112 ideas
| 23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
| 23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
| 21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
| 23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
| 20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
| 23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
| 23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
| 22246 | A train of reasoning must be treated as all happening simultaneously [Recanati] |
| 9038 | We must distinguish what the speaker denotes by a name, from what the name denotes [Evans] |
| 5824 | How can an expression be a name, if names can change their denotation? [Evans] |
| 9042 | A private intention won't give a name a denotation; the practice needs it to be made public [Evans] |
| 9041 | The Causal Theory of Names is wrong, since the name 'Madagascar' actually changed denotation [Evans] |
| 16357 | Mental files are the counterparts of singular terms [Recanati] |
| 16129 | Evans argues (falsely!) that a contradiction follows from treating objects as vague [Evans, by Lowe] |
| 16459 | Is it coherent that reality is vague, identities can be vague, and objects can have fuzzy boundaries? [Evans] |
| 16457 | There clearly are vague identity statements, and Evans's argument has a false conclusion [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 16460 | Evans assumes there can be vague identity statements, and that his proof cannot be right [Evans, by Lewis] |
| 14484 | If a=b is indeterminate, then a=/=b, and so there cannot be indeterminate identity [Evans, by Thomasson] |
| 16224 | There can't be vague identity; a and b must differ, since a, unlike b, is only vaguely the same as b [Evans, by PG] |
| 16360 | Identity statements are informative if they link separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 14895 | 'Superficial' contingency: false in some world; 'Deep' contingency: no obvious verification [Evans, by Macià/Garcia-Carpentiro] |
| 11881 | Rigid designators can be meaningful even if empty [Evans, by Mackie,P] |
| 23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
| 16374 | There is a continuum from acquaintance to description in knowledge, depending on the link [Recanati] |
| 23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
| 7639 | The Homunculus Fallacy explains a subject perceiving objects by repeating the problem internally [Evans] |
| 12580 | Experiences have no conceptual content [Evans, by Greco] |
| 7643 | We have far fewer colour concepts than we have discriminations of colour [Evans] |
| 23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
| 23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
| 23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
| 23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
| 23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
| 23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
| 20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
| 23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
| 22248 | How can we communicate indexical thoughts to people not in the right context? [Recanati] |
| 16354 | Indexicality is closely related to singularity, exploiting our direct relations with things [Recanati] |
| 18409 | Indexicals apply to singular thought, and mental files have essentially indexical features [Recanati] |
| 22247 | Indexicality is not just a feature of language; examples show it also occurs in thought [Recanati] |
| 16361 | A mental file treats all of its contents as concerning one object [Recanati] |
| 22242 | Mental files are concepts, which are either collections or (better) containers [Recanati] |
| 22243 | The Frege case of believing a thing is both F and not-F is explained by separate mental files [Recanati] |
| 16371 | Files can be confused, if two files correctly have a single name, or one file has two names [Recanati] |
| 16373 | Encylopedic files have further epistemic links, beyond the basic one [Recanati] |
| 16375 | Singular thoughts need a mental file, and an acquaintance relation from file to object [Recanati] |
| 16377 | Expected acquaintance can create a thought-vehicle file, but without singular content [Recanati] |
| 16378 | An 'indexed' file marks a file which simulates the mental file of some other person [Recanati] |
| 16387 | Reference by mental files is Millian, in emphasising acquaintance, rather than satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16358 | The reference of a file is fixed by what it relates to, not the information it contains [Recanati] |
| 16367 | There are transient 'demonstrative' files, habitual 'recognitional' files, cumulative 'encyclopedic' files [Recanati] |
| 16368 | Files are hierarchical: proto-files, then first-order, then higher-order encyclopedic [Recanati] |
| 16370 | A file has a 'nucleus' through its relation to the object, and a 'periphery' of links to other files [Recanati] |
| 16381 | The content of thought is what is required to understand it (which involves hearers) [Recanati] |
| 23794 | Some representational states, like perception, may be nonconceptual [Evans, by Schulte] |
| 16365 | Mental files are individual concepts (thought constituents) [Recanati] |
| 16366 | The Generality Constraint says if you can think a predicate you can apply it to anything [Evans] |
| 12575 | Concepts have a 'Generality Constraint', that we must know how predicates apply to them [Evans, by Peacocke] |
| 16356 | There may be two types of reference in language and thought: descriptive and direct [Recanati] |
| 16386 | Direct reference is strong Millian (just a tag) or weak Kaplanian (allowing descriptions as well) [Recanati] |
| 16393 | In super-direct reference, the referent serves as its own vehicle of reference [Recanati] |
| 5825 | Speakers intend to refer to items that are the source of their information [Evans] |
| 5823 | The intended referent of a name needs to be the cause of the speaker's information about it [Evans] |
| 16372 | Sense determines reference says same sense/same reference; new reference means new sense [Recanati] |
| 16388 | We need sense as well as reference, but in a non-descriptive form, and mental files do that [Recanati] |
| 16359 | Sense is a mental file (not its contents); similar files for Cicero and Tully are two senses [Recanati] |
| 16355 | Problems with descriptivism are reference by perception, by communications and by indexicals [Recanati] |
| 9039 | If descriptions are sufficient for reference, then I must accept a false reference if the descriptions fit [Evans] |
| 16348 | Descriptivism says we mentally relate to objects through their properties [Recanati] |
| 16384 | Definite descriptions reveal either a predicate (attributive use) or the file it belongs in (referential) [Recanati] |
| 16352 | A rigid definite description can be attributive, not referential: 'the actual F, whoever he is….' [Recanati] |
| 22245 | A linguistic expression refers to what its associated mental file refers to [Recanati] |
| 16353 | Singularity cannot be described, and it needs actual world relations [Recanati] |
| 16382 | Fregean modes of presentation can be understood as mental files [Recanati] |
| 16389 | If two people think 'I am tired', they think the same thing, and they think different things [Recanati] |
| 16363 | Indexicals (like mental files) determine their reference relationally, not by satisfaction [Recanati] |
| 16364 | Indexical don't refer; only their tokens do [Recanati] |
| 16351 | In 2-D semantics, reference is determined, then singularity by the truth of a predication [Recanati] |
| 16350 | Two-D semantics is said to help descriptivism of reference deal with singular objects [Recanati] |
| 16380 | Russellian propositions are better than Fregean thoughts, by being constant through communication [Recanati] |
| 22250 | There are speakers' thoughts and hearers' thoughts, but no further thought attached to the utterance [Recanati] |
| 22249 | The Naive view of communication is that hearers acquire exactly the thoughts of the speaker [Recanati] |
| 9043 | We use expressions 'deferentially', to conform to the use of other people [Evans] |
| 9040 | Charity should minimize inexplicable error, rather than maximising true beliefs [Evans] |
| 23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
| 20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
| 23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
| 23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
| 23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
| 23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
| 23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
| 23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
| 23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
| 23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
| 23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
| 23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
| 23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
| 23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
| 23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
| 4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
| 23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
| 23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
| 23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
| 23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
| 23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
| 20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
| 22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
| 23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
| 23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
| 23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
| 23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
| 23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |