Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dorothy Edgington, Edmund O. Wilson and Richard M. Hare

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62 ideas

4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / c. Derivation rules of PL
Conditional Proof is only valid if we accept the truth-functional reading of 'if' [Edgington]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 3. Levels of Reality
If observation goes up a level, we expect the laws of the lower level to remain in force [Wilson,EO]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
The goodness of a picture supervenes on the picture; duplicates must be equally good [Hare]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 5. Universals as Concepts
A child first sees objects as distinct, and later as members of groups [Wilson,EO]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 1. Types of Modality
There are two families of modal notions, metaphysical and epistemic, of equal strength [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
Metaphysical possibility is discovered empirically, and is contrained by nature [Edgington]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
Broadly logical necessity (i.e. not necessarily formal logical necessity) is an epistemic notion [Edgington]
An argument is only valid if it is epistemically (a priori) necessary [Edgington]
Logical necessity is epistemic necessity, which is the old notion of a priori [Edgington, by McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 6. Probability
Truth-functional possibilities include the irrelevant, which is a mistake [Edgington]
A thing works like formal probability if all the options sum to 100% [Edgington]
Conclusion improbability can't exceed summed premise improbability in valid arguments [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / a. Conditionals
It is a mistake to think that conditionals are statements about how the world is [Edgington]
Validity can preserve certainty in mathematics, but conditionals about contingents are another matter [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / b. Types of conditional
There are many different conditional mental states, and different conditional speech acts [Edgington]
Simple indicatives about past, present or future do seem to form a single semantic kind [Edgington]
Maybe forward-looking indicatives are best classed with the subjunctives [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / c. Truth-function conditionals
Truth-function problems don't show up in mathematics [Edgington]
Are conditionals truth-functional - do the truth values of A and B determine the truth value of 'If A, B'? [Edgington]
'If A,B' must entail ¬(A & ¬B); otherwise we could have A true, B false, and If A,B true, invalidating modus ponens [Edgington]
Inferring conditionals from disjunctions or negated conjunctions gives support to truth-functionalism [Edgington]
The truth-functional view makes conditionals with unlikely antecedents likely to be true [Edgington]
Doctor:'If patient still alive, change dressing'; Nurse:'Either dead patient, or change dressing'; kills patient! [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / d. Non-truthfunction conditionals
A conditional does not have truth conditions [Edgington]
X believes 'if A, B' to the extent that A & B is more likely than A & ¬B [Edgington]
Non-truth-functionalist say 'If A,B' is false if A is T and B is F, but deny that is always true for TT,FT and FF [Edgington]
I say "If you touch that wire you'll get a shock"; you don't touch it. How can that make the conditional true? [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / e. Supposition conditionals
Conditionals express what would be the outcome, given some supposition [Edgington]
On the supposition view, believe if A,B to the extent that A&B is nearly as likely as A [Edgington]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 8. Conditionals / f. Pragmatics of conditionals
Truth-functionalists support some conditionals which we assert, but should not actually believe [Edgington]
Does 'If A,B' say something different in each context, because of the possibiites there? [Edgington]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / a. Beliefs
Beliefs are really enabling mechanisms for survival [Wilson,EO]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers study the consequences of ethics instead of its origins [Wilson,EO]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
How can intuitionists distinguish universal convictions from local cultural ones? [Hare]
You can't use intuitions to decide which intuitions you should cultivate [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / d. Biological ethics
Genetic behaviours that have enhanced human success include aggression, rape and xenophobia [Wilson,EO, by Okasha]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
The rules of human decision-making converge and overlap in a 'human nature' [Wilson,EO]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivists mistakenly think all disagreements are about facts, and so there are no moral reasons [Hare]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
An 'ought' statement implies universal application [Hare]
If morality is just a natural or intuitive description, that leads to relativism [Hare]
In primary evaluative words like 'ought' prescription is constant but description can vary [Hare, by Hooker,B]
Moral statements are imperatives rather than the avowals of emotion - but universalisable [Hare, by Glock]
Universalised prescriptivism could be seen as implying utilitarianism [Hare, by Foot]
Hare says I acquire an agglomeration of preferences by role-reversal, leading to utilitarianism [Hare, by Williams,B]
If we have to want the preferences of the many, we have to abandon our own deeply-held views [Williams,B on Hare]
If morality is to be built on identification with the preferences of others, I must agree with their errors [Williams,B on Hare]
A judgement is presciptive if we expect it to be acted on [Hare]
Descriptivism say ethical meaning is just truth-conditions; prescriptivism adds an evaluation [Hare]
If there can be contradictory prescriptions, then reasoning must be involved [Hare]
Prescriptivism sees 'ought' statements as imperatives which are universalisable [Hare]
Prescriptivism implies a commitment, but descriptivism doesn't [Hare]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / f. Altruism
We undermine altruism by rewarding it, but we reward it to encourage it [Wilson,EO]
Pure hard-core altruism based on kin selection is the enemy of civilisation [Wilson,EO]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 1. Contractarianism
The actor is most convincing who believes that his performance is real [Wilson,EO]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 8. Contract Strategies
By far the easiest way of seeming upright is to be upright [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Moral judgements must invoke some sort of principle [Hare]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 4. Categorical Imperative
The categorical imperative leads to utilitarianism [Hare, by Nagel]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 1. A People / c. A unified people
The biology of societies: kin selection, parenting, mating; status, territory, contracts [Wilson,EO]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 2. Natural Purpose / c. Purpose denied
The only human purpose is that created by our genetic history [Wilson,EO]
27. Natural Reality / G. Biology / 3. Evolution
Cultural evolution is Lamarckian and fast, biological evolution is Darwinian and slow [Wilson,EO]
Over 99 percent of human evolution has been in the hunter-gatherer phase [Wilson,EO]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 1. Religious Commitment / a. Religious Belief
It is estimated that mankind has produced 100,000 religions [Wilson,EO]