Combining Philosophers

All the ideas for Eucleides, Jonathan Dancy and Bernard Williams

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124 ideas

1. Philosophy / E. Nature of Metaphysics / 3. Metaphysical Systems
As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / C. Correspondence Truth / 3. Correspondence Truth critique
The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 1. Coherence Truth
Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J]
If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J]
3. Truth / D. Coherence Truth / 2. Coherence Truth Critique
Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J]
7. Existence / D. Theories of Reality / 2. Realism
Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J]
In the realist view, the real external world explains how it (and perceptions of it) are possible [Williams,B]
10. Modality / A. Necessity / 10. Impossibility
Necessity implies possibility, but in experience it matters which comes first [Williams,B]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 1. Certainty
A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / B. Certain Knowledge / 3. Fallibilism
If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / a. Naïve realism
Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / b. Direct realism
Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J]
Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 1. Perceptual Realism / c. Representative realism
Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J]
Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 2. Phenomenalism
Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 3. Idealism / a. Idealism
Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J]
11. Knowledge Aims / C. Knowing Reality / 4. Solipsism
Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / A. A Priori Knowledge / 5. A Priori Synthetic
Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 1. Perception
Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 2. Qualities in Perception / e. Primary/secondary critique
We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J]
For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / a. Sense-data theory
We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 4. Sense Data / b. Nature of sense-data
It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / B. Perception / 7. Causal Perception
Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J]
Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J]
12. Knowledge Sources / E. Direct Knowledge / 4. Memory
If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J]
Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J]
Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J]
I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 2. Justification Challenges / a. Agrippa's trilemma
Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / A. Justification Problems / 3. Internal or External / a. Pro-internalism
For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J]
Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / a. Foundationalism
Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J]
Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / b. Basic beliefs
If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 4. Foundationalism / f. Foundationalism critique
Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / a. Coherence as justification
Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J]
Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J]
For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / B. Internal Justification / 5. Coherentism / b. Pro-coherentism
If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 1. External Justification
Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 2. Causal Justification
How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J]
Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / C. External Justification / 8. Social Justification
Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / D. Scepticism / 6. Scepticism Critique
What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J]
13. Knowledge Criteria / E. Relativism / 6. Relativism Critique
It is very confused to deduce a nonrelativist morality of universal toleration from relativism [Williams,B]
Our ability to react to an alien culture shows that ethical thought extends beyond cultural boundaries [Williams,B]
14. Science / C. Induction / 6. Bayes's Theorem
Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J]
15. Nature of Minds / A. Nature of Mind / 4. Other Minds / d. Other minds by analogy
The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J]
You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J]
16. Persons / A. Concept of a Person / 1. Existence of Persons
'Dead person' isn't a contradiction, so 'person' is somewhat vague [Williams,B]
You can only really love a person as a token, not as a type [Williams,B]
16. Persons / D. Continuity of the Self / 2. Mental Continuity / b. Self as mental continuity
The memory criterion has a problem when one thing branches into two things [Williams,B, by Macdonald,C]
16. Persons / F. Free Will / 5. Against Free Will
It is an absurd Kantian idea that at the limit rationality and freedom coincide [Williams,B]
There is only a problem of free will if you think the notion of 'voluntary' can be metaphysically deepened [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / c. Role of emotions
Reference to a person's emotions is often essential to understanding their actions [Williams,B]
18. Thought / A. Modes of Thought / 3. Emotions / g. Controlling emotions
Moral education must involve learning about various types of feeling towards things [Williams,B]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 5. Meaning as Verification
Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J]
Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J]
19. Language / A. Nature of Meaning / 7. Meaning Holism / b. Language holism
If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J]
19. Language / B. Reference / 1. Reference theories
The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / b. Indeterminate translation
There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J]
19. Language / F. Communication / 6. Interpreting Language / c. Principle of charity
Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J]
20. Action / B. Preliminaries of Action / 2. Willed Action / d. Weakness of will
We judge weakness of will by an assessment after the event is concluded [Williams,B, by Cottingham]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 3. Acting on Reason / c. Reasons as causes
Reasons are 'internal' if they give a person a motive to act, but 'external' otherwise [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 4. Responsibility for Actions
Responsibility involves cause, intention, state of mind, and response after the event [Williams,B]
20. Action / C. Motives for Action / 5. Action Dilemmas / a. Dilemmas
Many ethical theories neglect the power of regretting the ought not acted upon [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / d. Ethical theory
Philosophers try to produce ethical theories because they falsely assume that ethics can be simple [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / f. Ethical non-cognitivism
