166 ideas
| 3879 | Philosophy aims to provide a theory of everything [Scruton] |
| 12170 | Amusement rests on superiority, or relief, or incongruity [Scruton] |
| 12173 | The central object of amusement is the human [Scruton] |
| 12169 | Since only men laugh, it seems to be an attribute of reason [Scruton] |
| 12172 | Objects of amusement do not have to be real [Scruton] |
| 2797 | As coherence expands its interrelations become steadily tighter, culminating only in necessary truth [Dancy,J] |
| 3891 | If p entails q, then p is sufficient for q, and q is necessary for p [Scruton] |
| 8988 | Two marxist ideas have dominated in France: base and superstructure, and ideology [Scruton] |
| 8987 | On the surface of deconstructive writing, technicalities float and then drift away [Scruton] |
| 8992 | Deconstruction is the last spasm of romanticism, now become hopeless and destructive [Scruton] |
| 18543 | Do aesthetic reasons count as reasons, if they are rejectable without contradiction? [Scruton] |
| 3894 | We may define 'good' correctly, but then ask whether the application of the definition is good [Scruton] |
| 3883 | A true proposition is consistent with every other true proposition [Scruton] |
| 18542 | Defining truth presupposes that there can be a true definition [Scruton] |
| 2768 | The correspondence theory also has the problem that two sets of propositions might fit the facts equally well [Dancy,J] |
| 2765 | Rescher says that if coherence requires mutual entailment, this leads to massive logical redundancy [Dancy,J] |
| 2769 | If one theory is held to be true, all the other theories appear false, because they can't be added to the true one [Dancy,J] |
| 2766 | Even with a tight account of coherence, there is always the possibility of more than one set of coherent propositions [Dancy,J] |
| 3884 | The pragmatist does not really have a theory of truth [Scruton] |
| 5637 | Nowadays logic is seen as the science of extensions, not intensions [Scruton] |
| 3907 | Could you be intellectually acquainted with numbers, but unable to count objects? [Scruton] |
| 3908 | If maths contains unprovable truths, then maths cannot be reduced to a set of proofs [Scruton] |
| 2781 | Realism says that most perceived objects exist, and have some of their perceived properties [Dancy,J] |
| 3906 | If possible worlds are needed to define properties, maybe we should abandon properties [Scruton] |
| 3888 | Hume assumes that necessity can only be de dicto, not de re [Scruton] |
| 3903 | The conceivable can't be a test of the possible, if there are things which are possible but inconceivable [Scruton] |
| 3897 | Epistemology is about the justification of belief, not the definition of knowledge [Scruton] |
| 4266 | Having beliefs involves recognition, expectation and surprise [Scruton] |
| 4265 | If an animal has beliefs, that implies not only that it can make mistakes, but that it can learn from them [Scruton] |
| 2745 | A pupil who lacks confidence may clearly know something but not be certain of it [Dancy,J] |
| 2755 | If senses are fallible, then being open to correction is an epistemological virtue [Dancy,J] |
| 3881 | In the Cogito argument consciousness develops into self-consciousness [Scruton] |
| 5677 | Naïve direct realists hold that objects retain all of their properties when unperceived [Dancy,J] |
| 5678 | Scientific direct realism says we know some properties of objects directly [Dancy,J] |
| 5681 | Maybe we are forced from direct into indirect realism by the need to explain perceptual error [Dancy,J] |
| 5682 | Internal realism holds that we perceive physical objects via mental objects [Dancy,J] |
| 5683 | Indirect realism depends on introspection, the time-lag, illusions, and neuroscience [Dancy,J, by PG] |
| 2778 | Phenomenalism includes possible experiences, but idealism only refers to actual experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 5684 | Eliminative idealists say there are no objects; reductive idealists say objects exist as complex experiences [Dancy,J] |
| 2777 | Extreme solipsism only concerns current experience, but it might include past and future [Dancy,J] |
