Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Edwards, Peter Forrest and J Hoffman/G Rosenkrantz

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10 ideas

2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor

8964	Entities can be multiplied either by excessive categories, or excessive entities within a category [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 3. Truthmaker Maximalism

17962

The truth-maker principle is that every truth has a sufficient truth-maker [Forrest]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties

18430

We accept properties because of type/tokens, reference, and quantification [Edwards]

8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates

18432

Quineans say that predication is primitive and inexplicable [Edwards]

8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals

8962	'There are shapes which are never exemplified' is the toughest example for nominalists [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism

8961	Nominalists are motivated by Ockham's Razor and a distrust of unobservables [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]

8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 2. Resemblance Nominalism

18437

Resemblance nominalism requires a second entity to explain 'the rose is crimson' [Edwards]

9. Objects / C. Structure of Objects / 8. Parts of Objects / c. Wholes from parts

18434

That a whole is prior to its parts ('priority monism') is a view gaining in support [Edwards]

10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 2. Nature of Possible Worlds / a. Nature of possible worlds

15432

Structural universals might serve as possible worlds [Forrest, by Lewis]

8963	Four theories of possible worlds: conceptualist, combinatorial, abstract, or concrete [Hoffman/Rosenkrantz]