89 ideas
| 19275 | You cannot understand what exists without understanding possibility and necessity [Hale] |
| 10308 | Questions about objects are questions about certain non-vacuous singular terms [Hale] |
| 19291 | A canonical defintion specifies the type of thing, and what distinguish this specimen [Hale] |
| 10314 | An expression is a genuine singular term if it resists elimination by paraphrase [Hale] |
| 19297 | The two Barcan principles are easily proved in fairly basic modal logic [Hale] |
| 19301 | With a negative free logic, we can dispense with the Barcan formulae [Hale] |
| 19296 | If second-order variables range over sets, those are just objects; properties and relations aren't sets [Hale] |
| 19289 | Maybe conventionalism applies to meaning, but not to the truth of propositions expressed [Hale] |
| 10316 | We should decide whether singular terms are genuine by their usage [Hale] |
| 10312 | Often the same singular term does not ensure reliable inference [Hale] |
| 10313 | Plenty of clear examples have singular terms with no ontological commitment [Hale] |
| 10322 | If singular terms can't be language-neutral, then we face a relativity about their objects [Hale] |
| 19298 | Unlike axiom proofs, natural deduction proofs needn't focus on logical truths and theorems [Hale] |
| 10632 | The real numbers may be introduced by abstraction as ratios of quantities [Hale, by Hale/Wright] |
| 19295 | Add Hume's principle to logic, to get numbers; arithmetic truths rest on the nature of the numbers [Hale] |
| 19281 | Interesting supervenience must characterise the base quite differently from what supervenes on it [Hale] |
| 10512 | The abstract/concrete distinction is based on what is perceivable, causal and located [Hale] |
| 10517 | Colours and points seem to be both concrete and abstract [Hale] |
| 10519 | The abstract/concrete distinction is in the relations in the identity-criteria of object-names [Hale] |
| 10520 | Token-letters and token-words are concrete objects, type-letters and type-words abstract [Hale] |
| 10524 | There is a hierarchy of abstraction, based on steps taken by equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 19278 | There is no gap between a fact that p, and it is true that p; so we only have the truth-condtions for p [Hale] |
| 10521 | If F can't have location, there is no problem of things having F in different locations [Hale] |
| 10511 | It is doubtful if one entity, a universal, can be picked out by both predicates and abstract nouns [Hale] |
| 10318 | Realists take universals to be the referrents of both adjectives and of nouns [Hale] |
| 10310 | Objections to Frege: abstracta are unknowable, non-independent, unstatable, unindividuated [Hale] |
| 10518 | Shapes and directions are of something, but games and musical compositions are not [Hale] |
| 10513 | Many abstract objects, such as chess, seem non-spatial, but are not atemporal [Hale] |
| 10514 | If the mental is non-spatial but temporal, then it must be classified as abstract [Hale] |
| 10523 | Being abstract is based on a relation between things which are spatially separated [Hale] |
| 10307 | The modern Fregean use of the term 'object' is much broader than the ordinary usage [Hale] |
| 10315 | We can't believe in a 'whereabouts' because we ask 'what kind of object is it?' [Hale] |
| 19302 | If a chair could be made of slightly different material, that could lead to big changes [Hale] |
| 10522 | The relations featured in criteria of identity are always equivalence relations [Hale] |
| 10321 | We sometimes apply identity without having a real criterion [Hale] |
| 15086 | Absolute necessity might be achievable either logically or metaphysically [Hale] |
| 19290 | Absolute necessities are necessarily necessary [Hale] |
| 8261 | Maybe not-p is logically possible, but p is metaphysically necessary, so the latter is not absolute [Hale] |
| 15081 | A strong necessity entails a weaker one, but not conversely; possibilities go the other way [Hale] |
| 15080 | 'Relative' necessity is just a logical consequence of some statements ('strong' if they are all true) [Hale] |
| 19286 | 'Absolute necessity' is when there is no restriction on the things which necessitate p [Hale] |
| 19288 | Logical and metaphysical necessities differ in their vocabulary, and their underlying entities [Hale] |
| 15082 | Metaphysical necessity says there is no possibility of falsehood [Hale] |
| 15085 | 'Broadly' logical necessities are derived (in a structure) entirely from the concepts [Hale] |
| 15088 | Logical necessities are true in virtue of the nature of all logical concepts [Hale] |
| 19285 | Logical necessity is something which is true, no matter what else is the case [Hale] |
| 19287 | Maybe each type of logic has its own necessity, gradually becoming broader [Hale] |
| 12432 | Explanation of necessity must rest on something necessary or something contingent [Hale] |
| 12434 | Why is this necessary, and what is necessity in general; why is this necessary truth true, and why necessary? [Hale] |
| 12435 | The explanation of a necessity can be by a truth (which may only happen to be a necessary truth) [Hale] |
| 19282 | It seems that we cannot show that modal facts depend on non-modal facts [Hale] |
| 12433 | If necessity rests on linguistic conventions, those are contingent, so there is no necessity [Hale] |
| 15087 | Conceptual necessities are made true by all concepts [Hale] |
| 12436 | Concept-identities explain how we know necessities, not why they are necessary [Hale] |
| 19276 | The big challenge for essentialist views of modality is things having necessary existence [Hale] |
| 19293 | Essentialism doesn't explain necessity reductively; it explains all necessities in terms of a few basic natures [Hale] |
| 19294 | If necessity derives from essences, how do we explain the necessary existence of essences? [Hale] |
| 19279 | What are these worlds, that being true in all of them makes something necessary? [Hale] |
| 19299 | Possible worlds make every proposition true or false, which endorses classical logic [Hale] |
| 17405 | If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri] |
| 17397 | The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri] |
| 17393 | Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri] |
| 17403 | The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri] |
| 19300 | The molecules may explain the water, but they are not what 'water' means [Hale] |
| 4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |
| 17394 | Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri] |
| 17421 | If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri] |
| 17396 | The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri] |
| 17420 | The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri] |
| 17411 | If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri] |
| 17407 | The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri] |
| 17415 | A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri] |
| 17392 | How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri] |
| 17391 | Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri] |
| 17404 | Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri] |
| 17409 | Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri] |
| 17418 | It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri] |
| 17398 | 19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri] |
| 17406 | Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri] |
| 17408 | Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri] |
| 17412 | Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri] |
| 17413 | Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri] |
| 17416 | Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri] |
| 17414 | Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri] |
| 17410 | Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri] |
| 17395 | Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri] |
| 17422 | The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri] |
| 17419 | Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri] |
| 17417 | To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri] |