36 ideas
10455 | Free logic at least allows empty names, but struggles to express non-existence [Bach] |
3340 | Von Neumann defines each number as the set of all smaller numbers [Neumann, by Blackburn] |
15943 | Limitation of Size is not self-evident, and seems too strong [Lavine on Neumann] |
3355 | Von Neumann wanted mathematical functions to replace sets [Neumann, by Benardete,JA] |
10454 | In first-order we can't just assert existence, and it is very hard to deny something's existence [Bach] |
10453 | In logic constants play the role of proper names [Bach] |
10452 | Proper names can be non-referential - even predicate as well as attributive uses [Bach] |
10456 | Millian names struggle with existence, empty names, identities and attitude ascription [Bach] |
10440 | An object can be described without being referred to [Bach] |
10444 | Definite descriptions can be used to refer, but are not semantically referential [Bach] |
21554 | Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey] |
21553 | It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey] |
13489 | Von Neumann treated cardinals as a special sort of ordinal [Neumann, by Hart,WD] |
12336 | A von Neumann ordinal is a transitive set with transitive elements [Neumann, by Badiou] |
22716 | Von Neumann defined ordinals as the set of all smaller ordinals [Neumann, by Poundstone] |
18179 | For Von Neumann the successor of n is n U {n} (rather than {n}) [Neumann, by Maddy] |
18180 | Von Neumann numbers are preferred, because they continue into the transfinite [Maddy on Neumann] |
15925 | Each Von Neumann ordinal number is the set of its predecessors [Neumann, by Lavine] |
13672 | All the axioms for mathematics presuppose set theory [Neumann] |
12900 | How could 'S knows he has hands' not have a fixed content? [Bach] |
12901 | If contextualism is right, knowledge sentences are baffling out of their context [Bach] |
12902 | Sceptics aren't changing the meaning of 'know', but claiming knowing is tougher than we think [Bach] |
10446 | Fictional reference is different inside and outside the fiction [Bach] |
10447 | We can refer to fictional entities if they are abstract objects [Bach] |
10443 | You 'allude to', not 'refer to', an individual if you keep their identity vague [Bach] |
10439 | What refers: indefinite or definite or demonstrative descriptions, names, indexicals, demonstratives? [Bach] |
10441 | If we can refer to things which change, we can't be obliged to single out their properties [Bach] |
10442 | We can think of an individual without have a uniquely characterizing description [Bach] |
10445 | It can't be real reference if it could refer to some other thing that satisfies the description [Bach] |
10457 | Since most expressions can be used non-referentially, none of them are inherently referential [Bach] |
10463 | Just alluding to or describing an object is not the same as referring to it [Bach] |
10459 | Context does not create reference; it is just something speakers can exploit [Bach] |
10460 | 'That duck' may not refer to the most obvious one in the group [Bach] |
10461 | What a pronoun like 'he' refers back to is usually a matter of speaker's intentions [Bach] |
10462 | Information comes from knowing who is speaking, not just from interpretation of the utterance [Bach] |
10458 | People slide from contextual variability all the way to contextual determination [Bach] |