263 ideas
23350 | A wise philosophers uses reason to cautiously judge each aspect of living [Epictetus] |
23355 | The task of philosophy is to establish standards, as occurs with weights and measures [Epictetus] |
21394 | Philosophy is knowing each logos, how they fit together, and what follows from them [Epictetus] |
23367 | Even pointing a finger should only be done for a reason [Epictetus] |
20876 | Philosophy investigates the causes of disagreements, and seeks a standard for settling them [Epictetus] |
15390 | Metaphysics attempts to give an account of everything, in terms of categories and principles [Simons] |
12865 | Analytic philosophers may prefer formal systems because natural language is such mess [Simons] |
10237 | Coherence is a primitive, intuitive notion, not reduced to something formal [Shapiro] |
23344 | Reason itself must be compounded from some of our impressions [Epictetus] |
23343 | Because reason performs all analysis, we should analyse reason - but how? [Epictetus] |
10204 | An 'implicit definition' gives a direct description of the relations of an entity [Shapiro] |
13634 | Satisfaction is 'truth in a model', which is a model of 'truth' [Shapiro] |
13643 | Aristotelian logic is complete [Shapiro] |
10206 | Modal operators are usually treated as quantifiers [Shapiro] |
13651 | A set is 'transitive' if contains every member of each of its members [Shapiro] |
10252 | The Axiom of Choice seems to license an infinite amount of choosing [Shapiro] |
10301 | The axiom of choice is controversial, but it could be replaced [Shapiro] |
13647 | Choice is essential for proving downward Löwenheim-Skolem [Shapiro] |
10208 | Axiom of Choice: some function has a value for every set in a given set [Shapiro] |
13631 | Are sets part of logic, or part of mathematics? [Shapiro] |
13640 | Russell's paradox shows that there are classes which are not iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13654 | It is central to the iterative conception that membership is well-founded, with no infinite descending chains [Shapiro] |
13666 | Iterative sets are not Boolean; the complement of an iterative set is not an iterative sets [Shapiro] |
13653 | 'Well-ordering' of a set is an irreflexive, transitive, and binary relation with a least element [Shapiro] |
10207 | Anti-realists reject set theory [Shapiro] |
12815 | Classical mereology doesn't apply well to the objects around us [Simons] |
12819 | A 'part' has different meanings for individuals, classes, and masses [Simons] |
12832 | Complement: the rest of the Universe apart from some individual, written x-bar [Simons] |
12834 | Criticisms of mereology: parts? transitivity? sums? identity? four-dimensional? [Simons] |
12827 | Difference: the difference of individuals is the remainder of an overlap, written 'x - y' [Simons] |
12828 | General sum: the sum of objects satisfying some predicate, written σx(Fx) [Simons] |
12822 | Proper or improper part: x < y, 'x is (a) part of y' [Simons] |
12823 | Overlap: two parts overlap iff they have a part in common, expressed as 'x o y' [Simons] |
12824 | Disjoint: two individuals are disjoint iff they do not overlap, written 'x | y' [Simons] |
12825 | Product: the product of two individuals is the sum of all of their overlaps, written 'x · y' [Simons] |
12826 | Sum: the sum of individuals is what is overlapped if either of them are, written 'x + y' [Simons] |
12829 | General product: the nucleus of all objects satisfying a predicate, written πx(Fx) [Simons] |
12830 | Universe: the mereological sum of all objects whatever, written 'U' [Simons] |
12831 | Atom: an individual with no proper parts, written 'At x' [Simons] |
12844 | Dissective: stuff is dissective if parts of the stuff are always the stuff [Simons] |
12816 | Classical mereology doesn't handle temporal or modal notions very well [Simons] |
12821 | The part-relation is transitive and asymmetric (and thus irreflexive) [Simons] |
18847 | Each wheel is part of a car, but the four wheels are not a further part [Simons] |
12813 | Two standard formalisations of part-whole theory are the Calculus of Individuals, and Mereology [Simons] |
12846 | A 'group' is a collection with a condition which constitutes their being united [Simons] |
