416 ideas
| 2196 | The observation of human blindness and weakness is the result of all philosophy [Hume] |
| 9414 | Metaphysics is the mapping of possibilities [Lowe, by Mumford] |
| 16414 | Science needs metaphysics to weed out its presuppositions [Lowe, by Hofweber] |
| 13917 | Metaphysics aims to identify categories of being, and show their interdependency [Lowe] |
| 4194 | Metaphysics is concerned with the fundamental structure of reality as a whole [Lowe] |
| 8282 | Only metaphysics can decide whether identity survives through change [Lowe] |
| 16127 | Metaphysics tells us what there could be, rather than what there is [Lowe] |
| 4214 | Maybe such concepts as causation, identity and existence are primitive and irreducible [Lowe] |
| 13919 | Philosophy aims not at the 'analysis of concepts', but at understanding the essences of things [Lowe] |
| 2187 | If we suspect that a philosophical term is meaningless, we should ask what impression it derives from [Hume] |
| 2200 | All experimental conclusions assume that the future will be like the past [Hume] |
| 4222 | If all that exists is what is being measured, what about the people and instruments doing the measuring? [Lowe] |
| 3807 | Reason is and ought to be the slave of the passions [Hume] |
| 4217 | It is more extravagant, in general, to revise one's logic than to augment one's ontology [Lowe] |
| 16539 | A definition of a circle will show what it is, and show its generating principle [Lowe] |
| 16540 | Defining an ellipse by conic sections reveals necessities, but not the essence of an ellipse [Lowe] |
| 16548 | An essence is what an entity is, revealed by a real definition; this is not an entity in its own right [Lowe] |
| 16549 | Simple things like 'red' can be given real ostensive definitions [Lowe] |
| 8262 | How can a theory of meaning show the ontological commitments of two paraphrases of one idea? [Lowe] |
| 6961 | An analogy begins to break down as soon as the two cases differ [Hume] |
| 4636 | All reasoning concerning matters of fact is based on analogy (with similar results of similar causes) [Hume] |
| 18351 | Propositions are made true, in virtue of something which explains its truth [Lowe] |
| 8315 | Maybe facts are just true propositions [Lowe] |
| 8319 | One-to-one correspondence would need countable, individuable items [Lowe] |
| 8309 | A set is a 'number of things', not a 'collection', because nothing actually collects the members [Lowe] |
| 8322 | I don't believe in the empty set, because (lacking members) it lacks identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 8312 | It is better if the existential quantifier refers to 'something', rather than a 'thing' which needs individuation [Lowe] |
| 6653 | Syntactical methods of proof need only structure, where semantic methods (truth-tables) need truth [Lowe] |
| 4229 | An infinite series of tasks can't be completed because it has no last member [Lowe] |
| 4240 | It might be argued that mathematics does not, or should not, aim at truth [Lowe] |
| 8297 | Numbers are universals, being sets whose instances are sets of appropriate cardinality [Lowe] |
| 8649 | Two numbers are equal if all of their units correspond to one another [Hume] |
| 8266 | Simple counting is more basic than spotting that one-to-one correlation makes sets equinumerous [Lowe] |
| 8302 | Fs and Gs are identical in number if they one-to-one correlate with one another [Lowe] |
| 8298 | Sets are instances of numbers (rather than 'collections'); numbers explain sets, not vice versa [Lowe] |
| 8311 | If 2 is a particular, then adding particulars to themselves does nothing, and 2+2=2 [Lowe] |
| 4241 | If there are infinite numbers and finite concrete objects, this implies that numbers are abstract objects [Lowe] |
| 8310 | Does the existence of numbers matter, in the way space, time and persons do? [Lowe] |
| 2197 | Reason assists experience in discovering laws, and in measuring their application [Hume] |
| 8321 | All possible worlds contain abstracta (e.g. numbers), which means they contain concrete objects [Lowe] |
| 21291 | There is no medium state between existence and non-existence [Hume] |
| 7700 | We can't think about the abstract idea of triangles, but only of particular triangles [Hume] |
| 4239 | Nominalists deny abstract objects, because we can have no reason to believe in their existence [Lowe] |
| 8300 | Perhaps possession of causal power is the hallmark of existence (and a reason to deny the void) [Lowe] |
| 4202 | Change can be of composition (the component parts), or quality (properties), or substance [Lowe] |
| 15541 | Maybe particles are unchanging, and intrinsic change in things is their rearrangement [Lowe, by Lewis] |
| 8281 | Heraclitus says change is new creation, and Spinoza that it is just phases of the one substance [Lowe] |
| 4201 | Four theories of qualitative change are 'a is F now', or 'a is F-at-t', or 'a-at-t is F', or 'a is-at-t F' [Lowe, by PG] |
| 8270 | Events are changes or non-changes in properties and relations of persisting objects [Lowe] |
| 4219 | Numerically distinct events of the same kind (like two battles) can coincide in space and time [Lowe] |
| 4221 | Maybe modern physics requires an event-ontology, rather than a thing-ontology [Lowe] |
