66 ideas
3695 | Philosophy is a priori if it is anything [Bonjour] |
3651 | Perceiving necessary connections is the essence of reasoning [Bonjour] |
3700 | Coherence can't be validated by appeal to coherence [Bonjour] |
8893 | For any given area, there seem to be a huge number of possible coherent systems of beliefs [Bonjour] |
10405 | In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer] |
10407 | Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer] |
4261 | The Lottery Paradox says each ticket is likely to lose, so there probably won't be a winner [Bonjour, by PG] |
21554 | Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey] |
21553 | It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey] |
14592 | Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer] |
10421 | Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer] |
14594 | Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer] |
10410 | Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer] |
10416 | Can properties have parts? [Swoyer] |
10399 | If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer] |
14595 | Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer] |
10417 | There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer] |
10413 | The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer] |
10402 | Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer] |
10400 | Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer] |
10403 | If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer] |
14593 | Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer] |
3697 | The concept of possibility is prior to that of necessity [Bonjour] |
10406 | One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer] |
8888 | The concept of knowledge is so confused that it is best avoided [Bonjour] |
8887 | It is hard to give the concept of 'self-evident' a clear and defensible characterization [Bonjour] |
8897 | The adverbial account will still be needed when a mind apprehends its sense-data [Bonjour] |
3707 | Our rules of thought can only be judged by pure rational insight [Bonjour] |
3704 | Moderate rationalists believe in fallible a priori justification [Bonjour] |
10404 | Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer] |
4255 | Externalist theories of knowledge are one species of foundationalism [Bonjour] |
4257 | The big problem for foundationalism is to explain how basic beliefs are possible [Bonjour] |
8896 | Conscious states have built-in awareness of content, so we know if a conceptual description of it is correct [Bonjour] |
3696 | A priori justification requires understanding but no experience [Bonjour] |
3703 | You can't explain away a priori justification as analyticity, and you can't totally give it up [Bonjour] |
3706 | A priori justification can vary in degree [Bonjour] |
4256 | The main argument for foundationalism is that all other theories involve a regress leading to scepticism [Bonjour] |
3699 | The induction problem blocks any attempted proof of physical statements [Bonjour] |
21506 | A coherence theory of justification can combine with a correspondence theory of truth [Bonjour] |
21509 | There will always be a vast number of equally coherent but rival systems [Bonjour] |
21503 | Empirical coherence must attribute reliability to spontaneous experience [Bonjour] |
21511 | A well written novel cannot possibly match a real belief system for coherence [Bonjour] |
21510 | The objection that a negated system is equally coherent assume that coherence is consistency [Bonjour] |
21505 | A coherent system can be justified with initial beliefs lacking all credibility [Bonjour] |
21504 | The best explanation of coherent observations is they are caused by and correspond to reality [Bonjour] |
8891 | My incoherent beliefs about art should not undermine my very coherent beliefs about physics [Bonjour] |
8892 | Coherence seems to justify empirical beliefs about externals when there is no external input [Bonjour] |
8894 | Coherentists must give a reason why coherent justification is likely to lead to the truth [Bonjour] |
4258 | Extreme externalism says no more justification is required than the truth of the belief [Bonjour] |
3701 | Externalist theories of justification don't require believers to have reasons for their beliefs [Bonjour] |
8889 | Reliabilists disagree over whether some further requirement is needed to produce knowledge [Bonjour] |
4259 | External reliability is not enough, if the internal state of the believer is known to be irrational [Bonjour] |
8890 | If the reliable facts producing a belief are unknown to me, my belief is not rational or responsible [Bonjour] |
4260 | Even if there is no obvious irrationality, it may be irrational to base knowledge entirely on external criteria [Bonjour] |
3702 | Externalism means we have no reason to believe, which is strong scepticism [Bonjour] |
21508 | Anomalies challenge the claim that the basic explanations are actually basic [Bonjour] |
3709 | Induction must go beyond the evidence, in order to explain why the evidence occurred [Bonjour] |
8895 | If neither the first-level nor the second-level is itself conscious, there seems to be no consciousness present [Bonjour] |
3708 | All thought represents either properties or indexicals [Bonjour] |
10408 | Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer] |
10409 | Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer] |
10401 | The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer] |
10420 | Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer] |
3698 | Indeterminacy of translation is actually indeterminacy of meaning and belief [Bonjour] |
10412 | If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer] |
10411 | Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer] |