12861 | 'The wolves' are the matter of 'the pack'; the latter is a group, with different identity conditions [Simons] |
12848 | The same members may form two groups [Simons] |
13627 | There is no 'correct' logic for natural languages [Shapiro] |
13642 | Logic is the ideal for learning new propositions on the basis of others [Shapiro] |
13669 | Can one develop set theory first, then derive numbers, or are numbers more basic? [Shapiro] |
13667 | Skolem and Gödel championed first-order, and Zermelo, Hilbert, and Bernays championed higher-order [Shapiro] |
13668 | Bernays (1918) formulated and proved the completeness of propositional logic [Shapiro] |
13624 | The 'triumph' of first-order logic may be related to logicism and the Hilbert programme, which failed [Shapiro] |
13660 | Maybe compactness, semantic effectiveness, and the Löwenheim-Skolem properties are desirable [Shapiro] |
13662 | First-order logic was an afterthought in the development of modern logic [Shapiro] |
13673 | The notion of finitude is actually built into first-order languages [Shapiro] |
10588 | First-order logic is Complete, and Compact, with the Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems [Shapiro] |
13650 | Henkin semantics has separate variables ranging over the relations and over the functions [Shapiro] |
15944 | Second-order logic is better than set theory, since it only adds relations and operations, and nothing else [Shapiro, by Lavine] |
13645 | In standard semantics for second-order logic, a single domain fixes the ranges for the variables [Shapiro] |
13649 | Completeness, Compactness and Löwenheim-Skolem fail in second-order standard semantics [Shapiro] |
10298 | Some say that second-order logic is mathematics, not logic [Shapiro] |
10299 | If the aim of logic is to codify inferences, second-order logic is useless [Shapiro] |
13629 | Broad standard semantics, or Henkin semantics with a subclass, or many-sorted first-order semantics? [Shapiro] |
10300 | Logical consequence can be defined in terms of the logical terminology [Shapiro] |
10259 | The two standard explanations of consequence are semantic (in models) and deductive [Shapiro] |
13637 | If a logic is incomplete, its semantic consequence relation is not effective [Shapiro] |
13626 | Semantic consequence is ineffective in second-order logic [Shapiro] |
10257 | Intuitionism only sanctions modus ponens if all three components are proved [Shapiro] |
10253 | Either logic determines objects, or objects determine logic, or they are separate [Shapiro] |
10251 | The law of excluded middle might be seen as a principle of omniscience [Shapiro] |
8729 | Intuitionists deny excluded middle, because it is committed to transcendent truth or objects [Shapiro] |
13632 | Finding the logical form of a sentence is difficult, and there are no criteria of correctness [Shapiro] |
10212 | Classical connectives differ from their ordinary language counterparts; '∧' is timeless, unlike 'and' [Shapiro] |
10209 | A function is just an arbitrary correspondence between collections [Shapiro] |
12876 | Philosophy is stuck on the Fregean view that an individual is anything with a proper name [Simons] |
13674 | We might reduce ontology by using truth of sentences and terms, instead of using objects satisfying models [Shapiro] |
10290 | Second-order variables also range over properties, sets, relations or functions [Shapiro] |
10268 | Maybe plural quantifiers should be understood in terms of classes or sets [Shapiro] |
12845 | Some natural languages don't distinguish between singular and plural [Simons] |
13633 | 'Satisfaction' is a function from models, assignments, and formulas to {true,false} [Shapiro] |
10235 | A sentence is 'satisfiable' if it has a model [Shapiro] |
10239 | The central notion of model theory is the relation of 'satisfaction' [Shapiro] |
13644 | Semantics for models uses set-theory [Shapiro] |
10240 | Model theory deals with relations, reference and extensions [Shapiro] |
13636 | An axiomatization is 'categorical' if its models are isomorphic, so there is really only one interpretation [Shapiro] |
13670 | Categoricity can't be reached in a first-order language [Shapiro] |
10238 | The set-theoretical hierarchy contains as many isomorphism types as possible [Shapiro] |