| 2794 | Knowing that a cow is not a horse seems to be a synthetic a priori truth [Dancy,J] |
| 3887 | Maybe our knowledge of truth and causation is synthetic a priori [Scruton] |
| 2780 | Perception is either direct realism, indirect realism, or phenomenalism [Dancy,J] |
| 4264 | Perception (which involves an assessment) is a higher state than sensation [Scruton] |
| 3901 | Touch only seems to reveal primary qualities [Scruton] |
| 3885 | We only conceive of primary qualities as attached to secondary qualities [Scruton] |
| 5680 | For direct realists the secondary and primary qualities seem equally direct [Dancy,J] |
| 3910 | If primary and secondary qualities are distinct, what has the secondary qualities? [Scruton] |
| 5679 | We can't grasp the separation of quality types, or what a primary-quality world would be like [Dancy,J] |
| 3899 | The representational theory says perceptual states are intentional states [Scruton] |
| 2782 | We can be looking at distant stars which no longer actually exist [Dancy,J] |
| 2775 | It is not clear from the nature of sense data whether we should accept them as facts [Dancy,J] |
| 2784 | Appearances don't guarantee reality, unless the appearance is actually caused by the reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2785 | Perceptual beliefs may be directly caused, but generalisations can't be [Dancy,J] |
| 2788 | If perception and memory are indirect, then two things stand between mind and reality [Dancy,J] |
| 2787 | Memories aren't directly about the past, because time-lags and illusions suggest representation [Dancy,J] |
| 2791 | Phenomenalism about memory denies the past, or reduces it to present experience [Dancy,J] |
| 2790 | I can remember plans about the future, and images aren't essential (2+3=5) [Dancy,J] |
| 2754 | Foundations are justified by non-beliefs, or circularly, or they need no justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2749 | For internalists we must actually know that the fact caused the belief [Dancy,J] |
| 2770 | Internalists tend to favour coherent justification, but not the coherence theory of truth [Dancy,J] |
| 2752 | Foundationalism requires inferential and non-inferential justification [Dancy,J] |
| 2771 | Foundationalists must accept not only the basic beliefs, but also rules of inference for further progress [Dancy,J] |
| 2756 | If basic beliefs can be false, falsehood in non-basic beliefs might by a symptom [Dancy,J] |
| 2753 | Beliefs can only be infallible by having almost no content [Dancy,J] |
| 2773 | Coherentism gives a possible justification of induction, and opposes scepticism [Dancy,J] |
| 2779 | Idealists must be coherentists, but coherentists needn't be idealists [Dancy,J] |
| 2786 | For coherentists justification and truth are not radically different things [Dancy,J] |
| 2767 | If it is empirical propositions which have to be coherent, this eliminates coherent fiction [Dancy,J] |
| 2776 | Externalism could even make belief unnecessary (e.g. in animals) [Dancy,J] |
| 2746 | How can a causal theory of justification show that all men die? [Dancy,J] |
| 2747 | Causal theories don't allow for errors in justification [Dancy,J] |
| 3898 | My belief that it will rain tomorrow can't be caused by its raining tomorrow [Scruton] |
| 2772 | Coherentism moves us towards a more social, shared view of knowledge [Dancy,J] |
| 3880 | Logical positivism avoids scepticism, by closing the gap between evidence and conclusion [Scruton] |
| 2743 | What is the point of arguing against knowledge, if being right undermines your own argument? [Dancy,J] |
| 3878 | Why should you believe someone who says there are no truths? [Scruton] |
| 2751 | Probabilities can only be assessed relative to some evidence [Dancy,J] |
| 2757 | The argument from analogy rests on one instance alone [Dancy,J] |
| 2758 | You can't separate mind and behaviour, as the analogy argument attempts [Dancy,J] |
| 4271 | There is consciousness whenever behaviour must be explained in terms of mental activity [Scruton] |
| 4272 | Our concept of a person is derived from Roman law [Scruton] |
| 3892 | Every event having a cause, and every event being determined by its cause, are not the same [Scruton] |