| 8308 | Events are ontologically indispensable for singular causal explanations [Lowe] |
| 4220 | Maybe an event is the exemplification of a property at a time [Lowe] |
| 4225 | Events are changes in the properties of or relations between things [Lowe] |
| 8314 | Are facts wholly abstract, or can they contain some concrete constituents? [Lowe] |
| 8316 | Facts cannot be wholly abstract if they enter into causal relations [Lowe] |
| 8318 | The problem with the structured complex view of facts is what binds the constituents [Lowe] |
| 8323 | It is whimsical to try to count facts - how many facts did I learn before breakfast? [Lowe] |
| 8313 | Facts are needed for truth-making and causation, but they seem to lack identity criteria [Lowe] |
| 8258 | Two of the main rivals for the foundations of ontology are substances, and facts or states-of-affairs [Lowe] |
| 8301 | Some abstractions exist despite lacking causal powers, because explanation needs them [Lowe] |
| 8283 | Ontological categories are not natural kinds: the latter can only be distinguished using the former [Lowe] |
| 8284 | The top division of categories is either abstract/concrete, or universal/particular, or necessary/contingent [Lowe] |
| 13122 | Lowe divides things into universals and particulars, then kinds and properties, and abstract/concrete [Lowe, by Westerhoff] |
| 4196 | The main categories of existence are either universal and particular, or abstract and concrete [Lowe] |
| 18353 | Modes are beings that are related both to substances and to universals [Lowe] |
| 8273 | Is 'the Thames is broad in London' relational, or adverbial, or segmental? [Lowe] |
| 8285 | I prefer 'modes' to 'tropes', because it emphasises their dependence [Lowe] |
| 4234 | Trope theory says blueness is a real feature of objects, but not the same as an identical blue found elsewhere [Lowe] |
| 4235 | Maybe a cushion is just a bundle of tropes, such as roundness, blueness and softness [Lowe] |
| 4236 | Tropes seem to be abstract entities, because they can't exist alone, but must come in bundles [Lowe] |
| 8286 | Tropes cannot have clear identity-conditions, so they are not objects [Lowe] |
| 8294 | How can tropes depend on objects for their identity, if objects are just bundles of tropes? [Lowe] |
| 8295 | Why cannot a trope float off and join another bundle? [Lowe] |
| 8296 | Does a ball snug in plaster have one trope, or two which coincide? [Lowe] |
| 18352 | Tropes have existence independently of any entities [Lowe] |
| 11942 | Power is the possibility of action, as discovered by experience [Hume] |
| 11949 | There may well be powers in things, with which we are quite unacquainted [Hume] |
| 11950 | We have no idea of powers, because we have no impressions of them [Hume] |
| 11941 | The distinction between a power and its exercise is entirely frivolous [Hume] |
| 13602 | We cannot form an idea of a 'power', and the word is without meaning [Hume] |
| 8288 | Sortal terms for universals involve a substance, whereas adjectival terms do not [Lowe] |
| 4197 | The category of universals can be sub-divided into properties and relations [Lowe] |
| 8293 | Real universals are needed to explain laws of nature [Lowe] |
| 8307 | Particulars are instantiations, and universals are instantiables [Lowe] |
| 4232 | Nominalists believe that only particulars exist [Lowe] |
| 11098 | Momentary impressions are wrongly identified with one another on the basis of resemblance [Hume, by Quine] |
| 7954 | If we see a resemblance among objects, we apply the same name to them, despite their differences [Hume] |
| 7720 | Two things can only resemble one another in some respect, and that may reintroduce a universal [Lowe] |
| 4205 | 'Is non-self-exemplifying' is a predicate which cannot denote a property (as it would be a contradiction) [Lowe] |
| 8967 | Not all predicates can be properties - 'is non-self-exemplifying', for example [Lowe] |
| 4233 | If 'blueness' is a set of particulars, there is danger of circularity, or using universals, in identifying the set [Lowe] |
| 8267 | Perhaps concrete objects are entities which are in space-time and subject to causality [Lowe] |
| 8265 | Our commitment to the existence of objects should depend on their explanatory value [Lowe] |
| 8275 | Objects are entities with full identity-conditions, but there are entities other than objects [Lowe] |
| 16130 | To be an object at all requires identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 7783 | Bodies, properties, relations, events, numbers, sets and propositions are 'things' if they exist [Lowe] |
| 8263 | An object is an entity which has identity-conditions [Lowe] |
| 21293 | Individuation is only seeing that a thing is stable and continuous over time [Hume] |
| 8965 | Neither mere matter nor pure form can individuate a sphere, so it must be a combination [Lowe] |
| 8268 | Some things (such as electrons) can be countable, while lacking proper identity [Lowe] |
| 8303 | Criteria of identity cannot individuate objects, because they are shared among different types [Lowe] |
| 8292 | Diversity of two tigers is their difference in space-time; difference of matter is a consequence [Lowe] |
| 8291 | Individuation principles identify what kind it is; identity criteria distinguish items of the same kind [Lowe] |
