76 ideas
| 3348 | If phenomenology is deprived of the synthetic a priori, it is reduced to literature [Benardete,JA on Husserl] |
| 15570 | Phenomenology is the science of essences - necessary universal structures for art, representation etc. [Husserl, by Polt] |
| 7614 | Bracketing subtracts entailments about external reality from beliefs [Husserl, by Putnam] |
| 6893 | Phenomenology aims to describe experience directly, rather than by its origins or causes [Husserl, by Mautner] |
| 22216 | Phenomenology studies different types of correlation between consciousness and its objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 21217 | Phenomenology needs absolute reflection, without presuppositions [Husserl] |
| 22218 | There can only be a science of fluctuating consciousness if it focuses on stable essences [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22217 | Phenomenology aims to validate objects, on the basis of intentional intuitive experience [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22219 | Husserl saw transcendental phenomenology as idealist, in its construction of objects [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22204 | Start philosophising with no preconceptions, from the intuitively non-theoretical self-given [Husserl] |
| 22207 | Epoché or 'bracketing' is refraining from judgement, even when some truths are certain [Husserl] |
| 22208 | 'Bracketing' means no judgements at all about spatio-temporal existence [Husserl] |
| 22210 | After everything is bracketed, consciousness still has a unique being of its own [Husserl] |
| 22215 | Phenomenology describes consciousness, in the light of pure experiences [Husserl] |
| 22201 | The use of mathematical-style definitions in philosophy is fruitless and harmful [Husserl] |
| 21222 | Logicians presuppose a world, and ignore logic/world connections, so their logic is impure [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 21223 | Phenomenology grounds logic in subjective experience [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 9837 | 0 is not a number, as it answers 'how many?' negatively [Husserl, by Dummett] |
| 9576 | Multiplicity in general is just one and one and one, etc. [Husserl] |
| 17444 | Husserl said counting is more basic than Frege's one-one correspondence [Husserl, by Heck] |
| 22886 | The modern idea of 'limit' allows infinite quantities to have a finite sum [Bardon] |
| 21224 | Pure mathematics is the relations between all possible objects, and is thus formal ontology [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22209 | Our goal is to reveal a new hidden region of Being [Husserl] |
| 22914 | An equally good question would be why there was nothing instead of something [Bardon] |
| 22211 | As a thing and its perception are separated, two modes of Being emerge [Husserl] |
| 21226 | Husserl sees the ego as a monad, unifying presence, sense and intentional acts [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22202 | The World is all experiencable objects [Husserl] |
| 22213 | Absolute reality is an absurdity [Husserl] |
| 16235 | Persistence conditions cannot contradict, so there must be a 'dominant sortal' [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
| 14753 | The 'dominant' of two coinciding sortals is the one that entails the widest range of properties [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 16072 | 'The rock' either refers to an object, or to a collection of parts, or to some stuff [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
| 14751 | Tib goes out of existence when the tail is lost, because Tib was never the 'cat' [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 16071 | Sculpting a lump of clay destroys one object, and replaces it with another one [Burke,M, by Wasserman] |
| 16234 | Burke says when two object coincide, one of them is destroyed in the process [Burke,M, by Hawley] |
| 13278 | Maybe the clay becomes a different lump when it becomes a statue [Burke,M, by Koslicki] |
| 14750 | Two entities can coincide as one, but only one of them (the dominant sortal) fixes persistence conditions [Burke,M, by Sider] |
| 21218 | The sense of anything contingent has a purely apprehensible essence or Eidos [Husserl] |
| 19263 | Imagine an object's properties varying; the ones that won't vary are the essential ones [Husserl, by Vaidya] |
| 21220 | The physical given, unlike the mental given, could be non-existing [Husserl] |
| 21216 | Husserl says we have intellectual intuitions (of categories), as well as of the senses [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22205 | Feelings of self-evidence (and necessity) are just the inventions of theory [Husserl] |
| 21221 | Direct 'seeing' by consciousness is the ultimate rational legitimation [Husserl] |
| 22220 | The phenomena of memory are given in the present, but as being past [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 22206 | Natural science has become great by just ignoring ancient scepticism [Husserl] |
| 22221 | We know another's mind via bodily expression, while also knowing it is inaccessible [Husserl, by Bernet] |
| 21228 | Husserl's monads (egos) communicate, through acts of empathy. [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22212 | Pure consciousness is a sealed off system of actual Being [Husserl] |
| 9575 | Husserl identifies a positive mental act of unification, and a negative mental act for differences [Husserl, by Frege] |
| 21225 | The psychological ego is worldly, and the pure ego follows transcendental reduction [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 22214 | We never meet the Ego, as part of experience, or as left over from experience [Husserl] |
| 21214 | We clarify concepts (e.g. numbers) by determining their psychological origin [Husserl, by Velarde-Mayol] |
| 9819 | Psychologism blunders in focusing on concept-formation instead of delineating the concepts [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 9851 | Husserl wanted to keep a shadowy remnant of abstracted objects, to correlate them [Dummett on Husserl] |
| 22203 | Only facts follow from facts [Husserl] |
| 22902 | Why does an effect require a prior event if the prior event isn't a cause? [Bardon] |
| 22905 | Becoming disordered is much easier for a system than becoming ordered [Bardon] |
| 22913 | The universe expands, so space-time is enlarging [Bardon] |
| 22889 | We should treat time as adverbial, so we don't experience time, we experience things temporally [Bardon, by Bardon] |
| 22900 | How can we question the passage of time, if the question takes time to ask? [Bardon] |
| 22898 | What is time's passage relative to, and how fast does it pass? [Bardon] |
| 22897 | The A-series says a past event is becoming more past, but how can it do that? [Bardon] |
| 22901 | The B-series needs a revised view of causes, laws and explanations [Bardon] |
| 22896 | The B-series is realist about time, but idealist about its passage [Bardon] |
| 22903 | The B-series adds directionality when it accepts 'earlier' and 'later' [Bardon] |
| 22910 | To define time's arrow by causation, we need a timeless definition of causation [Bardon] |
| 22909 | We judge memories to be of the past because the events cause the memories [Bardon] |
| 22904 | The psychological arrow of time is the direction from our memories to our anticipations [Bardon] |
| 22906 | The direction of entropy is probabilistic, not necessary, so cannot be identical to time's arrow [Bardon] |
| 22907 | It is arbitrary to reverse time in a more orderly universe, but not in a sub-system of it [Bardon] |
| 22883 | It seems hard to understand change without understanding time first [Bardon] |
| 22890 | We experience static states (while walking round a house) and observe change (ship leaving dock) [Bardon] |
| 22884 | The motion of a thing should be a fact in the present moment [Bardon] |
| 22892 | Experiences of motion may be overlapping, thus stretching out the experience [Bardon] |
| 22911 | At least eternal time gives time travellers a possible destination [Bardon] |
| 22912 | Time travel is not a paradox if we include it in the eternal continuum of events [Bardon] |
| 22882 | We use calendars for the order of events, and clocks for their passing [Bardon] |