| 3911 | The very concept of a substance denies the possibility of mutual interaction and dependence [Scruton] |
| 4267 | Conditioning may change behaviour without changing the mind [Scruton] |
| 4269 | An emotion is a motive which is also a feeling [Scruton] |
| 12174 | Only rational beings are attentive without motive or concern [Scruton] |
| 4270 | Do we use reason to distinguish people from animals, or use that difference to define reason? [Scruton] |
| 5636 | Cartesian 'ideas' confuse concepts and propositions [Scruton] |
| 2744 | Verificationism (the 'verification principle') is an earlier form of anti-realism [Dancy,J] |
| 2760 | Logical positivism implies foundationalism, by dividing weak from strong verifications [Dancy,J] |
| 2761 | If the meanings of sentences depend on other sentences, how did we learn language? [Dancy,J] |
| 1757 | The Electra: she knows this man, but not that he is her brother [Eucleides, by Diog. Laertius] |
| 3882 | Wittgenstein makes it impossible to build foundations from something that is totally private [Scruton] |
| 2763 | There is an indeterminacy in juggling apparent meanings against probable beliefs [Dancy,J] |
| 2762 | Charity makes native beliefs largely true, and Humanity makes them similar to ours [Dancy,J] |
| 12156 | Aesthetics has risen and fallen with Romanticism [Scruton] |
| 12158 | Aesthetic experience informs the world with the values of the observer [Scruton] |
| 18550 | Art gives us imaginary worlds which we can view impartially [Scruton] |
| 18546 | The pleasure taken in beauty also aims at understanding and valuing [Scruton] |
| 12163 | Literary meaning emerges in comparisons, and tradition shows which comparisons are relevant [Scruton] |
| 18544 | Maybe 'beauty' is too loaded, and we should talk of fittingness or harmony [Scruton] |
| 18553 | Beauty shows us what we should want in order to achieve human fulfilment [Scruton] |
| 18556 | Beauty is rationally founded, inviting meaning, comparison and self-reflection [Scruton] |
| 18548 | Natural beauty reassures us that the world is where we belong [Scruton] |
| 12165 | Romantics say music expresses ideas, or the Will, or intuitions, or feelings [Scruton] |
| 18551 | Croce says art makes inarticulate intuitions conscious; rival views say the audience is the main concern [Scruton] |
| 12167 | Reference without predication is the characteristic of expression [Scruton] |
| 12162 | In literature, word replacement changes literary meaning [Scruton] |
| 12166 | If music refers to love, it contains no predication, so it is expression, not language [Scruton] |
| 12168 | Music is not representational, since thoughts about a subject are never essential to it [Scruton] |
| 12159 | Without intentions we can't perceive sculpture, but that is not the whole story [Scruton] |
| 12160 | In aesthetic interest, even what is true is treated as though it were not [Scruton] |
| 12164 | Expressing melancholy is a good thing, but arousing it is a bad thing [Scruton] |
| 12161 | We can be objective about conventions, but love of art is needed to understand its traditions [Scruton] |
| 4284 | All moral life depends ultimately on piety, which is our recognition of our own dependence [Scruton] |
| 7260 | If there are intuited moral facts, why should we care about them? [Dancy,J] |
| 7261 | Internalists say that moral intuitions are motivating; externalist say a desire is also needed [Dancy,J] |
| 7262 | Obviously judging an action as wrong gives us a reason not to do it [Dancy,J] |
| 7265 | Moral facts are not perceived facts, but perceived reasons for judgements [Dancy,J] |
| 18681 | The base for values has grounds, catalysts and intensifiers [Dancy,J, by Orsi] |
| 18541 | Beauty (unlike truth and goodness) is questionable as an ultimate value [Scruton] |
| 3028 | The chief good is unity, sometimes seen as prudence, or God, or intellect [Eucleides] |
| 7590 | Consequentialism emphasises value rather than obligation in morality [Scruton] |
| 4273 | Kant's Moral Law is the rules rational beings would accept when trying to live by agreement [Scruton] |
| 3896 | Any social theory of morality has the problem of the 'free rider', who only pretends to join in [Scruton] |