10214 | Theory ontology is never complete, but is only determined 'up to isomorphism' [Shapiro] |
13648 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorems show an explosion of infinite models, so 1st-order is useless for infinity [Shapiro] |
13658 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: each satisfiable countable set always has countable models [Shapiro] |
13659 | Upward Löwenheim-Skolem: each infinite model has infinite models of all sizes [Shapiro] |
13675 | Substitutional semantics only has countably many terms, so Upward Löwenheim-Skolem trivially fails [Shapiro] |
10234 | Any theory with an infinite model has a model of every infinite cardinality [Shapiro] |
10292 | Downward Löwenheim-Skolem: if there's an infinite model, there is a countable model [Shapiro] |
10590 | Up Löwenheim-Skolem: if natural numbers satisfy wffs, then an infinite domain satisfies them [Shapiro] |
10296 | The Löwenheim-Skolem Theorems fail for second-order languages with standard semantics [Shapiro] |
10297 | The Löwenheim-Skolem theorem seems to be a defect of first-order logic [Shapiro] |
13635 | 'Weakly sound' if every theorem is a logical truth; 'sound' if every deduction is a semantic consequence [Shapiro] |
13628 | We can live well without completeness in logic [Shapiro] |
13630 | Non-compactness is a strength of second-order logic, enabling characterisation of infinite structures [Shapiro] |
13646 | Compactness is derived from soundness and completeness [Shapiro] |
13661 | A language is 'semantically effective' if its logical truths are recursively enumerable [Shapiro] |
10201 | Virtually all of mathematics can be modeled in set theory [Shapiro] |
13641 | Complex numbers can be defined as reals, which are defined as rationals, then integers, then naturals [Shapiro] |
8763 | The number 3 is presumably identical as a natural, an integer, a rational, a real, and complex [Shapiro] |
13676 | Only higher-order languages can specify that 0,1,2,... are all the natural numbers that there are [Shapiro] |
13677 | Natural numbers are the finite ordinals, and integers are equivalence classes of pairs of finite ordinals [Shapiro] |
10213 | Real numbers are thought of as either Cauchy sequences or Dedekind cuts [Shapiro] |
18243 | Understanding the real-number structure is knowing usage of the axiomatic language of analysis [Shapiro] |
18249 | Cauchy gave a formal definition of a converging sequence. [Shapiro] |
18245 | Cuts are made by the smallest upper or largest lower number, some of them not rational [Shapiro] |
13652 | The 'continuum' is the cardinality of the powerset of a denumerably infinite set [Shapiro] |
10236 | There is no grounding for mathematics that is more secure than mathematics [Shapiro] |
8764 | Categories are the best foundation for mathematics [Shapiro] |
10256 | For intuitionists, proof is inherently informal [Shapiro] |
13657 | First-order arithmetic can't even represent basic number theory [Shapiro] |
10202 | Natural numbers just need an initial object, successors, and an induction principle [Shapiro] |
10294 | Second-order logic has the expressive power for mathematics, but an unworkable model theory [Shapiro] |
10205 | Mathematics originally concerned the continuous (geometry) and the discrete (arithmetic) [Shapiro] |
8762 | Two definitions of 3 in terms of sets disagree over whether 1 is a member of 3 [Shapiro] |
13656 | Some sets of natural numbers are definable in set-theory but not in arithmetic [Shapiro] |
10222 | Mathematical foundations may not be sets; categories are a popular rival [Shapiro] |
10218 | Baseball positions and chess pieces depend entirely on context [Shapiro] |
10224 | The even numbers have the natural-number structure, with 6 playing the role of 3 [Shapiro] |
10228 | Could infinite structures be apprehended by pattern recognition? [Shapiro] |
10230 | The 4-pattern is the structure common to all collections of four objects [Shapiro] |
10249 | The main mathematical structures are algebraic, ordered, and topological [Shapiro] |
10273 | Some structures are exemplified by both abstract and concrete [Shapiro] |
10276 | Mathematical structures are defined by axioms, or in set theory [Shapiro] |
8760 | Numbers do not exist independently; the essence of a number is its relations to other numbers [Shapiro] |
