part of God's essence [Descartes] |
| 2268 | One idea leads to another, but there must be an initial idea that contains the reality of all the others [Descartes] |
| 3640 | Possible existence is a perfection in the idea of a triangle [Descartes] |
| 2288 | I cannot think of a supremely perfect being without the supreme perfection of existence [Descartes] |
| 3632 | We mustn't worship God as an image because we have no idea of him [Hobbes on Descartes] |
| 3633 | We can never conceive of an infinite being [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 5036 | Descartes cannot assume that a most perfect being exists without contradictions [Leibniz on Descartes] |
| 3638 | Existence is not a perfection; it is what makes perfection possible [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 3634 | We can't prove a first cause from our inability to grasp infinity [Descartes] |
| 16712 | Atheism is an atrocious and intolerable crime in any country [Descartes] |
| 3660 | Atheism arises from empiricism, because God is intangible [Descartes] |
| 16772 | An angelic mind would not experience pain, even when connected to a human body [Descartes, by Pasnau] |
| 3652 | I can't prove the soul is indestructible, only that it is separate from the mortal body [Descartes] |
| 3636 | God didn't give us good judgement even about our own lives [Gassendi on Descartes] |
| 2278 | Error arises because my faculty for judging truth is not infinite [Descartes] |
| 2277 | Since God does not wish to deceive me, my judgement won't make errors if I use it properly [Descartes] |
| 2281 | If we ask whether God's works are perfect, we must not take a narrow viewpoint, but look at the universe as a whole [Descartes] |