15 ideas
23449 | Interpreting a text is representing it as making sense [Morris,M] |
23484 | Bipolarity adds to Bivalence the capacity for both truth values [Morris,M] |
23494 | Conjunctive and disjunctive quantifiers are too specific, and are confined to the finite [Morris,M] |
23451 | Counting needs to distinguish things, and also needs the concept of a successor in a series [Morris,M] |
23460 | To count, we must distinguish things, and have a series with successors in it [Morris,M] |
23452 | Discriminating things for counting implies concepts of identity and distinctness [Morris,M] |
19542 | It is nonsense that understanding does not involve knowledge; to understand, you must know [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19543 | To grasp understanding, we should be more explicit about what needs to be known [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19541 | Rather than knowledge, our epistemic aim may be mere true belief, or else understanding and wisdom [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19540 | Don't confuse justified belief with justified believers [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19539 | If knowledge is unanalysable, that makes justification more important [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
19000 | Read 'all ravens are black' as about ravens, not as about an implication [Belnap] |
17897 | Analytic explanation is wholes in terms of parts; synthetic is parts in terms of wholes or contexts [Belnap] |
19538 | Entailment is modelled in formal semantics as set inclusion (where 'mammals' contains 'cats') [Dougherty/Rysiew] |
23491 | There must exist a general form of propositions, which are predictabe. It is: such and such is the case [Morris,M] |