8761 | A 'system' is related objects; a 'pattern' or 'structure' abstracts the pure relations from them [Shapiro] |
10270 | The main versions of structuralism are all definitionally equivalent [Shapiro] |
10221 | Is there is no more to structures than the systems that exemplify them? [Shapiro] |
10248 | Number statements are generalizations about number sequences, and are bound variables [Shapiro] |
10220 | Because one structure exemplifies several systems, a structure is a one-over-many [Shapiro] |
10223 | There is no 'structure of all structures', just as there is no set of all sets [Shapiro] |
8703 | Shapiro's structuralism says model theory (comparing structures) is the essence of mathematics [Shapiro, by Friend] |
10274 | Does someone using small numbers really need to know the infinite structure of arithmetic? [Shapiro] |
10200 | We distinguish realism 'in ontology' (for objects), and 'in truth-value' (for being either true or false) [Shapiro] |
10210 | If mathematical objects are accepted, then a number of standard principles will follow [Shapiro] |
10215 | Platonists claim we can state the essence of a number without reference to the others [Shapiro] |
10233 | Platonism must accept that the Peano Axioms could all be false [Shapiro] |
10244 | Intuition is an outright hindrance to five-dimensional geometry [Shapiro] |
10280 | A stone is a position in some pattern, and can be viewed as an object, or as a location [Shapiro] |
13664 | Logicism is distinctive in seeking a universal language, and denying that logic is a series of abstractions [Shapiro] |
13625 | Mathematics and logic have no border, and logic must involve mathematics and its ontology [Shapiro] |
8744 | Logicism seems to be a non-starter if (as is widely held) logic has no ontology of its own [Shapiro] |
8749 | Term Formalism says mathematics is just about symbols - but real numbers have no names [Shapiro] |
8750 | Game Formalism is just a matter of rules, like chess - but then why is it useful in science? [Shapiro] |
8752 | Deductivism says mathematics is logical consequences of uninterpreted axioms [Shapiro] |
10254 | Can the ideal constructor also destroy objects? [Shapiro] |
10255 | Presumably nothing can block a possible dynamic operation? [Shapiro] |
8753 | Critics resent the way intuitionism cripples mathematics, but it allows new important distinctions [Shapiro] |
8731 | Conceptualist are just realists or idealist or nominalists, depending on their view of concepts [Shapiro] |
13663 | Some reject formal properties if they are not defined, or defined impredicatively [Shapiro] |
8730 | 'Impredicative' definitions refer to the thing being described [Shapiro] |
10279 | Can we discover whether a deck is fifty-two cards, or a person is time-slices or molecules? [Shapiro] |
12838 | Four-dimensional ontology has no change, since that needs an object, and time to pass [Simons] |
12842 | There are real relational changes, as well as bogus 'Cambridge changes' [Simons] |
12841 | I don't believe in processes [Simons] |
12836 | Fans of process ontology cheat, since river-stages refer to 'rivers' [Simons] |
8979 | Slow and continuous events (like balding or tree-growth) are called 'processes', not 'events' [Simons] |
8981 | Maybe processes behave like stuff-nouns, and events like count-nouns [Simons] |
12880 | Moments are things like smiles or skids, which are founded on other things [Simons] |
12881 | A smiling is an event with causes, but the smile is a continuant without causes [Simons] |
12883 | Moving disturbances are are moments which continuously change their basis [Simons] |
12882 | A wave is maintained by a process, but it isn't a process [Simons] |
12840 | I do not think there is a general identity condition for events [Simons] |
8973 | Einstein's relativity brought events into ontology, as the terms of a simultaneity relationships [Simons] |
12839 | Relativity has an ontology of things and events, not on space-time diagrams [Simons] |
12879 | Independent objects can exist apart, and maybe even entirely alone [Simons] |
10227 | The abstract/concrete boundary now seems blurred, and would need a defence [Shapiro] |
10226 | Mathematicians regard arithmetic as concrete, and group theory as abstract [Shapiro] |
