Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Lackey, Gabriel M.A. Segal and Keith Devlin

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33 ideas

1. Philosophy / B. History of Ideas / 5. Later European Thought
8092 Logic was merely a branch of rhetoric until the scientific 17th century [Devlin]
1. Philosophy / G. Scientific Philosophy / 1. Aims of Science
3123 Science is in the business of carving nature at the joints [Segal]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 8. Naturalising Reason
3125 Psychology studies the way rationality links desires and beliefs to causality [Segal]
4. Formal Logic / A. Syllogistic Logic / 2. Syllogistic Logic
8081 'No councillors are bankers' and 'All bankers are athletes' implies 'Some athletes are not councillors' [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 1. Propositional Logic
8085 Modern propositional inference replaces Aristotle's 19 syllogisms with modus ponens [Devlin]
4. Formal Logic / B. Propositional Logic PL / 2. Tools of Propositional Logic / e. Axioms of PL
8086 Predicate logic retains the axioms of propositional logic [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 1. Overview of Logic
8091 Situation theory is logic that takes account of context [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / A. Overview of Logic / 2. History of Logic
8087 Golden ages: 1900-1960 for pure logic, and 1950-1985 for applied logic [Devlin]
8089 Montague's intensional logic incorporated the notion of meaning [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / B. Logical Consequence / 7. Strict Implication
8082 Where a conditional is purely formal, an implication implies a link between premise and conclusion [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
8072 Sentences of apparent identical form can have different contextual meanings [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 4. Paradoxes in Logic / a. Achilles paradox
8075 Space and time are atomic in the arrow, and divisible in the tortoise [Devlin]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
21554 Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
21553 It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 5. Metaphysical Necessity
3105 Is 'Hesperus = Phosphorus' metaphysically necessary, but not logically or epistemologically necessary? [Segal]
10. Modality / D. Knowledge of Modality / 4. Conceivable as Possible / b. Conceivable but impossible
3106 If claims of metaphysical necessity are based on conceivability, we should be cautious [Segal]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 5. Language Relativism
8088 People still say the Hopi have no time concepts, despite Whorf's later denial [Devlin]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 3. Best Explanation / c. Against best explanation
3113 The success and virtue of an explanation do not guarantee its truth [Segal]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 4. Folk Psychology
3112 Folk psychology is ridiculously dualist in its assumptions [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 5. Twin Earth
3108 If 'water' has narrow content, it refers to both H2O and XYZ [Segal]
3110 Humans are made of H2O, so 'twins' aren't actually feasible [Segal]
3124 Externalists can't assume old words refer to modern natural kinds [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 6. Broad Content
3117 Concepts can survive a big change in extension [Segal]
3104 Must we relate to some diamonds to understand them? [Segal]
3103 Maybe content involves relations to a language community [Segal]
3111 Externalism can't explain concepts that have no reference [Segal]
3109 If content is external, so are beliefs and desires [Segal]
3116 Maybe experts fix content, not ordinary users [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 7. Narrow Content
3121 If content is narrow, my perfect twin shares my concepts [Segal]
18. Thought / C. Content / 10. Causal Semantics
3118 If thoughts ARE causal, we can't explain how they cause things [Segal]
3119 Even 'mass' cannot be defined in causal terms [Segal]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 1. Syntax
8073 How do we parse 'time flies like an arrow' and 'fruit flies like an apple'? [Devlin]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
8076 The distinction between sentences and abstract propositions is crucial in logic [Devlin]