| 4206 | Conventionalists see the world as an amorphous lump without identities, but are we part of the lump? [Lowe] |
| 16128 | A 'substance' is an object which doesn't depend for existence on other objects [Lowe] |
| 7712 | On substances, Leibniz emphasises unity, Spinoza independence, Locke relations to qualities [Lowe] |
| 12048 | The only meaning we have for substance is a collection of qualities [Hume] |
| 13424 | Aristotelians propose accidents supported by substance, but they don't understand either of them [Hume] |
| 4204 | Statues can't survive much change to their shape, unlike lumps of bronze, which must retain material [Lowe] |
| 16545 | The essence of lumps and statues shows that two objects coincide but are numerically distinct [Lowe] |
| 16546 | The essence of a bronze statue shows that it could be made of different bronze [Lowe] |
| 13918 | Holes, shadows and spots of light can coincide without being identical [Lowe] |
| 8279 | The identity of composite objects isn't fixed by original composition, because how do you identify the origin? [Lowe] |
| 16551 | Grasping an essence is just grasping a real definition [Lowe] |
| 13921 | All things must have an essence (a 'what it is'), or we would be unable to think about them [Lowe] |
| 16542 | Explanation can't give an account of essence, because it is too multi-faceted [Lowe] |
| 13922 | Knowing an essence is just knowing what the thing is, not knowing some further thing [Lowe] |
| 16552 | If we must know some entity to know an essence, we lack a faculty to do that [Lowe] |
| 21299 | Changing a part can change the whole, not absolutely, but by its proportion of the whole [Hume] |
| 21300 | A change more obviously destroys an identity if it is quick and observed [Hume] |
| 6618 | A 'substance' is a thing that remains the same when its properties change [Lowe] |
| 1321 | If identity survives change or interruption, then resemblance, contiguity or causation must unite the parts of it [Hume] |
| 1330 | If a republic can retain identity through many changes, so can an individual [Hume] |
| 8271 | An object 'endures' if it is always wholly present, and 'perdures' if different parts exist at different times [Lowe] |
| 8272 | How can you identify temporal parts of tomatoes without referring to tomatoes? [Lowe] |
| 21302 | If a ruined church is rebuilt, its relation to its parish makes it the same church [Hume] |
| 21303 | We accept the identity of a river through change, because it is the river's nature [Hume] |
| 21301 | The purpose of the ship makes it the same one through all variations [Hume] |
| 4198 | If 5% replacement preserves a ship, we can replace 4% and 4% again, and still retain the ship [Lowe] |
| 4199 | A renovation or a reconstruction of an original ship would be accepted, as long as the other one didn't exist [Lowe] |
| 4200 | If old parts are stored and then appropriated, they are no longer part of the original (which is the renovated ship). [Lowe] |
| 1207 | Both number and unity are incompatible with the relation of identity [Hume] |
| 21290 | Multiple objects cannot convey identity, because we see them as different [Hume] |
| 8305 | A clear idea of the kind of an object must precede a criterion of identity for it [Lowe] |
| 8290 | One view is that two objects of the same type are only distinguished by differing in matter [Lowe] |
| 13920 | Each thing has to be of a general kind, because it belongs to some category [Lowe] |
| 21289 | 'An object is the same with itself' is meaningless; it expresses unity, not identity [Hume] |
| 21292 | Saying an object is the same with itself is only meaningful over a period of time [Hume] |
| 4203 | Identity of Indiscernibles (same properties, same thing) ) is not Leibniz's Law (same thing, same properties) [Lowe] |
| 15079 | 'Conceptual' necessity is narrow logical necessity, true because of concepts and logical laws [Lowe] |
| 16533 | Logical necessities, based on laws of logic, are a proper sub-class of metaphysical necessities [Lowe] |
| 16063 | Metaphysical necessity is logical necessity 'broadly construed' [Lowe, by Lynch/Glasgow] |
| 16531 | 'Metaphysical' necessity is absolute and objective - the strongest kind of necessity [Lowe] |
| 8260 | Logical necessity can be 'strict' (laws), or 'narrow' (laws and definitions), or 'broad' (all logical worlds) [Lowe] |
| 9428 | Nothing we clearly imagine is absolutely impossible [Hume] |
| 4766 | Necessity only exists in the mind, and not in objects [Hume] |
| 16131 | The metaphysically possible is what acceptable principles and categories will permit [Lowe] |
| 4195 | It is impossible to reach a valid false conclusion from true premises, so reason itself depends on possibility [Lowe] |
| 16532 | 'Epistemic' necessity is better called 'certainty' [Lowe] |
| 2216 | We transfer the frequency of past observations to our future predictions [Hume] |
| 2215 | There is no such thing as chance [Hume] |
| 16543 | If an essence implies p, then p is an essential truth, and hence metaphysically necessary [Lowe] |
| 16544 | Metaphysical necessity is either an essential truth, or rests on essential truths [Lowe] |
