22 ideas
18365 | If truths are just identical with facts, then truths will make themselves true [David] |
3745 | Must sentences make statements to qualify for truth? [O'Connor] |
18362 | Examples show that truth-making is just non-symmetric, not asymmetric [David] |
18360 | It is assumed that a proposition is necessarily true if its truth-maker exists [David] |
18358 | Two different propositions can have the same fact as truth-maker [David] |
18355 | What matters is truth-making (not truth-makers) [David] |
18354 | Correspondence is symmetric, while truth-making is taken to be asymmetric [David] |
18356 | Correspondence is an over-ambitious attempt to explain truth-making [David] |
18363 | Correspondence theorists see facts as the only truth-makers [David] |
3742 | Beliefs must match facts, but also words must match beliefs [O'Connor] |
18364 | Correspondence theory likes ideal languages, that reveal the structure of propositions [David] |
18357 | What makes a disjunction true is simpler than the disjunctive fact it names [David] |
18359 | One proposition can be made true by many different facts [David] |
3744 | The semantic theory requires sentences as truth-bearers, not propositions [O'Connor] |
3749 | What does 'true in English' mean? [O'Connor] |
3746 | Logic seems to work for unasserted sentences [O'Connor] |
21554 | Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey] |
21553 | It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey] |
3747 | Events are fast changes which are of interest to us [O'Connor] |
18361 | A reflexive relation entails that the relation can't be asymmetric [David] |
3743 | We can't contemplate our beliefs until we have expressed them [O'Connor] |
3748 | Without language our beliefs are particular and present [O'Connor] |