Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eucleides, Chris Swoyer and J.J.C. Smart

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43 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 1. Nature of Metaphysics
Metaphysics should avoid talk of past, present or future [Smart]
2. Reason / A. Nature of Reason / 6. Coherence
Coherence is consilience, simplicity, analogy, and fitting into a web of belief [Smart]
We need comprehensiveness, as well as self-coherence [Smart]
4. Formal Logic / F. Set Theory ST / 5. Conceptions of Set / e. Iterative sets
In the iterative conception of sets, they form a natural hierarchy [Swoyer]
5. Theory of Logic / E. Structures of Logic / 1. Logical Form
Logical Form explains differing logical behaviour of similar sentences [Swoyer]
7. Existence / A. Nature of Existence / 4. Abstract Existence
Some abstract things have a beginning and end, so may exist in time (though not space) [Swoyer]
7. Existence / C. Structure of Existence / 5. Supervenience / a. Nature of supervenience
Supervenience is nowadays seen as between properties, rather than linguistic [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 1. Ontologies
Ontologists seek existence and identity conditions, and modal and epistemic status for a thing [Swoyer]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 4. Anti-realism
Anti-realists can't explain different methods to measure distance [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 1. Nature of Properties
Can properties have parts? [Swoyer]
If a property such as self-identity can only be in one thing, it can't be a universal [Swoyer]
Can properties exemplify other properties? [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 5. Natural Properties
There are only first-order properties ('red'), and none of higher-order ('coloured') [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / B. Properties / 11. Properties as Sets
The best-known candidate for an identity condition for properties is necessary coextensiveness [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / D. Universals / 1. Universals
Various attempts are made to evade universals being wholly present in different places [Swoyer]
8. Modes of Existence / E. Nominalism / 4. Concept Nominalism
Conceptualism says words like 'honesty' refer to concepts, not to properties [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 2. Abstract Objects / a. Nature of abstracta
If properties are abstract objects, then their being abstract exemplifies being abstract [Swoyer]
9. Objects / A. Existence of Objects / 5. Simples
Quantum field theory suggests that there are, fundamentally, no individual things [Swoyer]
10. Modality / E. Possible worlds / 1. Possible Worlds / e. Against possible worlds
One might hope to reduce possible worlds to properties [Swoyer]
12. Knowledge Sources / D. Empiricism / 5. Empiricism Critique
Extreme empiricists can hardly explain anything [Swoyer]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 3. Evidentialism / a. Evidence
I simply reject evidence, if it is totally contrary to my web of belief [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 1. Explanation / c. Direction of explanation
The height of a flagpole could be fixed by its angle of shadow, but that would be very unusual [Smart]
Universe expansion explains the red shift, but not vice versa [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / c. Explanations by coherence
Explanation of a fact is fitting it into a system of beliefs [Smart]
Explanations are bad by fitting badly with a web of beliefs, or fitting well into a bad web [Smart]
Deducing from laws is one possible way to achieve a coherent explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / d. Consilience
An explanation is better if it also explains phenomena from a different field [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / g. Causal explanations
If scientific explanation is causal, that rules out mathematical explanation [Smart]
14. Science / D. Explanation / 2. Types of Explanation / j. Explanations by reduction
Scientific explanation tends to reduce things to the unfamiliar (not the familiar) [Smart]
18. Thought / C. Content / 8. Intension
Intensions are functions which map possible worlds to sets of things denoted by an expression [Swoyer]
18. Thought / D. Concepts / 4. Structure of Concepts / e. Concepts from exemplars
Research suggests that concepts rely on typical examples [Swoyer]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / C. Assigning Meanings / 3. Predicates
The F and G of logic cover a huge range of natural language combinations [Swoyer]
19. Language / D. Propositions / 2. Abstract Propositions / a. Propositions as sense
Maybe a proposition is just a property with all its places filled [Swoyer]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Negative utilitarianism implies that the world should be destroyed, to avoid future misery [Smart]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Any group interested in ethics must surely have a sentiment of generalised benevolence [Smart]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 4. Regularities / a. Regularity theory
If laws are mere regularities, they give no grounds for future prediction [Swoyer]
26. Natural Theory / D. Laws of Nature / 8. Scientific Essentialism / a. Scientific essentialism
Two properties can have one power, and one property can have two powers [Swoyer]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / a. Special relativity
Special relativity won't determine a preferred frame, but we can pick one externally [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / B. Modern Physics / 1. Relativity / b. General relativity
Unlike Newton, Einstein's general theory explains the perihelion of Mercury [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / b. Rate of time
If time flows, then 'how fast does it flow?' is a tricky question [Smart]
27. Natural Reality / D. Time / 2. Passage of Time / e. Tensed (A) series
The past, present, future and tenses of A-theory are too weird, and should be analysed indexically [Smart]