68 ideas
| 10794 | The nominalist is tied by standard semantics to first-order, denying higher-order abstracta [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10786 | Anything which refers tends to be called a 'name', even if it isn't a noun [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10788 | Nominalists see proper names as a main vehicle of reference [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10799 | Nominalists should quantify existentially at first-order, and substitutionally when higher [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10790 | Quantifiers are needed to refer to infinitely many objects [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10791 | Substitutional semantics has no domain of objects, but place-markers for substitutions [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10785 | Maybe a substitutional semantics for quantification lends itself to nominalism [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10795 | Substitutional language has no ontology, and is just a way of speaking [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10798 | A true universal sentence might be substitutionally refuted, by an unnamed denumerable object [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10787 | Is being just referent of the verb 'to be'? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 458 | Nothing could come out of nothing, and existence could never completely cease [Empedocles] |
| 5112 | Empedocles says things are at rest, unless love unites them, or hatred splits them [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| 10789 | Nominalists say predication is relations between individuals, or deny that it refers [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 10796 | If objects are thoughts, aren't we back to psychologism? [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 13209 | There is no coming-to-be of anything, but only mixing and separating [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| 11181 | Aristotelian essentialism involves a 'natural' or 'causal' interpretation of modal operators [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11184 | Aristotelian essentialism is about shared properties, individuating essentialism about distinctive properties [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11180 | Essentialist sentences are not theorems of modal logic, and can even be false [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11186 | 'Essentially' won't replace 'necessarily' for vacuous properties like snub-nosed or self-identical [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11185 | 'Is essentially' has a different meaning from 'is necessarily', as they often cannot be substituted [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11182 | If essences are objects with only essential properties, they are elusive in possible worlds [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 457 | Substance is not created or destroyed in mortals, but there is only mixing and exchange [Empedocles] |
| 10797 | Substitutivity won't fix identity, because expressions may be substitutable, but not refer at all [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11183 | The use of possible worlds is to sort properties (not to individuate objects) [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 11187 | In possible worlds, names are just neutral unvarying pegs for truths and predicates [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 17979 | Research shows perceptual discrimination is sharper at category boundaries [Murphy] |
| 462 | One vision is produced by both eyes [Empedocles] |
| 18690 | Induction is said to just compare properties of categories, but the type of property also matters [Murphy] |
| 22765 | Wisdom and thought are shared by all things [Empedocles] |
| 1524 | For Empedocles thinking is almost identical to perception [Empedocles, by Theophrastus] |
| 17980 | The main theories of concepts are exemplar, prototype and knowledge [Murphy] |
| 17973 | The theoretical and practical definitions for the classical view are very hard to find [Murphy] |
| 17969 | The classical definitional approach cannot distinguish typical and atypical category members [Murphy] |
| 17970 | Classical concepts follow classical logic, but concepts in real life don't work that way [Murphy] |
| 17971 | Classical concepts are transitive hierarchies, but actual categories may be intransitive [Murphy] |
| 17972 | The classical core is meant to be the real concept, but actually seems unimportant [Murphy] |
| 17975 | There is no 'ideal' bird or dog, and prototypes give no information about variability [Murphy] |
| 17976 | Prototypes are unified representations of the entire category (rather than of members) [Murphy] |
| 18691 | The prototype theory uses observed features, but can't include their construction [Murphy] |
| 17983 | The prototype theory handles hierarchical categories and combinations of concepts well [Murphy] |
| 17985 | Prototypes theory of concepts is best, as a full description with weighted typical features [Murphy] |
| 17986 | Learning concepts is forming prototypes with a knowledge structure [Murphy] |
| 17974 | The most popular theories of concepts are based on prototypes or exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17977 | The exemplar view of concepts says 'dogs' is the set of dogs I remember [Murphy] |
| 17982 | Exemplar theory struggles with hierarchical classification and with induction [Murphy] |
| 17981 | Children using knowing and essentialist categories doesn't fit the exemplar view [Murphy] |
| 17984 | Conceptual combination must be compositional, and can't be built up from exemplars [Murphy] |
| 17987 | The concept of birds from exemplars must also be used in inductions about birds [Murphy] |
| 17978 | We do not learn concepts in isolation, but as an integrated part of broader knowledge [Murphy] |
| 18687 | Concepts with familiar contents are easier to learn [Murphy] |
| 18688 | Some knowledge is involved in instant use of categories, other knowledge in explanations [Murphy] |
| 18689 | People categorise things consistent with their knowledge, even rejecting some good evidence [Murphy] |
| 552 | Empedocles said good and evil were the basic principles [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| 589 | 'Nature' is just a word invented by people [Empedocles] |
| 21823 | The principle of 'Friendship' in Empedocles is the One, and is bodiless [Empedocles, by Plotinus] |
| 2680 | Empedocles said that there are four material elements, and two further creative elements [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| 6002 | Empedocles says bone is water, fire and earth in ratio 2:4:2 [Empedocles, by Inwood] |
| 13207 | Fire, Water, Air and Earth are elements, being simple as well as homoeomerous [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| 459 | All change is unity through love or division through hate [Empedocles] |
| 13218 | The elements combine in coming-to-be, but how do the elements themselves come-to-be? [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| 13225 | Love and Strife only explain movement if their effects are distinctive [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| 460 | If the one Being ever diminishes it would no longer exist, and what could ever increase it? [Empedocles] |
| 11189 | Dispositional essences are special, as if an object loses them they cease to exist [Marcus (Barcan)] |
| 5090 | Maybe bodies are designed by accident, and the creatures that don't work are destroyed [Empedocles, by Aristotle] |
| 466 | God is pure mind permeating the universe [Empedocles] |
| 461 | God is a pure, solitary, and eternal sphere [Empedocles] |
| 1719 | In Empedocles' theory God is ignorant because, unlike humans, he doesn't know one of the elements (strife) [Aristotle on Empedocles] |
| 1522 | It is wretched not to want to think clearly about the gods [Empedocles] |