| 4274 | The modern virtues are courage, prudence, wisdom, temperance, justice, charity and loyalty [Scruton] |
| 4286 | Only just people will drop their own self-interests when faced with an impartial verdict [Scruton] |
| 4283 | Sympathy can undermine the moral order just as much as crime does [Scruton] |
| 7589 | Altruism is either emotional (where your interests are mine) or moral (where they are reasons for me) [Scruton] |
| 3886 | Membership is the greatest source of obligation [Scruton] |
| 4290 | That which can only be done by a callous person, ought not to be done [Scruton] |
| 4285 | As soon as we drop self-interest and judge impartially, we find ourselves agreeing about conflicts [Scruton] |
| 3895 | The categorical imperative is not just individual, but can be used for negotiations between strangers [Scruton] |
| 4280 | Utilitarianism is wrong precisely because it can't distinguish animals from people [Scruton] |
| 4287 | Utilitarianism merely guides us (by means of sympathy) when the moral law is silent [Scruton] |
| 4282 | Morality is not a sort of calculation, it is what sets the limits to when calculation is appropriate [Scruton] |
| 4281 | Utilitarianism says we can't blame Stalin yet, but such a theory is a sick joke [Scruton] |
| 5660 | Allegiance is prior to the recognition of individual rights [Scruton] |
| 7595 | The idea of a right seems fairly basic; justice may be the disposition to accord rights to people [Scruton] |
| 8989 | The benefits of social freedom outweigh the loneliness, doubt and alienation it brings [Scruton] |
| 7588 | Allegiance is fundamental to the conservative view of society [Scruton] |
| 8990 | So-called 'liberation' is the enemy of freedom, destroying the very structures that are needed [Scruton] |
| 7594 | Democrats are committed to a belief and to its opposite, if the majority prefer the latter [Scruton] |
| 7593 | Liberals focus on universal human freedom, natural rights, and tolerance [Scruton, by PG] |
| 5653 | A right is a power which is enforced in the name of justice [Scruton] |
| 7592 | For positivists law is a matter of form, for naturalists it is a matter of content [Scruton] |
| 7587 | The issue of abortion seems insoluble, because there is nothing with which to compare it [Scruton] |
| 18554 | Prostitution is wrong because it hardens the soul, since soul and body are one [Scruton] |
| 4268 | Animals command our sympathy and moral concern initially because of their intentionality [Scruton] |
| 4291 | Letting your dog kill wild rats, and keeping rats for your dog to kill, are very different [Scruton] |
| 4263 | Many of the stranger forms of life (e.g. worms) interest us only as a species, not as individuals [Scruton] |
| 4276 | An animal has individuality if it is nameable, and advanced animals can respond to their name [Scruton] |
| 4277 | I may avoid stepping on a spider or flower, but fellow-feeling makes me protect a rabbit [Scruton] |
| 4278 | Lucky animals are eaten by large predators, the less lucky starve, and worst is death by small predators [Scruton] |
| 4279 | We can easily remove the risk of suffering from an animal's life, but we shouldn't do it [Scruton] |
| 4289 | Sheep and cattle live comfortable lives, and die an enviably easy death [Scruton] |
| 4292 | Concern for one animal may harm the species, if the individual is part of a bigger problem [Scruton] |
| 4294 | Animals are outside the community of rights, but we still have duties towards them [Scruton] |
| 4295 | We favour our own animals over foreign ones because we see them as fellow citizens [Scruton] |
| 4296 | Brutal animal sports are banned because they harm the personality of the watcher [Scruton] |
| 4288 | Many breeds of animals have needs which our own ancestors planted in them [Scruton] |
| 4293 | Introducing a natural means of controlling animal population may not be very compassionate [Scruton] |
| 3890 | 'Cause' used to just mean any valid explanation [Scruton] |
| 3904 | Measuring space requires no movement while I do it [Scruton] |
| 3905 | 'Existence' is not a predicate of 'man', but of the concept of man, saying it has at least one instance [Scruton] |