73 ideas
9161 | Maybe reasonableness requires circular justifications - that is one coherentist view [Field,H] |
10825 | The notion of truth is to help us make use of the utterances of others [Field,H] |
10820 | In the early 1930s many philosophers thought truth was not scientific [Field,H] |
13499 | Tarski reduced truth to reference or denotation [Field,H, by Hart,WD] |
10818 | Tarski really explained truth in terms of denoting, predicating and satisfied functions [Field,H] |
10817 | Tarski just reduced truth to some other undefined semantic notions [Field,H] |
9570 | In Field's Platonist view, set theory is false because it asserts existence for non-existent things [Field,H, by Chihara] |
10260 | Logical consequence is defined by the impossibility of P and ¬q [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
10819 | Tarski gives us the account of truth needed to build a group of true sentences in a model [Field,H] |
10827 | Model theory is unusual in restricting the range of the quantifiers [Field,H] |
9226 | If mathematical theories conflict, it may just be that they have different subject matter [Field,H] |
8958 | In Field's version of science, space-time points replace real numbers [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18221 | 'Metric' axioms uses functions, points and numbers; 'synthetic' axioms give facts about space [Field,H] |
8757 | The Indispensability Argument is the only serious ground for the existence of mathematical entities [Field,H] |
18212 | Nominalists try to only refer to physical objects, or language, or mental constructions [Field,H] |
10261 | The application of mathematics only needs its possibility, not its truth [Field,H, by Shapiro] |
18218 | Hilbert explains geometry, by non-numerical facts about space [Field,H] |
9623 | Field needs a semantical notion of second-order consequence, and that needs sets [Brown,JR on Field,H] |
18215 | It seems impossible to explain the idea that the conclusion is contained in the premises [Field,H] |
18216 | Abstractions can form useful counterparts to concrete statements [Field,H] |
18214 | Mathematics is only empirical as regards which theory is useful [Field,H] |
8714 | Fictionalists say 2+2=4 is true in the way that 'Oliver Twist lived in London' is true [Field,H] |
18210 | Why regard standard mathematics as truths, rather than as interesting fictions? [Field,H] |
18211 | You can reduce ontological commitment by expanding the logic [Field,H] |
8959 | Field presumes properties can be eliminated from science [Field,H, by Szabó] |
18213 | Abstract objects are only applicable to the world if they are impure, and connect to the physical [Field,H] |
9160 | Lots of propositions are default reasonable, but the a priori ones are empirically indefeasible [Field,H] |
9164 | We treat basic rules as if they were indefeasible and a priori, with no interest in counter-evidence [Field,H] |
9165 | Reliability only makes a rule reasonable if we place a value on the truth produced by reliable processes [Field,H] |
9162 | Believing nothing, or only logical truths, is very reliable, but we want a lot more than that [Field,H] |
9166 | People vary in their epistemological standards, and none of them is 'correct' [Field,H] |
17405 | If a theory can be fudged, so can observations [Scerri] |
17397 | The periodic system is the big counterexample to Kuhn's theory of revolutionary science [Scerri] |
9163 | If we only use induction to assess induction, it is empirically indefeasible, and hence a priori [Field,H] |
17393 | Scientists eventually seek underlying explanations for every pattern [Scerri] |
18222 | Beneath every extrinsic explanation there is an intrinsic explanation [Field,H] |
17403 | The periodic table suggests accommodation to facts rates above prediction [Scerri] |
10826 | 'Valence' and 'gene' had to be reduced to show their compatibility with physicalism [Field,H] |
9917 | 'Abstract' is unclear, but numbers, functions and sets are clearly abstract [Field,H] |
22244 | 'Partial reference' is when the subject thinks two objects are one object [Field,H, by Recanati] |
7615 | Field says reference is a causal physical relation between mental states and objects [Field,H, by Putnam] |
4375 | Evaluations are not disguised emotions; instead, emotion is a type of evaluation [Achtenberg] |
17394 | Natural kinds are what are differentiated by nature, and not just by us [Scerri] |
17421 | If elements are natural kinds, might the groups of the periodic table also be natural kinds? [Scerri] |
8404 | Explain single events by general rules, or vice versa, or probability explains both, or they are unconnected [Field,H] |
8401 | Physical laws are largely time-symmetric, so they make a poor basis for directional causation [Field,H] |
8400 | Identifying cause and effect is not just conventional; we explain later events by earlier ones [Field,H] |
8402 | The only reason for adding the notion of 'cause' to fundamental physics is directionality [Field,H] |
17396 | The colour of gold is best explained by relativistic effects due to fast-moving inner-shell electrons [Scerri] |
18223 | In theories of fields, space-time points or regions are causal agents [Field,H] |
17420 | The stability of nuclei can be estimated through their binding energy [Scerri] |
17411 | If all elements are multiples of one (of hydrogen), that suggests once again that matter is unified [Scerri] |
18220 | Both philosophy and physics now make substantivalism more attractive [Field,H] |
18219 | Relational space is problematic if you take the idea of a field seriously [Field,H] |
17407 | The electron is the main source of chemical properties [Scerri] |
17409 | Does radioactivity show that only physics can explain chemistry? [Scerri] |
17392 | How can poisonous elements survive in the nutritious compound they compose? [Scerri] |
17391 | Periodicity and bonding are the two big ideas in chemistry [Scerri] |
17404 | Chemistry does not work from general principles, but by careful induction from large amounts of data [Scerri] |
17415 | A big chemistry idea is that covalent bonds are shared electrons, not transfer of electrons [Scerri] |
17418 | It is now thought that all the elements have literally evolved from hydrogen [Scerri] |
17398 | 19th C views said elements survived abstractly in compounds, but also as 'material ingredients' [Scerri] |
17406 | Moseley, using X-rays, showed that atomic number ordered better than atomic weight [Scerri] |
17408 | Some suggested basing the new periodic table on isotopes, not elements [Scerri] |
17412 | Elements are placed in the table by the number of positive charges - the atomic number [Scerri] |
17413 | Elements in the table are grouped by having the same number of outer-shell electrons [Scerri] |
17416 | Orthodoxy says the periodic table is explained by quantum mechanics [Scerri] |
17414 | Pauli explained the electron shells, but not the lengths of the periods in the table [Scerri] |
17395 | Elements were ordered by equivalent weight; later by atomic weight; finally by atomic number [Scerri] |
17422 | The best classification needs the deepest and most general principles of the atoms [Scerri] |
17410 | Moseley showed the elements progress in units, and thereby clearly identified the gaps [Scerri] |
17417 | To explain the table, quantum mechanics still needs to explain order of shell filling [Scerri] |
17419 | Since 99.96% of the universe is hydrogen and helium, the periodic table hardly matters [Scerri] |