15 ideas
| 9470 | Modal logic is not an extensional language [Parsons,C] |
| 13418 | The old problems with the axiom of choice are probably better ascribed to the law of excluded middle [Parsons,C] |
| 9469 | Substitutional existential quantifier may explain the existence of linguistic entities [Parsons,C] |
| 9468 | On the substitutional interpretation, '(∃x) Fx' is true iff a closed term 't' makes Ft true [Parsons,C] |
| 17447 | Parsons says counting is tagging as first, second, third..., and converting the last to a cardinal [Parsons,C, by Heck] |
| 18201 | General principles can be obvious in mathematics, but bold speculations in empirical science [Parsons,C] |
| 13419 | If functions are transfinite objects, finitists can have no conception of them [Parsons,C] |
| 13417 | If a mathematical structure is rejected from a physical theory, it retains its mathematical status [Parsons,C] |
| 8329 | Either causal relations are given in experience, or they are unobserved and theoretical [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 2685 | The Greek 'philia' covers all good and fruitful relationships [Cooper,JM] |
| 8324 | The problem is to explain how causal laws and relations connect, and how they link to the world [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8328 | Causation isn't energy transfer, because an electron is caused by previous temporal parts [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8327 | If direction of causation is just direction of energy transfer, that seems to involve causation [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8330 | Are causes sufficient for the event, or necessary, or both? [Sosa/Tooley] |
| 8325 | The dominant view is that causal laws are prior; a minority say causes can be explained singly [Sosa/Tooley] |