Moral conflicts have a different feeling and structure from belief conflicts [Williams,B, by Foot]
We tolerate inconsistency in ethics but not in other beliefs (which reflect an independent order) [Williams,B, by Foot]
If moral systems can't judge other moral systems, then moral relativism is true [Williams,B, by Foot]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 1. Nature of Ethics / g. Moral responsibility
In bad actions, guilt points towards victims, and shame to the agent [Williams,B]
Blame usually has no effect if the recipient thinks it unjustified [Williams,B]
Blame partly rests on the fiction that blamed agents always know their obligations [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / c. Ethical intuitionism
If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J]
Intuitionism has been demolished by critics, and no longer looks interesting [Williams,B]
Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J]
Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J]
Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / e. Human nature
We can't accept Aristotle's naturalism about persons, because it is normative and unscientific [Williams,B, by Hursthouse]
The category of person is a weak basis for ethics, because it is not fixed but comes in degrees [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / h. Expressivism
Emotivism saw morality as expressing emotions, and influencing others' emotions [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / A. Ethics Foundations / 2. Source of Ethics / i. Prescriptivism
The weakness of prescriptivism is shown by "I simply don't like staying at good hotels" [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / a. Nature of value
The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / b. Fact and value
Some ethical ideas, such as 'treachery' and 'promise', seem to express a union of facts and values [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / B. Value / 1. Nature of Value / f. Ultimate value
Maybe the unthinkable is a moral category, and considering some options is dishonourable or absurd [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / b. Types of good
The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / g. Consequentialism
Consequentialism assumes that situations can be compared [Williams,B]
For a consequentialist massacring 7 million must be better than massacring 7 million and one [Williams,B]
It is an error of consequentialism to think we just aim at certain states of affairs; we also want to act [Williams,B]
22. Metaethics / C. The Good / 1. Goodness / i. Moral luck
If all that matters in morality is motive and intention, that makes moral luck irrelevant [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 3. Promise Keeping
Promise keeping increases reliability, by making deliberation focus on something which would be overlooked [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / B. Contract Ethics / 5. Free Rider
A weakness of contractual theories is the position of a person of superior ability and power [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 1. Virtue Theory / a. Nature of virtue
Greek moral progress came when 'virtue' was freed from social status [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / c. Motivation for virtue
A crucial feature of moral thought is second-order desire - the desire to have certain desires [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 2. Elements of Virtue Theory / e. Character
An admirable human being should have certain kinds of emotional responses [Williams,B]
It is important that a person can change their character, and not just be successive 'selves' [Williams,B]
Kantians have an poor account of individuals, and insist on impartiality, because they ignore character [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / C. Virtue Theory / 3. Virtues / h. Respect
Equality of opportunity without equality of respect would create a very inhuman society [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 1. Deontology
'Deon' in Greek means what one must do; there was no word meaning 'duty' [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 2. Duty
The concept of a 'duty to myself' is fraudulent [Williams,B]
Obligation and duty look backwards (because of a promise or job), although the acts are in the future [Williams,B]
Not all moral deliberations lead to obligations; some merely reveal what 'may' be done [Williams,B]
"Ought implies can" is a famous formula in connection with moral obligation [Williams,B]
The modern idea of duty is unknown in archaic Greece [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 3. Universalisability
Why should I think of myself as both the legislator and the citizen who follows the laws? [Williams,B]
We don't have a duty to ensure that others do their duty [Williams,B]
If the self becomes completely impartial, it no longer has enough identity to worry about its interests [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / D. Deontological Ethics / 6. Motivation for Duty
If reason cannot lead people to good, we must hope they have an internal voice [Williams,B]
Kant's love of consistency is too rigid, and it even overrides normal fairness [Williams,B]
If the moral self is seen as characterless, then other people have a very limited role in our moral lives [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 1. Utilitarianism
Utilitarianism cannot make any serious sense of integrity [Williams,B]
For utilitarians states of affairs are what have value, not matter who produced them [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / E. Utilitarianism / 3. Motivation for Altruism
Utilitarian benevolence involves no particular attachments, and is immune to the inverse square law [Williams,B]
23. Ethics / F. Existentialism / 7. Existential Action
Ethical conviction must be to some extent passive, and can't just depend on the will and decisions [Williams,B]
Taking responsibility won't cure ethical uncertainty by; we are uncertain what to decide [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 1. Grounds of equality
Equality implies that people are alike in potential as well as in needs [Williams,B]
Equality seems to require that each person be acknowledged as having a significant point of view [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / B. Equalities / 4. Economic equality
It is a mark of extreme exploitation that the sufferers do not realise their plight [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / E. Policies / 5. Education / a. Aims of education
It is a mark of our having ethical values that we aim to reproduce them in our children [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 3. Abortion
Most women see an early miscarriage and a late stillbirth as being very different in character [Williams,B]
25. Social Practice / F. Life Issues / 6. Animal Rights
Speciesism isn't like racism, because the former implies a viewpoint which belongs to no one [Williams,B]
29. Religion / D. Religious Issues / 3. Problem of Evil / a. Problem of Evil
There is a problem of evil only if you expect the world to be good [Williams,B]