26 ideas
18405 | A 'teepee' argument has several mutually supporting planks to it [Cappelen/Dever] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
1556 | By nature people are close to one another, but culture drives them apart [Hippias] |
18425 | We can acquire self-knowledge with mirrors, not just with proprioception and introspection [Cappelen/Dever] |
18421 | Proprioception is only immune from error if you are certain that it represents the agent [Cappelen/Dever] |
18422 | Prioprioception focuses on your body parts, not on your self, or indexicality [Cappelen/Dever] |
18419 | Folk Functionalism is a Ramsification of our folk psychology [Cappelen/Dever] |
18404 | It is assumed that indexical content is needed to represent the perspective of perception [Cappelen/Dever] |
18407 | Indexicality is not significantly connected to agency [Cappelen/Dever] |
18427 | If some of our thought is tied to its context, it will be hard to communicate it [Cappelen/Dever] |
18426 | All information is objective, and purely indexical information is not much use [Cappelen/Dever] |
18428 | You don't remember your house interior just from an experienced viewpoint [Cappelen/Dever] |
18429 | Our beliefs and desires are not organised around ourselves, but around the world [Cappelen/Dever] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
18413 | Fregeans can't agree on what 'senses' are [Cappelen/Dever] |
18417 | Possible worlds accounts of content are notoriously coarse-grained [Cappelen/Dever] |
18408 | Indexicals are just non-constant in meaning, and don't involve any special concepts [Cappelen/Dever] |
18414 | Fregeans say 'I' differs in reference, so it must also differ in sense [Cappelen/Dever] |
18423 | All indexicals can be expressed non-indexically [Cappelen/Dever] |
18406 | The basic Kaplan view is that there is truth-conditional content, and contextual character [Cappelen/Dever] |
18411 | It is proposed that a huge range of linguistic items are context-sensitive [Cappelen/Dever] |
18420 | We deny that action involves some special class of beliefs [Cappelen/Dever] |