| 4207 | We might eliminate 'possible' and 'necessary' in favour of quantification over possible worlds [Lowe] |
| 8320 | Does every abstract possible world exist in every possible world? [Lowe] |
| 16538 | We could give up possible worlds if we based necessity on essences [Lowe] |
| 2209 | Belief is stronger, clearer and steadier than imagination [Hume] |
| 2208 | Belief is just a particular feeling attached to ideas of objects [Hume] |
| 2207 | Belief can't be a concept plus an idea, or we could add the idea to fictions [Hume] |
| 20189 | Belief is a feeling, independent of the will, which arises from uncontrolled and unknown causes [Hume] |
| 3661 | 'Natural beliefs' are unavoidable, whatever our judgements [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 6635 | Causal theories of belief make all beliefs true, and can't explain belief about the future [Lowe] |
| 2213 | Beliefs are built up by resemblance, contiguity and causation [Hume] |
| 6619 | Perhaps 'I' no more refers than the 'it' in 'it is raining' [Lowe] |
| 6643 | 'Ecological' approaches say we don't infer information, but pick it up directly from reality [Lowe] |
| 6526 | Hume says objects are not a construction, but an imaginative leap [Hume, by Robinson,H] |
| 8280 | While space may just be appearance, time and change can't be, because the appearances change [Lowe] |
| 2191 | Relations of ideas are known by thought, independently from the world [Hume] |
| 8276 | Properties or qualities are essentially adjectival, not objectual [Lowe] |
| 2239 | If secondary qualities (e.g. hardness) are in the mind, so are primary qualities like extension [Hume] |
| 2237 | It never occurs to people that they only experience representations, not the real objects [Hume] |
| 6638 | One must be able to visually recognise a table, as well as knowing its form [Lowe] |
| 6644 | Computationalists object that the 'ecological' approach can't tell us how we get the information [Lowe] |
| 6647 | Comparing shapes is proportional in time to the angle of rotation [Lowe] |
| 6639 | The 'disjunctive' theory of perception says true perceptions and hallucinations need have nothing in common [Lowe] |
| 7710 | Perception is a mode of belief-acquisition, and does not involve sensation [Lowe] |
| 7711 | Science requires a causal theory - perception of an object must be an experience caused by the object [Lowe] |
| 6640 | A causal theorist can be a direct realist, if all objects of perception are external [Lowe] |
| 6645 | If blindsight shows we don't need perceptual experiences, the causal theory is wrong [Lowe] |
| 6637 | How could one paraphrase very complex sense-data reports adverbially? [Lowe] |
| 2184 | All ideas are copies of impressions [Hume] |
| 2190 | All objects of enquiry are Relations of Ideas, or Matters of Fact [Hume] |
| 2192 | All reasoning about facts is causal; nothing else goes beyond memory and senses [Hume] |
| 2246 | If books don't relate ideas or explain facts, commit them to the flames [Hume] |
| 21309 | A proposition cannot be intelligible or consistent, if the perceptions are not so [Hume] |
| 23631 | Hume is loose when he says perceptions of different strength are different species [Reid on Hume] |
| 2182 | Impressions are our livelier perceptions, Ideas the less lively ones [Hume] |
| 6489 | Associationism results from having to explain intentionality just with sense-data [Robinson,H on Hume] |
| 2189 | All ideas are connected by Resemblance, Contiguity in time or place, and Cause and Effect [Hume] |
| 2702 | Only madmen dispute the authority of experience [Hume] |
| 2183 | We can only invent a golden mountain by combining experiences [Hume] |
| 21285 | Events are baffling before experience, and obvious after experience [Hume] |
| 2194 | How could Adam predict he would drown in water or burn in fire? [Hume] |
| 2186 | We cannot form the idea of something we haven't experienced [Hume] |
| 2205 | You couldn't reason at all if you lacked experience [Hume] |
| 2217 | When definitions are pushed to the limit, only experience can make them precise [Hume] |
| 3902 | Hume mistakenly lumps sensations and perceptions together as 'impressions' [Scruton on Hume] |
| 6182 | Even Hume didn't include mathematics in his empiricism [Hume, by Kant] |
| 23421 | If a person had a gap in their experience of blue shades, they could imaginatively fill it in [Hume] |
| 16534 | 'Intuitions' are just unreliable 'hunches'; over centuries intuitions change enormously [Lowe] |
| 6667 | There are memories of facts, memories of practical skills, and autobiographical memory [Lowe] |
| 2206 | Reasons for belief must eventually terminate in experience, or they are without foundation [Hume] |
| 2235 | There is no certain supreme principle, or infallible rule of inference [Hume] |
| 10328 | We think testimony matches reality because of experience, not some a priori connection [Hume] |
| 2230 | Good testimony needs education, integrity, motive and agreement [Hume, by PG] |
| 12417 | Mathematicians only accept their own proofs when everyone confims them [Hume] |
| 2238 | Reason can never show that experiences are connected to external objects [Hume] |
| 2242 | Mitigated scepticism draws attention to the limitations of human reason, and encourages modesty [Hume] |
