Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Dougherty,T/Rysiew,P, Jonathan Glover and Robert Audi

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74 ideas

10. Modality / A. Necessity / 7. Natural Necessity
Because 'gold is malleable' is necessary does not mean that it is analytic [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 2. Understanding
It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew]
To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / d. Cause of beliefs
Beliefs are based on perception, memory, introspection or reason [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 4. Belief / e. Belief holism
Could you have a single belief on its own? [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / A. Knowledge / 7. Knowledge First
Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
We can make certain of what we know, so knowing does not entail certainty [Audi,R]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
If you gradually remove a book's sensory properties, what is left at the end? [Audi,R]
Sense-data theory is indirect realism, but phenomenalism is direct irrealism [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 9. A Priori from Concepts
The concepts needed for a priori thought may come from experience [Audi,R]
Red and green being exclusive colours seems to be rationally graspable but not analytic [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 3. Representation
To see something as a field, I obviously need the concept of a field [Audi,R]
How could I see a field and believe nothing regarding it? [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
Sense data imply representative realism, possibly only representing primary qualities [Audi,R]
Sense-data (and the rival 'adverbial' theory) are to explain illusions and hallucinations [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 5. Interpretation
Perception is first simple, then objectual (with concepts) and then propositional [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / C. Rationalism / 1. Rationalism
The principles of justification have to be a priori [Audi,R]
Virtually all rationalists assert that we can have knowledge of synthetic a priori truths [Audi,R]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
To remember something is to know it [Audi,R]
I might remember someone I can't recall or image, by recognising them on meeting [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / a. Justification issues
Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 1. Justification / b. Need for justification
If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Justification is either unanchored (infinite or circular), or anchored (in knowledge or non-knowledge) [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
Internalism about justification implies that there is a right to believe something [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / c. Coherentism critique
Maths may be consistent with observations, but not coherent [Audi,R]
It is very hard to show how much coherence is needed for justification [Audi,R]
A consistent madman could have a very coherent belief system [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Consistent accurate prediction looks like knowledge without justified belief [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / a. Reliable knowledge
A reliability theory of knowledge seems to involve truth as correspondence [Audi,R]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 3. Reliabilism / b. Anti-reliabilism
'Reliable' is a very imprecise term, and may even mean 'justified' [Audi,R]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
Persons are conscious, they relate, they think, they feel, and they are self-aware [Glover]
16. Persons / C. Self-Awareness / 4. Errors in Introspection
We can be ignorant about ourselves, for example, our desires and motives [Audi,R]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 2. Semantics
Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Actions are not mere effects of reasons, but are under their control [Audi,R]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
A problem arises in any moral system that allows more than one absolute right [Glover]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / b. Double Effect
Double Effect: no bad acts with good consequences, but possibly good acts despite bad consequences [Glover]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / c. Omissions
Acts and Omissions: bad consequences are morally better if they result from an omission rather than an act [Glover]
It doesn't seem worse to switch off a life-support machine than to forget to switch it on [Glover]
Harmful omissions are unavoidable, while most harmful acts can be avoided [Glover]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / c. Life
What matters is not intrinsic value of life or rights, but worthwhile and desired life, and avoidance of pain [Glover]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 2. Values / e. Death
'Death' is best seen as irreversible loss of consciousness, since this is why we care about brain function [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
You can't separate acts from the people performing them [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / h. Good as benefit
Aggression in defence may be beneficial but morally corrupting [Glover]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 2. Happiness / d. Routes to happiness
The quality of a life is not altogether independent of its length [Glover]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
Duty prohibits some acts, whatever their consequences [Glover]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Satisfaction of desires is not at all the same as achieving happiness [Glover, by PG]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 5. Rule Utilitarianism
Rule-utilitarianism is either act-utilitarianism, or not really utilitarian [Glover]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 2. Population / a. Human population
How can utilitarianism decide the ideal population size? [Glover]
The sanctity of life doctrine implies a serious increase of abnormality among the population [Glover]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / g. Liberalism critique
Autonomy favours present opinions over future ones, and says nothing about the interests of potential people [Glover]
If a whole community did not mind death, respect for autonomy suggests that you could kill them all [Glover]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
Autonomy seems to acquire greater weight when the decision is more important to a person [Glover]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 2. Moral rights
Being alive is not intrinsically good, and there is no 'right to life' [Glover]
You can't have a right to something you can't desire, so a foetus has no 'right' to life [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 1. Causing Death
If someone's life is 'worth living', that gives one direct reason not to kill him [Glover]
Utilitarians object to killing directly (pain, and lost happiness), and to side-effects (loss to others, and precedents) [Glover]
What is wrong with killing someone, if another equally worthwhile life is substituted? [Glover]
The 'no trade-off' position: killing is only justified if it prevents other deaths [Glover]
Societies spend a lot to save known persons, but very little to reduce fatal accidents [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 2. Euthanasia
Involuntary euthanasia is wrong because it violates autonomy, and it has appalling side-effects [Glover]
Euthanasia is voluntary (patient's wish), or involuntary (ignore wish), or non-voluntary (no wish possible) [Glover]
Maybe extreme treatment is not saving life, but prolonging the act of dying [Glover]
The Nazi mass murders seem to have originated in their euthanasia programme [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
If killing is wrong because it destroys future happiness, not conceiving a happy child is also wrong [Glover]
Defenders of abortion focus on early pregnancy, while opponents focus on later stages [Glover]
If abortion is wrong, it is because a foetus is a human being or a person (or potentially so) [Glover]
If abortion is wrong because of the 'potential' person, that makes contraception wrong too [Glover]
Abortion differs morally from deliberate non-conception only in its side-effects [Glover]
If viability is a test or boundary at the beginning of life, it should also be so for frail old people [Glover]
Apart from side effects, it seems best to replace an inadequate foetus with one which has a better chance [Glover]
It is always right for a qualified person to perform an abortion when requested by the mother [Glover]
Conception isn't the fixed boundary for a person's beginning, because twins are possible within two weeks [Glover]
How would we judge abortion if mothers had transparent wombs? [Glover]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 4. Suicide
One test for a worthwhile life is to assess the amount of life for which you would rather be unconscious [Glover]