Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Lackey, Alex Oliver and H.L.A. Hart

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44 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
A metaphysics has an ontology (objects) and an ideology (expressed ideas about them) [Oliver]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 6. Ockham's Razor
Ockham's Razor has more content if it says believe only in what is causal [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 7. Making Modal Truths
Necessary truths seem to all have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 12. Rejecting Truthmakers
Slingshot Argument: seems to prove that all sentences have the same truth-maker [Oliver]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 11. Ontological Commitment / c. Commitment of predicates
Accepting properties by ontological commitment tells you very little about them [Oliver]
Reference is not the only way for a predicate to have ontological commitment [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
There are four conditions defining the relations between particulars and properties [Oliver]
If properties are sui generis, are they abstract or concrete? [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 2. Need for Properties
There are just as many properties as the laws require [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 3. Types of Properties
We have four options, depending whether particulars and properties are sui generis or constructions [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 10. Properties as Predicates
The expressions with properties as their meanings are predicates and abstract singular terms [Oliver]
There are five main semantic theories for properties [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / a. Nature of tropes
Tropes are not properties, since they can't be instantiated twice [Oliver]
The property of redness is the maximal set of the tropes of exactly similar redness [Oliver]
The orthodox view does not allow for uninstantiated tropes [Oliver]
Maybe concrete particulars are mereological wholes of abstract particulars [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 13. Tropes / b. Critique of tropes
Tropes can overlap, and shouldn't be splittable into parts [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
'Structural universals' methane and butane are made of the same universals, carbon and hydrogen [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 3. Instantiated Universals
Located universals are wholly present in many places, and two can be in the same place [Oliver]
Aristotle's instantiated universals cannot account for properties of abstract objects [Oliver]
If universals ground similarities, what about uniquely instantiated universals? [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 4. Uninstantiated Universals
Uninstantiated universals seem to exist if they themselves have properties [Oliver]
Uninstantiated properties are useful in philosophy [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 6. Platonic Forms / b. Partaking
Instantiation is set-membership [Oliver]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 1. Nominalism / a. Nominalism
Nominalism can reject abstractions, or universals, or sets [Oliver]
9. Objects / B. Unity of Objects / 1. Unifying an Object / b. Unifying aggregates
Things can't be fusions of universals, because two things could then be one thing [Oliver]
Abstract sets of universals can't be bundled to make concrete things [Oliver]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
Science is modally committed, to disposition, causation and law [Oliver]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / i. Conceptual priority
Conceptual priority is barely intelligible [Oliver]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Conduct is not isolated from its effect on the moral code [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 5. Democracy / e. Democratic minorities
The great danger of democracy is that the oppression of the minority becomes unobjectionable [Hart,HLA]
24. Political Theory / D. Ideologies / 6. Liberalism / a. Liberalism basics
In an organised society all actions have some effect on other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / A. Freedoms / 5. Freedom of lifestyle
The value of liberty allows freedom of action, even if that distresses other people [Hart,HLA]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
Hart (against Bentham) says human rights are what motivate legal rights [Hart,HLA, by Sen]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / a. Legal system
The principle of legality requires crimes to be precisely defined in advance of any action [Hart,HLA]
Some private moral issues are no concern of the law [Hart,HLA]
Do morals influence law? Is morality an aspect of law? Can law be morally criticised? [Hart,HLA]
Is the enforcement of morality morally justifiable? [Hart,HLA]
Modern law still suppresses practices seen as immoral, and yet harmless [Hart,HLA]
Positive law needs secondary 'rules of recognition' for their correct application [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 2. The Law / d. Legal positivism
Hart replaced positivism with the democratic requirement of the people's acceptance [Hart,HLA, by Zimmermann,J]
25. Social Practice / D. Justice / 3. Punishment / b. Retribution for crime
Moral wickedness of an offence is always relevant to the degree of punishment [Hart,HLA]