Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Lackey, C.D. Broad and Karen Bennett

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17 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience: No A-difference without a B-difference [Bennett,K]
Supervenience is non-symmetric - sometimes it's symmetric, and sometimes it's one-way [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / b. Types of supervenience
Weak supervenience is in one world, strong supervenience in all possible worlds [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / c. Significance of supervenience
Aesthetics, morality and mind supervene on the physical? Modal on non-modal? General on particular? [Bennett,K]
Some entailments do not involve supervenience, as when brotherhood entails siblinghood [Bennett,K]
Reduction requires supervenience, but does supervenience suffice for reduction? [Bennett,K]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 6. Physicalism
Definitions of physicalism are compatible with a necessary God [Bennett,K]
9. Objects / E. Objects over Time / 4. Four-Dimensionalism
A thing is simply a long event, linked by qualities, and spatio-temporal unity [Broad]
Surely the past phases of a thing are not parts of the thing? [Broad]
If short-lived happenings like car crashes are 'events', why not long-lived events like Dover Cliffs? [Broad]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
The metaphysically and logically possible worlds are the same, so they are the same strength [Bennett,K]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 6. Inference in Perception
Broad rejects the inferential component of the representative theory [Broad, by Maund]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 1. Nature of Time / g. Growing block
The present and past exist, but the future does not [Broad, by Dummett]
We could say present and past exist, but not future, so that each event adds to the total history [Broad]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / d. Time series
We imagine the present as a spotlight, moving across events from past to future [Broad]