12847 | Mass nouns admit 'much' and 'a little', and resist 'many' and 'few'. [Simons] |
12863 | Mass terms (unlike plurals) are used with indifference to whether they can exist in units [Simons] |
12862 | Gold is not its atoms, because the atoms must be all gold, but gold contains neutrons [Simons] |
12858 | Mixtures disappear if nearly all of the mixture is one ingredient [Simons] |
12859 | A mixture can have different qualities from its ingredients. [Simons] |
10262 | Fictionalism eschews the abstract, but it still needs the possible (without model theory) [Shapiro] |
10277 | Structuralism blurs the distinction between mathematical and ordinary objects [Shapiro] |
13638 | Properties are often seen as intensional; equiangular and equilateral are different, despite identity of objects [Shapiro] |
10591 | Logicians use 'property' and 'set' interchangeably, with little hanging on it [Shapiro] |
18431 | Internal relations combine some tropes into a nucleus, which bears the non-essential tropes [Simons, by Edwards] |
10272 | The notion of 'object' is at least partially structural and mathematical [Shapiro] |
12850 | To individuate something we must pick it out, but also know its limits of variation [Simons] |
12860 | Sortal nouns for continuants tell you their continuance- and cessation-conditions [Simons] |
12886 | A whole requires some unique relation which binds together all of the parts [Simons] |
12835 | Does Tibbles remain the same cat when it loses its tail? [Simons] |
12857 | Tibbles isn't Tib-plus-tail, because Tibbles can survive its loss, but the sum can't [Simons] |
12820 | Without extensional mereology two objects can occupy the same position [Simons] |
10275 | A blurry border is still a border [Shapiro] |
12866 | Composition is asymmetric and transitive [Simons] |
12867 | A hand constitutes a fist (when clenched), but a fist is not composed of an augmented hand [Simons] |
12864 | We say 'b is part of a', 'b is a part of a', 'b are a part of a', or 'b are parts of a'. [Simons] |
12814 | Classical mereology says there are 'sums', for whose existence there is no other evidence [Simons] |
12817 | 'Mereological extensionality' says objects with the same parts are identical [Simons] |
12833 | If there are c atoms, this gives 2^c - 1 individuals, so there can't be just 2 or 12 individuals [Simons] |
12849 | Sums are more plausible for pluralities and masses than they are for individuals [Simons] |
12877 | Sums of things in different categories are found within philosophy. [Simons] |
12888 | The wholeness of a melody seems conventional, but of an explosion it seems natural [Simons] |
12871 | Objects have their essential properties because of the kind of objects they are [Simons] |
12870 | We must distinguish the de dicto 'must' of propositions from the de re 'must' of essence [Simons] |
12873 | Original parts are the best candidates for being essential to artefacts [Simons] |
12874 | An essential part of an essential part is an essential part of the whole [Simons] |
12837 | Four dimensional-objects are stranger than most people think [Simons] |
12856 | Intermittent objects would be respectable if they occurred in nature, as well as in artefacts [Simons] |
12885 | Objects like chess games, with gaps in them, are thereby less unified [Simons] |
12854 | An entrepreneur and a museum curator would each be happy with their ship at the end [Simons] |
12855 | The 'best candidate' theories mistakenly assume there is one answer to 'Which is the real ship?' [Simons] |
12872 | The zygote is an essential initial part, for a sexually reproduced organism [Simons] |
10258 | Logical modalities may be acceptable, because they are reducible to satisfaction in models [Shapiro] |
10266 | Why does the 'myth' of possible worlds produce correct modal logic? [Shapiro] |
12889 | The limits of change for an individual depend on the kind of individual [Simons] |
23359 | We can't believe apparent falsehoods, or deny apparent truths [Epictetus] |
23356 | Self-evidence is most obvious when people who deny a proposition still have to use it [Epictetus] |
8725 | Rationalism tries to apply mathematical methodology to all of knowledge [Shapiro] |
10203 | We apprehend small, finite mathematical structures by abstraction from patterns [Shapiro] |