| 2243 | Mitigated scepticism sensibly confines our enquiries to the narrow capacity of human understanding [Hume] |
| 5548 | Hume became a total sceptic, because he believed that reason was a deception [Hume, by Kant] |
| 2236 | Examples of illusion only show that sense experience needs correction by reason [Hume] |
| 6642 | Psychologists say illusions only occur in unnatural and passive situations [Lowe] |
| 2240 | It is a very extravagant aim of the sceptics to destroy reason and argument by means of reason and argument [Hume] |
| 2241 | The main objection to scepticism is that no good can come of it [Hume] |
| 4223 | Unfalsifiability may be a failure in an empirical theory, but it is a virtue in metaphysics [Lowe] |
| 7446 | The idea of inductive evidence, around 1660, made Hume's problem possible [Hume, by Hacking] |
| 2198 | We assume similar secret powers behind similar experiences, such as the nourishment of bread [Hume] |
| 2199 | Reason cannot show why reliable past experience should extend to future times and remote places [Hume] |
| 2201 | Induction can't prove that the future will be like the past, since induction assumes this [Hume] |
| 2203 | If we infer causes from repetition, this explains why we infer from a thousand objects what we couldn't infer from one [Hume] |
| 2204 | All inferences from experience are effects of custom, not reasoning [Hume] |
| 2202 | Fools, children and animals all learn from experience [Hume] |
| 3598 | Hume just shows induction isn't deduction [Williams,M on Hume] |
| 6350 | Premises can support an argument without entailing it [Pollock/Cruz on Hume] |
| 8968 | If the flagpole causally explains the shadow, the shadow cannot explain the flagpole [Lowe] |
| 4193 | The behaviour of persons and social groups seems to need rational rather than causal explanation [Lowe] |
| 6641 | Externalists say minds depend on environment for their very existence and identity [Lowe] |
| 6617 | The main questions are: is mind distinct from body, and does it have unique properties? [Lowe] |
| 6626 | 'Phenomenal' consciousness is of qualities; 'apperceptive' consciousness includes beliefs and desires [Lowe] |
| 6646 | The brain may have two systems for vision, with only the older one intact in blindsight [Lowe] |
| 21806 | Memory, senses and understanding are all founded on the imagination [Hume] |
| 8966 | Properties are facets of objects, only discussable separately by an act of abstraction [Lowe] |
| 15755 | Hume needs a notion which includes degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| 2210 | A picture of a friend strengthens our idea of him, by resemblance [Hume] |
| 17712 | General ideas are the connection by resemblance to some particular [Hume] |
| 8544 | Hume does not distinguish real resemblances among degrees of resemblance [Shoemaker on Hume] |
| 2211 | When I am close to (contiguous with) home, I feel its presence more nearly [Hume] |
| 2214 | Our awareness of patterns of causation is too important to be left to slow and uncertain reasoning [Hume] |
| 2212 | An object made by a saint is the best way to produce thoughts of him [Hume] |
| 6665 | Persons are selves - subjects of experience, with reflexive self-knowledge [Lowe] |
| 3819 | Hume's 'bundle' won't distinguish one mind with ten experiences from ten minds [Searle on Hume] |
| 1317 | A person is just a fast-moving bundle of perceptions [Hume] |
| 1331 | The parts of a person are always linked together by causation [Hume] |
| 1388 | Hume gives us an interesting sketchy causal theory of personal identity [Perry on Hume] |
| 21297 | A person is simply a bundle of continually fluctuating perceptions [Hume] |
| 5323 | Experiences are logically separate, but factually linked by simultaneity or a feeling of continuousness [Ayer on Hume] |
| 6670 | If my brain could survive on its own, I cannot be identical with my whole body [Lowe] |
| 1316 | Introspection always discovers perceptions, and never a Self without perceptions [Hume] |
| 6671 | It seems impossible to get generally applicable mental concepts from self-observation [Lowe] |
| 7714 | Personal identity is a problem across time (diachronic) and at an instant (synchronic) [Lowe] |
| 1333 | Memory only reveals personal identity, by showing cause and effect [Hume] |
| 1332 | We use memory to infer personal actions we have since forgotten [Hume] |
| 21305 | Memory not only reveals identity, but creates it, by producing resemblances [Hume] |
| 21307 | Who thinks that because you have forgotten an incident you are no longer that person? [Hume] |
| 21306 | Causation unites our perceptions, by producing, destroying and modifying each other [Hume] |
| 21311 | Are self and substance the same? Then how can self remain if substance changes? [Hume] |
| 21312 | Perceptions are distinct, so no connection between them can ever be discovered [Hume] |
| 6666 | All human languages have an equivalent of the word 'I' [Lowe] |
| 21294 | A continuous lifelong self must be justified by a single sustained impression, which we don't have [Hume] |
| 21295 | When I introspect I can only observe my perceptions, and never a self which has them [Hume] |
| 21298 | We pretend our perceptions are continuous, and imagine a self to fill the gaps [Hume] |
