Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eucleides, Ian McFetridge and Joseph Butler

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21 ideas

3. Truth / B. Truthmakers / 1. For Truthmakers
18487 We want to know what makes sentences true, rather than defining 'true' [McFetridge]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 8. Facts / a. Facts
18488 We normally explain natural events by citing further facts [McFetridge]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 5. Self-Identity
3144 Everything is what it is, and not another thing [Butler]
9. Objects / F. Identity among Objects / 9. Sameness
21315 A tree remains the same in the popular sense, but not in the strict philosophical sense [Butler]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 6. Logical Necessity
12184 Logical necessity overrules all other necessities [McFetridge]
15083 The fundamental case of logical necessity is the valid conclusion of an inference [McFetridge, by Hale]
15084 In the McFetridge view, logical necessity means a consequent must be true if the antecedent is [McFetridge, by Hale]
12180 Logical necessity requires that a valid argument be necessary [McFetridge]
12181 Traditionally, logical necessity is the strongest, and entails any other necessities [McFetridge]
12183 It is only logical necessity if there is absolutely no sense in which it could be false [McFetridge]
12192 The mark of logical necessity is deduction from any suppositions whatever [McFetridge]
10. Modality / B. Possibility / 2. Epistemic possibility
12182 We assert epistemic possibility without commitment to logical possibility [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 1. Sources of Necessity
12187 Objectual modal realists believe in possible worlds; non-objectual ones rest it on the actual world [McFetridge]
10. Modality / C. Sources of Modality / 5. Modality from Actuality
12186 Modal realists hold that necessities and possibilities are part of the totality of facts [McFetridge]
16. Persons / B. Nature of the Self / 4. Presupposition of Self
21317 Despite consciousness fluctuating, we are aware that it belongs to one person [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / a. Memory is Self
21313 If consciousness of events makes our identity, then if we have forgotten them we didn't exist then [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / c. Inadequacy of mental continuity
21314 Consciousness presupposes personal identity, so it cannot constitute it [Butler]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 5. Concerns of the Self
21318 If the self changes, we have no responsibilities, and no interest in past or future [Butler]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
1757 The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
8066 Butler exalts conscience, but it may be horribly misleading [Anscombe on Butler]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
3028 The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]