Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Douglas Lackey, Paul Audi and Jeremy Bentham

expand these ideas     |    start again     |     specify just one area for these philosophers

26 ideas

5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / b. Cantor's paradox
21554 Sets always exceed terms, so all the sets must exceed all the sets [Lackey]
5. Theory of Logic / L. Paradox / 5. Paradoxes in Set Theory / c. Burali-Forti's paradox
21553 It seems that the ordinal number of all the ordinals must be bigger than itself [Lackey]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / a. Nature of grounding
17292 Avoid 'in virtue of' for grounding, since it might imply a reflexive relation such as identity [Audi,P]
17295 Ground relations depend on the properties [Audi,P]
17297 A ball's being spherical non-causally determines its power to roll [Audi,P]
17302 Ground is irreflexive, asymmetric, transitive, non-monotonic etc. [Audi,P]
17303 The best critique of grounding says it is actually either identity or elimination [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / b. Relata of grounding
17294 Grounding is a singular relation between worldly facts [Audi,P]
17300 If grounding relates facts, properties must be included, as well as objects [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / c. Grounding and explanation
17296 We must accept grounding, for our important explanations [Audi,P]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 1. Grounding / d. Grounding and reduction
17301 Reduction is just identity, so the two things are the same fact, so reduction isn't grounding [Audi,P]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / b. Types of fact
17293 Worldly facts are obtaining states of affairs, with constituents; conceptual facts also depend on concepts [Audi,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / a. Types of explanation
17298 Two things being identical (like water and H2O) is not an explanation [Audi,P]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
17299 There are plenty of examples of non-causal explanation [Audi,P]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / c. Right and good
5901 Is 'productive of happiness' the definition of 'right', or the cause of it? [Ross on Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / b. Types of pleasure
5934 Of Bentham's 'dimensions' of pleasure, only intensity and duration matter [Ross on Bentham]
5271 Prejudice apart, push-pin has equal value with music and poetry [Bentham]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 3. Pleasure / e. Role of pleasure
3777 Pleasure and pain control all human desires and duties [Bentham]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 2. Ideal of Pleasure
3554 Bentham thinks happiness is feeling good, but why use morality to achieve that? [Annas on Bentham]
3781 The value of pleasures and pains is their force [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / A. Basis of a State / 3. Natural Values / c. Natural rights
20977 Natural rights are nonsense, and unspecified natural rights is nonsense on stilts [Bentham]
24. Political Theory / B. Nature of a State / 2. State Legitimacy / d. General will
3778 The community's interest is a sum of individual interests [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / C. Rights / 1. Basis of Rights
21003 Only laws can produce real rights; rights from 'law of nature' are imaginary [Bentham]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
20280 Large mature animals are more rational than babies. But all that really matters is - can they suffer? [Bentham]
26. Natural Theory / A. Speculations on Nature / 1. Nature
3779 Unnatural, when it means anything, means infrequent [Bentham]
28. God / A. Divine Nature / 6. Divine Morality / b. Euthyphro question
3780 We must judge a thing morally to know if it conforms to God's will [Bentham]