| 21304 | Identity in the mind is a fiction, like that fiction that plants and animals stay the same [Hume] |
| 21308 | We have no impression of the self, and we therefore have no idea of it [Hume] |
| 21310 | Does an oyster with one perception have a self? Would lots of perceptions change that? [Hume] |
| 2222 | The doctrine of free will arises from a false sensation we have of freedom in many actions [Hume] |
| 2223 | Liberty is merely acting according to the will, which anyone can do if they are not in chains [Hume] |
| 3655 | Hume makes determinism less rigid by removing the necessity from causation [Trusted on Hume] |
| 8289 | The idea that Cartesian souls are made of some ghostly 'immaterial' stuff is quite unwarranted [Lowe] |
| 6625 | If qualia are causally inert, how can we even know about them? [Lowe] |
| 6621 | You can only identify behaviour by ascribing belief, so the behaviour can't explain the belief [Lowe] |
| 6654 | A computer program is equivalent to the person AND the manual [Lowe] |
| 6623 | Functionalism can't distinguish our experiences in spectrum inversion [Lowe] |
| 6628 | Functionalism only discusses relational properties of mental states, not intrinsic properties [Lowe] |
| 6629 | Functionalism commits us to bizarre possibilities, such as 'zombies' [Lowe] |
| 6622 | Non-reductive physicalism accepts token-token identity (not type-type) and asserts 'supervenience' of mind and brain [Lowe] |
| 6634 | Physicalists must believe in narrow content (because thoughts are merely the brain states) [Lowe] |
| 6630 | Eliminativism is incoherent if it eliminates reason and truth as well as propositional attitudes [Lowe] |
| 6648 | Some behaviourists believe thought is just suppressed speech [Lowe] |
| 6652 | 'Base rate neglect' makes people favour the evidence over its background [Lowe] |
| 6651 | People are wildly inaccurate in estimating probabilities about an observed event [Lowe] |
| 7715 | Mentalese isn't a language, because it isn't conventional, or a means of public communication [Lowe] |
| 6655 | The 'Frame Problem' is how to program the appropriate application of general knowledge [Lowe] |
| 6657 | Computers can't be rational, because they lack motivation and curiosity [Lowe] |
| 6656 | The Turing test is too behaviourist, and too verbal in its methods [Lowe] |
| 6636 | The naturalistic views of how content is created are the causal theory and the teleological theory [Lowe] |
| 6633 | Twin Earth cases imply that even beliefs about kinds of stuff are indexical [Lowe] |
| 16535 | A concept is a way of thinking of things or kinds, whether or not they exist [Lowe] |
| 8299 | Abstractions are non-spatial, or dependent, or derived from concepts [Lowe] |
| 4238 | The centre of mass of the solar system is a non-causal abstract object, despite having a location [Lowe] |
| 4237 | Concrete and abstract objects are distinct because the former have causal powers and relations [Lowe] |
| 8306 | You can think of a direction without a line, but a direction existing with no lines is inconceivable [Lowe] |
| 7722 | If meaning is mental pictures, explain "the cat (or dog!) is NOT on the mat" [Lowe] |
| 16550 | Direct reference doesn't seem to require that thinkers know what it is they are thinking about [Lowe] |
| 6632 | The same proposition provides contents for the that-clause of an utterance and a belief [Lowe] |
| 6631 | If propositions are abstract entities, how can minds depend on their causal powers? [Lowe] |
| 6659 | The three main theories of action involve the will, or belief-plus-desire, or an agent [Lowe] |
| 20030 | If one event causes another, the two events must be wholly distinct [Hume, by Wilson/Schpall] |
| 2220 | Only experience teaches us about our wills [Hume] |
| 6661 | Libet gives empirical support for the will, as a kind of 'executive' mental operation [Lowe] |
| 6692 | For Hume, practical reason has little force, because we can always modify our desires [Hume, by Graham] |
| 8257 | Reason alone can never be a motive to any action of the will [Hume] |
| 6662 | We feel belief and desire as reasons for choice, not causes of choice [Lowe] |
| 22374 | You can only hold people responsible for actions which arise out of their character [Hume] |
| 6663 | People's actions are explained either by their motives, or their reasons, or the causes [Lowe] |
| 2224 | Praise and blame can only be given if an action proceeds from a person's character and disposition [Hume] |
| 21103 | Moral questions can only be decided by common opinion [Hume] |
| 18552 | Forget about beauty; just concentrate on the virtues of delicacy and discernment admired in critics [Hume, by Scruton] |
| 6608 | Strong sense, delicate sentiment, practice, comparisons, and lack of prejudice, are all needed for good taste [Hume] |
| 2225 | If you deny all necessity and causation, then our character is not responsible for our crime [Hume] |
| 2226 | Repentance gets rid of guilt, which shows that responsibility arose from the criminal principles in the mind [Hume] |
| 22382 | We cannot discover vice by studying a wilful murder; that only arises from our own feelings [Hume] |
| 4008 | Modern science has destroyed the Platonic synthesis of scientific explanation and morality [Hume, by Taylor,C] |