23329 | We make progress when we improve and naturalise our choices, asserting their freedom [Epictetus] |
23330 | Freedom is making all things happen by choice, without constraint [Epictetus] |
23342 | Freedom is acting by choice, with no constraint possible [Epictetus] |
23332 | Zeus gave me a nature which is free (like himself) from all compulsion [Epictetus] |
23331 | Not even Zeus can control what I choose [Epictetus] |
23338 | You can fetter my leg, but not even Zeus can control my power of choice [Epictetus] |
20875 | If we could foresee the future, we should collaborate with disease and death [Epictetus] |
23347 | If I know I am fated to be ill, I should want to be ill [Epictetus] |
10229 | Simple types can be apprehended through their tokens, via abstraction [Shapiro] |
9626 | A structure is an abstraction, focussing on relationships, and ignoring other features [Shapiro] |
10217 | We can apprehend structures by focusing on or ignoring features of patterns [Shapiro] |
9554 | We can focus on relations between objects (like baseballers), ignoring their other features [Shapiro] |
10231 | Abstract objects might come by abstraction over an equivalence class of base entities [Shapiro] |
18883 | Any equivalence relation among similar things allows the creation of an abstractum [Simons] |
18884 | Abstraction is usually seen as producing universals and numbers, but it can do more [Simons] |
12843 | With activities if you are doing it you've done it, with performances you must finish to have done it [Simons] |
23325 | Epictetus developed a notion of will as the source of our responsibility [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
12875 | One false note doesn't make it a performance of a different work [Simons] |
20873 | Tragedies are versified sufferings of people impressed by externals [Epictetus] |
23364 | Homer wrote to show that the most blessed men can be ruined by poor judgement [Epictetus] |
23366 | We see nature's will in the ways all people are the same [Epictetus] |
23340 | We consist of animal bodies and god-like reason [Epictetus] |
23358 | Every species produces exceptional beings, and we must just accept their nature [Epictetus] |
23339 | I will die as becomes a person returning what he does not own [Epictetus] |
23345 | Don't be frightened of pain or death; only be frightened of fearing them [Epictetus] |
23357 | Knowledge of what is good leads to love; only the wise, who distinguish good from evil, can love [Epictetus] |
23363 | The evil for everything is what is contrary to its nature [Epictetus] |
23328 | The essences of good and evil are in dispositions to choose [Epictetus] |
23362 | All human ills result from failure to apply preconceptions to particular cases [Epictetus] |
23353 | We have a natural sense of honour [Epictetus] |
23354 | If someone harms themselves in harming me, then I harm myself by returning the harm [Epictetus] |
23324 | In the Discourses choice [prohairesis] defines our character and behaviour [Epictetus, by Frede,M] |
4022 | Epictetus says we should console others for misfortune, but not be moved by pity [Epictetus, by Taylor,C] |
23365 | If someone is weeping, you should sympathise and help, but not share his suffering [Epictetus] |
23361 | Health is only a good when it is used well [Epictetus] |
23346 | A person is as naturally a part of a city as a foot is part of the body [Epictetus] |
23351 | We are citizens of the universe, and principal parts of it [Epictetus] |
20874 | A citizen is committed to ignore private advantage, and seek communal good [Epictetus] |
23352 | A citizen should only consider what is good for the whole society [Epictetus] |
22604 | Punishing a criminal for moral ignorance is the same as punishing someone for being blind [Epictetus] |
23368 | Perhaps we should persuade culprits that their punishment is just? [Epictetus] |
23349 | Asses are born to carry human burdens, not as ends in themselves [Epictetus] |
23341 | God created humans as spectators and interpreters of God's works [Epictetus] |
23348 | Both god and the good bring benefits, so their true nature seems to be the same [Epictetus] |
23360 | Each of the four elements in you is entirely scattered after death [Epictetus] |