Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Lackey, Dag Prawitz and Correia,F/Schnieder,B

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12 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Using modal logic, philosophers tried to handle all metaphysics in modal terms [Correia/Schnieder]
2. Reason / B. Laws of Thought / 2. Sufficient Reason
Why do rationalists accept Sufficient Reason, when it denies the existence of fundamental facts? [Correia/Schnieder]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
Logic is based on transitions between sentences [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 1. Logical Consequence
Logical consequence isn't a black box (Tarski's approach); we should explain how arguments work [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 2. Logical Connectives / a. Logical connectives
Natural deduction introduction rules may represent 'definitions' of logical connectives [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / H. Proof Systems / 4. Natural Deduction
In natural deduction, inferences are atomic steps involving just one logical constant [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / J. Model Theory in Logic / 1. Logical Models
Model theory looks at valid sentences and consequence, but not how we know these things [Prawitz]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
Is existential dependence by grounding, or do grounding claims arise from existential dependence? [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
Grounding is metaphysical and explanation epistemic, so keep them apart [Correia/Schnieder]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
The identity of two facts may depend on how 'fine-grained' we think facts are [Correia/Schnieder]