| 8067 | The problem of getting to 'ought' from 'is' would also apply in getting to 'owes' or 'needs' [Anscombe on Hume] |
| 4578 | You can't move from 'is' to 'ought' without giving some explanation or reason for the deduction [Hume] |
| 4581 | Virtues and vices are like secondary qualities in perception, found in observers, not objects [Hume] |
| 3926 | The human heart has a natural concern for public good [Hume] |
| 23115 | We have no natural love of mankind, other than through various relationships [Hume] |
| 3650 | Total selfishness is not irrational [Hume] |
| 3929 | No moral theory is of any use if it doesn't serve the interests of the individual concerned [Hume] |
| 3925 | Personal Merit is the possession of useful or agreeable mental qualities [Hume] |
| 4580 | All virtues benefit either the public, or the individual who possesses them [Hume] |
| 3922 | Justice only exists to support society [Hume] |
| 23560 | If we all naturally had everything we could ever desire, the virtue of justice would be irrelevant [Hume] |
| 21093 | Friendship without community spirit misses out on the main part of virtue [Hume] |
| 3918 | Moral philosophy aims to show us our duty [Hume] |
| 3919 | Conclusions of reason do not affect our emotions or decisions to act [Hume] |
| 3928 | Virtue just requires careful calculation and a preference for the greater happiness [Hume] |
| 3923 | No one would cause pain to a complete stranger who happened to be passing [Hume] |
| 3924 | Nature makes private affections come first, because public concerns are spread too thinly [Hume] |
| 20581 | If men are born free, are women born slaves? [Astell] |
| 21099 | People must have agreed to authority, because they are naturally equal, prior to education [Hume] |
| 3921 | The safety of the people is the supreme law [Hume] |
| 21096 | The only purpose of government is to administer justice, which brings security [Hume] |
| 21100 | The idea that society rests on consent or promises undermines obedience [Hume] |
| 20495 | We no more give 'tacit assent' to the state than a passenger carried on board a ship while asleep [Hume] |
| 21101 | The people would be amazed to learn that government arises from their consent [Hume] |
| 21091 | It would be absurd if even a free constitution did not impose restraints, for the public good [Hume] |
| 21097 | Modern monarchies are (like republics) rule by law, rather than by men [Hume] |
| 21092 | Nobility either share in the power of the whole, or they compose the power of the whole [Hume] |
| 3927 | Society prefers helpful lies to harmful truth [Hume] |
| 2233 | No government has ever suffered by being too tolerant of philosophy [Hume] |
| 6703 | Poor people lack the knowledge or wealth to move to a different state [Hume] |
| 3920 | If you equalise possessions, people's talents will make them unequal again [Hume] |
| 21094 | There are two kinds of right - to power, and to property [Hume] |
| 6581 | Hume thought (unlike Locke) that property is a merely conventional relationship [Hume, by Fogelin] |
| 21102 | We all know that the history of property is founded on injustices [Hume] |
| 21095 | It is an exaggeration to say that property is the foundation of all government [Hume] |
| 4677 | If suicide is wrong because only God disposes of our lives, it must also be wrong to save lives [Hume] |
| 2195 | We can discover some laws of nature, but never its ultimate principles and causes [Hume] |
| 14301 | We have no good concept of solidity or matter, because accounts of them are all circular [Hume] |
| 2245 | A priori it looks as if a cause could have absolutely any effect [Hume] |
| 4772 | If a singular effect is studied, its cause can only be inferred from the types of events involved [Hume] |
| 4579 | The idea of a final cause is very uncertain and unphilosophical [Hume] |
| 4210 | If the concept of a cause says it precedes its effect, that rules out backward causation by definition [Lowe] |
| 8341 | Hume never even suggests that there is no such thing as causation [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 8344 | At first Hume said qualities are the causal entities, but later he said events [Hume, by Davidson] |
| 4215 | It seems proper to say that only substances (rather than events) have causal powers [Lowe] |
| 4209 | The theories of fact causation and event causation are both worth serious consideration [Lowe] |
| 8317 | To cite facts as the elements in causation is to confuse states of affairs with states of objects [Lowe] |
| 8382 | For Hume a constant conjunction is both necessary and sufficient for causation [Hume, by Crane] |
| 4211 | Causal overdetermination is either actual overdetermination, or pre-emption, or the fail-safe case [Lowe] |
| 2234 | It is only when two species of thing are constantly conjoined that we can infer one from the other [Hume] |
| 16946 | Causation is just invariance, as long as it is described in general terms [Quine on Hume] |
| 15250 | If impressions, memories and ideas only differ in vivacity, nothing says it is memory, or repetition [Whitehead on Hume] |
| 3662 | Hume says we can only know constant conjunctions, not that that's what causation IS [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 4771 | In both of Hume's definitions, causation is extrinsic to the sequence of events [Psillos on Hume] |
| 5194 | Hume's definition of cause as constantly joined thoughts can't cover undiscovered laws [Ayer on Hume] |
| 2221 | A cause is either similar events following one another, or an experience always suggesting a second experience [Hume] |
| 2193 | No causes can be known a priori, but only from experience of constant conjunctions [Hume] |
| 4213 | Causation may be instances of laws (seen either as constant conjunctions, or as necessities) [Lowe] |
| 8422 | Cause is where if the first object had not been, the second had not existed [Hume] |
| 19274 | Hume seems to presuppose necessary connections between mental events [Kripke on Hume] |
| 20705 | That events could be uncaused is absurd; I only say intuition and demonstration don't show this [Hume] |
| 2218 | In observing causes we can never observe any necessary connections or binding qualities [Hume] |
| 15249 | Hume never shows how a strong habit could generate the concept of necessity [Harré/Madden on Hume] |
| 8339 | Hume's regularity theory of causation is epistemological; he believed in some sort of natural necessity [Hume, by Strawson,G] |
| 4212 | Hume showed that causation could at most be natural necessity, never metaphysical necessity [Lowe] |
| 14581 | The normative view says laws show the natural behaviour of natural kind members [Lowe, by Mumford/Anjum] |
| 16547 | H2O isn't necessary, because different laws of nature might affect how O and H combine [Lowe] |
| 4208 | 'If he wasn't born he wouldn't have died' doesn't mean birth causes death, so causation isn't counterfactual [Lowe] |
| 4224 | If motion is change of distance between objects, it involves no intrinsic change in the objects [Lowe] |
| 8269 | Points are limits of parts of space, so parts of space cannot be aggregates of them [Lowe] |
| 4227 | Surfaces, lines and points are not, strictly speaking, parts of space, but 'limits', which are abstract [Lowe] |
| 4228 | If space is entirely relational, what makes a boundary, or a place unoccupied by physical objects? [Lowe] |
| 6959 | We can't assume God's perfections are like our ideas or like human attributes [Hume] |
| 6957 | The objects of theological reasoning are too big for our minds [Hume] |
| 2244 | It can never be a logical contradiction to assert the non-existence of something thought to exist [Hume] |
| 21255 | No being's non-existence can imply a contradiction, so its existence cannot be proved a priori [Hume] |
| 21254 | A chain of events requires a cause for the whole as well as the parts, yet the chain is just a sum of parts [Hume] |
| 1435 | If something must be necessary so that something exists rather than nothing, why can't the universe be necessary? [Hume] |
| 6962 | The thing which contains order must be God, so see God where you see order [Hume] |
| 2232 | You can't infer the cause to be any greater than its effect [Hume] |
| 6960 | Analogy suggests that God has a very great human mind [Hume] |
| 6958 | How can we pronounce on a whole after a brief look at a very small part? [Hume] |
| 6965 | The universe may be the result of trial-and-error [Hume] |
| 6964 | From our limited view, we cannot tell if the universe is faulty [Hume] |
| 21279 | If the divine cause is proportional to its effects, the effects are finite, so the Deity cannot be infinite [Hume] |
| 21282 | Design cannot prove a unified Deity. Many men make a city, so why not many gods for a world? [Hume] |
| 21280 | From a ship you would judge its creator a genius, not a mere humble workman [Hume] |
| 6966 | Creation is more like vegetation than human art, so it won't come from reason [Hume] |
| 21281 | This excellent world may be the result of a huge sequence of trial-and-error [Hume] |
| 21283 | Humans renew their species sexually. If there are many gods, would they not do the same? [Hume] |
| 21284 | This Creator god might be an infant or incompetent or senile [Hume] |
| 6967 | Order may come from an irrational source as well as a rational one [Hume] |
| 21286 | Motion often begins in matter, with no sign of a controlling agent [Hume] |
| 21287 | The universe could settle into superficial order, without a designer [Hume] |
| 21288 | Ideas arise from objects, not vice versa; ideas only influence matter if they are linked [Hume] |
| 21256 | A surprise feature of all products of 9 looks like design, but is actually a necessity [Hume] |
| 6963 | Why would we infer an infinite creator from a finite creation? [Hume] |
| 2227 | A miracle violates laws which have been established by continuous unchanging experience, so should be ignored [Hume] |
| 7636 | It can't be more rational to believe in natural laws than miracles if the laws are not rational [Ishaq on Hume] |
| 2228 | All experience must be against a supposed miracle, or it wouldn't be called 'a miracle' [Hume] |
| 2229 | To establish a miracle the falseness of the evidence must be a greater miracle than the claimed miraculous event [Hume] |
| 2185 | The idea of an infinite, intelligent, wise and good God arises from augmenting the best qualities of our own minds [Hume] |
| 21296 | If all of my perceptions were removed by death, nothing more is needed for total annihilation [Hume] |